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" ... differences between the parties have almost disappeared. Most of the differences
between the parties are on foreign affairs, and often they are greater inside the parties
than between them."l
"Foreign policy has always contained a reliable left-right fracture. Now the fracture
was along some more obscure axis, and within both the left and the right.,,2
~Denis Healey in an interview in TheDaily Telegraph, 24 January 2009, p20.
John Majo~ writing about the break-up of Yugoslavia, in John Major - the Autobiography, (London:
Harper Collms, 1999. Paperback 2000) p535.
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1991-1995:
A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
by Ann Marie Schreiner
The break-up of Yugoslavia, and the ensuing wars, dominated the British foreign
policy agenda for the first half of the 1990s. The way in which the British
Government reacted to the series of crises was a matter of ongoing scrutiny by those
within and outside of Parliament. The complex nature of the conflicts, in the early
years of the post Cold War world, meant that responses by British politicians were in
no way based on traditional ideological divisions, that is, M.P.s did not form neat,
homogenous groups reflecting the three political currents. The Labour Party was no
exception to this rule. The thesis is a study of the way in which politicians of the
Labour Party responded to the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the way its M.P.s reacted
to events in the region, and to the actions of the British Government.
With close reference to Parliamentary debates as recorded in Hansard, the
thesis shows the many and complex ways in which politicians from one British
political party responded to a foreign policy episode. What is demonstrated is that a
number of factors influenced the opinions of the politicians. One would expect to find
some level of front and back bench division. However, what is apparent is much more
complex. Whilst, in general, the Shadow Cabinet mirrored the responses of their
Parliamentary opponents, of more interest is the way in which the back bench
politicians contributed to debates. Some M.P.s followed the example of their senior
colleagues, whereas others took totally different positions. However, the motivations
for these opinions varied. It is not possible to offer a simple, generalised reading of
the responses that were taken by members of the Parliamentary Labour Party.
Contributions to debates were influenced by a variety of features: namely, the way in
which an individual viewed an international institution such as the United Nations,
NATO and the European Union; the attitude that they took towards military
intervention; and finally, the way in which the events of the Second World War
informed their position on a contemporary conflict.
The thesis adds to the research undertaken by scholars such as Brendan Simms
and Mark Phythian. Through close reference to debates in Hansard, this work offers
the opportunity to gain a much more detailed understanding of the responses of one
British political party to one episodein international relations.
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INTRODUCTION
The break-up of Yugoslavia began in 1991 and lasted until the end of the decade. This
period included the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, and the later NATO action
against Serbia in 1999.1 Across Europe, the outbreak of war on the continent
provoked extensive debate within political and intellectual circles alike.2 This was no
less the case in Britain, where the question of how to deal with events in the Balkans
became a topic for regular discussion in Parliament. The Parliamentary Labour Party
contributed a broad range of interpretations. As has been well documented, the party
has typically included politicians from a variety of ideological strands, that is, from
those representing a more traditionally social democratic position to those who
espouse a socialist perspective.' These politicians provided a wealth of responses to
the questions posed by the onset of the war. This thesis presents an original analysis
of how they responded to an international relations crisis which brought chaos to the
post Cold War world.
The thesis examines parliamentary debates which focussed on the break-up of
Yugoslavia during the years 1991-1995 and other related issues, for example the
1 The NATO action against Serbia was in response to the policy against the Kosovo Albanians that the
Serbian Government was pursuing in Kosovo. The military campaign by the Alliance came after a
rrolonged period of international diplomacy in the quest to find some form of resolution for the region.
Some examples of the work which was published include: Alain Finkielkraut, Dispatchesfrom the
Balkan War and Other Writings, translated by Peter S. Rogers and Richard Golsam (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1999. Part of the book was published as Comment peut-on eire croate?
Editions Gallimard, 1992); and Rabia Ali and Lawrence Lifschultz (eds.), Why Bosnia? Writings on the
Balkan War (Stony Creek, Connecticut: The Pamphleteer's Press, 1993).
3 The following works all outline the broad ideological roots on which the Labour Party was founded,
and how, to this day, this range of opinions still permeates through the party in Parliament: Brian
Brivati and Richard Heffernan (eds.), The Labour Party - a Centenary History (Basingstoke:
Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000); John Callaghan, Socialism in Britain since J884 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Ltd., 1990); Keith Laybourn, A Century of Labour - A History of the Labour Party (Stroud, Glos:
Sutton Publishing Limited, 2000); and Andrew Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997). There are plenty more titles which explore similar themes; these are
just a small selection.
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imposition of sanctions and the use of airstrikes.4 It charts the stance taken by Labour
politicians from across the party, that is, from those in the Shadow Cabinet to those on
the back benches. The study shows how the main party of the left reacted to a foreign
policy incident, and details how the views and opinions of its politicians evolved and
developed during the period.
In a broader historical context, the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina raised many issues in the post Cold War world. International relations,
previously dominated by the two superpowers and the realities of living within a bi-
polar world, was confronted by a series of new, challenging and difficult questions. In
Britain, the start of these wars within Europe led to testing times for international
diplomacy, with a pervading air of powerlessness, or an inability to deal with what
was taking place. Within Parliament, politicians had to take decisions regarding the
break-up of Yugoslavia which were no longer determined by Cold War realities.
Thus, the opportunity to discuss topics previously considered an anathema, such as
the sidelining of Russia with regard to NATO action in the Balkans, became a real
part of Parliamentary debate. In this thesis I demonstrate how one political party
reacted to one foreign affairs episode, and illustrate the complexities and conflicting
views that shaped the debate, against the backdrop of a supposed 'new world order'.
The thesis offers a detailed study of how deliberations on the break-up of
Yugoslavia were conducted during the course of that period (1991-1995). It traces
how external factors influenced policy debated within the British House of Commons,
and shows how party ideology related to discussions on international relations. My
intention is to analyse the vast range of responses and reactions to the break-up of
Yugoslavia that existed within the British Labour Party. The thesis shows that
4 A list of all of the debates that have been studied for this thesis is noted in Appendix 1.
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Parliamentary Labour Party reaction to these wars was not based on one homogenous
position informed by a specific discernable core ideology or policy statement. Neither
was there a clear divide between the front bench and back bench politicians. Instead,
what is demonstrated is that these responses cover the whole gamut of opinions
conceivable on the range of issues examined herein. The sub-commentaries that I will
reveal include: tensions between those in favour of NATO action and those who
supported the United Nations; debates regarding the scale of intervention, namely
humanitarian relief versus military action; and divisions between politicians in their
support for the different constituent national groups within the former Yugoslavia.
As is shown within this study, the Shadow Cabinet offered a unified response
to the unfolding crises in the Balkans. Whilst one would expect the front bench of the
main Opposition party to present a consensual stance, of note here is that there was
little striking difference between the Shadow Cabinet and the approach taken by the
Conservative Government. The study will illustrate the position taken by these Labour
politicians on a range of issues, and in the main it will show that there was little to
divide the two front benches in their responses to the break-up of Yugoslavia. Whilst
it is important to note that there were some differences in opinion, as will be shown,
these distinctions were marginal, and cannot be viewed as a clear attempt by the
Labour Party to present a comprehensive alternative to the policies undertaken by the
Conservative Government. I therefore show that at this level, that is on the front
benches, bi-partisanship in foreign policy was, albeit with some exceptions,
maintained.
Contributions from back bench politicians of the Labour Party provide a
complex area of study. The thesis shows that a multitude of views existed within this
group of figures, showing little evidence of consistency amongst those from the same
3
political party. What is shown here is that responses from the Labour back benches
varied from those who expressed agreement with their front bench colleagues, to
those who demonstrated views identifiable as being more of the left wing, and finally
to those contributing opinions that bore no resemblance to either the front bench, or
the opinions of the left wing of the party. Politicians in this category included Tony
Banks and Ken Livingstone who both advocated a strong position on intervention.
What is shown then is how traditional Labour figures were very often divided in their
views, leading to some on the left to express opinions that one would not expect to see
from this branch of the party. Thus, Tony Banks, as has been previously mentioned,
was proactive in his calls for intervention, whereas his back bench colleague Tony
Benn was vehemently opposed to military intervention. This had the consequence of
seeing unusual and unexpected alliances between figures that, under normal
circumstances, would share little common ground.' Conversely, it meant that
politicians who were normally united in positions held on key issues were, in this
instance, standing on opposite sides of a debate. Another factor which dominates the
thesis is that back benchers who shared similar views did not always do so for the
same reasons, thus motivations were often very different. This is most graphically
illustrated in the debates that took place on the issue of military intervention. Reasons
for the support of such action varied from an almost Benthamite approach to the
situation, that is, the policy to be implemented should be for the greatest good of the
greatest number of people, through to promoting British national interest, an inherent
dislike of appeasement, and a means with which to criticise the lack of action of the
Major Government. This thesis explores the vast range of views within the Labour
5 Tony Banks's calls for intervention mirrored the remarks made by Margaret Thatcher, a figure
situated on the right of the Conservative Party. It is unlikely that these two figures would normally
share agreement on political issues.
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Party that surrounded the wars in Yugoslavia, and how surprising divisions - and
indeed unions - arose from such deliberations.
The primary source used in this thesis focuses on Parliamentary debates from
the British House of Commons. All proceedings are recorded in Hansard. These
volumes provide a verbatim account of daily proceedings at Westminster. Using this
material enables the thesis to show the wealth of opinion and comment that developed
on the break-up of Yugoslavia within the Labour Party during the years 1991-1995.
Examining the debates offers a chance to identify common themes and strands of
discussion. It also enables the reader to recognise how different figures within the
Labour Party presented their views, and reacted to each other. A broad range of
politicians is studied, either from the front bench, thus presenting an official Shadow
Cabinet stance, or those on the back benches of the House of Commons. The
comments of these figures present the views of those not constrained by the
responsibilities of being on the front bench of the party, thus presenting us with
perhaps more frank, colourful contributions to the debates.
Using a source such as Hansard presents the historian with a range of both
strengths and weaknesses. The advantages of such a document mean that it is possible
to see how M.P.s reacted on a very immediate basis to events in the Balkans. Thus,
any debate referring to a particular incident usually occurred just days later. This
means that one is able to see how politicians reacted to issues and events in their
immediate aftermath. The immediacy of the material then means that one is able to
read almost instant responses to various crises. Using Hansard as the main primary
source also affords the opportunity to examine all M.P.s and not just those who have
Subsequently published diaries and autobiographies. This means that those politicians,
Who perhaps enjoy a slightly lower profile than other, better known faces, are able to
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be treated in an equal fashion. Likewise, as Hansard records everything which takes
place in Parliament, it presents an opportunity to read the responses and reactions of
the different politicians over the full four year period of study. This is something
which may not be possible using other sources.
All sources present problems to the historian and Hansard is no exception.
The House of Commons is frequently criticised as having a combative atmosphere,
and of being a place where some politicians can be accused of 'showboating'. This is
especially true of the weekly Prime Minister's Questions. As Hansard provides a
word-by-word account of debates, it is possible to read all of the insults and more
colourful remarks that are made in the House of Commons. This could mean that the
quality of the material provided from Hansard is diluted due to the type of comments
made by different politicians. However, after consideration of the debates examined
for this thesis, it is fair to suggest that although there are examples of 'showboating'
by some politicians, in the main, there is a large amount of good material from which
to draw. Another weakness that can be identified from the use of Hansard as the key
primary source is based on its presentation. Debates are published in column
formation. From a purely practical point, it is fairly difficult to cross reference and
easily identify appropriate speeches. Similarly, although there is a general index
detailing debates, there is no one effective way to track one particular M.Po's
contributions on a particular topic. However, after the consideration of all of these
points, it would be fair to say that Hansard has been an extremely rich and detailed
text upon which to base this thesis, with its strengths easily eclipsing its shortcomings.
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METHODOLOGY
Parliamentary debates are meticulously recorded in Hansard, the official report of all
political business conducted within the Palace of Westminster. Despite the existence
of an internet search engine for this resource, it has been more reliable to trawl
through the archives by hand. This is for a number of reasons. Firstly, this method has
frequently been affected by the difficulties rendered by unreliable quirks that
electronic databases can often present. In addition to this technical point,
Parliamentary debates that covered issues pertaining to the former Yugoslavia were
not necessarily clearly sign-posted as being on that particular topic. This is related to
the use of 'key words' when using an internet search engine. Obviously a search is
only as good as the words inputted at the beginning of the entire process: omissions at
this stage could lead to relevant debates being missed. For example, discussions on
wider issues such as the European Union would frequently include useful
deliberations on the Balkans that would prove to be valuable to this study."
Thus four years worth of debates from the House of Commons have been
assessed in order to access debates pertaining to the break-up of Yugoslavia.' This
period covers the key, landmark developments that took place in the region, namely
the initial breakdown in relations between the component republics of the Yugoslav
federation, continuing through to the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, and the prolonged
Bosnian conflict, ending with the Dayton agreement at the end of 1995. As well as
enabling me to identify debates with obvious relevance, for example 'Bosnia', this
approach has also offered the chance to find debates on related topics, such as 'Air
Strikes'; use of the internet search engine would not necessarily have picked up such
examples. In all, some 62 debates have been analysed from the years 1991-1995.
6 See, for example, European Council (Luxembourg) (Official Report, Hansard: 1 July 1991), and
European Council (Copenhagen) (Official Report, Hansard: 23 June 1993).
7 Please see Appendix I.
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Additionally, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs questions from this period (1991-
1995) have also been examined; this has offered the chance to highlight individual
causes of concern or interest that specific M.P.s might have raised with either the
Foreign Secretary, or one of his Ministers.
Broadly speaking, the methods of analysis used herein fall midway between
the approaches demonstrated by Brendan Simms and Norman Fairclough." Brendan
Simms's work, Unfinest Hour - Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia, is a damning
critique of the way in which Britain responded to the break-up of Yugoslavia. 9
Although Simms does look at the British Parliamentary response, he examines the
positions taken by all of the political parties, and does not analyse the Labour Party
in-depth.l" Simms's work offers a general comprehensive study of British policy
towards Bosnia during the break-up of Yugoslavia.
Fairclough presents an analysis of the development of ideas within New
Labour. He uses the study of language and communication to show how the Labour
Party presents its political ideas and policies. Analysis of political speeches shows
how various issues are highlighted and focussed on by the government. Particularly
relevant to this study is Fairclough's chapter on Kosovo." He uses Blair's speeches to
show how the argument for NATO intervention was presented to a wider audience.
As Fairclough explains, "(t)he world is simplistically divided in Blair's speech into
'us' and 'the dictators', 'goodies' and 'baddies' "Y He further explains that in many
ways the language used is 'disguising' reality:
8 Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour - Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Allen Lane, The
Penguin Press, 2001); and Norman Fairclough, New Labour, New Language? (London: Routledge,
2000)
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid. See pp297-300.
IINorman Fairclough, Op cit., 'Chapter 6: Rhetoric and Reality: Kosovo', ppI42-160.
12 Ibid, p154.
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When I say language is disguising reality, I am not suggesting that there is
a reality 'out there' which we can all see if we simply look in the right
way. All we have are different representations of reality, drawing on
different discourses. But that does not mean that all representations and
discourses are equally good .... So talking about a gap between rhetoric
and reality is a shorthand way of questioning particular representations of
reality - suggesting in this case that Blair's representation of reality is not
as good as others (perhaps, for instance, those in a special issue of New
Left Review devoted to the war).':'
This thesis by no means presents a deeply complex linguistic analysis. It is a work of
detailed contemporary history. However, the speeches of the different politicians are
analysed and used to present an indication of the key debates that occurred during the
break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The method used within this thesis is a
compromise approach sited someway between the two different examples discussed;
that is, following a more detailed study of the Labour Party politicians than Simms,
but without employing the linguistic analysis of Fairclough. If suggesting an example
of a similar methodology to that used within this thesis, Oliver J. Daddow's work on
British and European relations demonstrates a comparable style of 'soft discourse
analysis', whilst offering meticulously presented insights into primary source material
for the political historian."
Secondary literature on the Labour Party and the precise subject of foreign
affairs has, until the emergence of New Labour, been sporadic at best. The existing
historiography typically focuses on two particular periods; either the years in the first
half of the twentieth century, to include both the First and Second World War and the
onset of the Cold War, or the years after 1997, and the emergence of New Labour. 15
13 Ibid, pp 154-5.
14 Oliver J.Daddow, Britain and Europe since 1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
15 Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1914 -1965 (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1969); Eugene J. Meehan, The British Left Wing and Foreign
Policy: A Study of the Influence of Ideology (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,
1960); John F. Naylor, Labour's International Policy - The Labour Party in the 1930s (London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969); John Saville, The Politics of Continuity - British Foreign Policy and
the Labour Government, 1945-46 (London: Verso, 1993); Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Party and the
World: Volume 1-The Evolution of Labour's Foreign Policy 1900-51 (Manchester: Manchester
9
This study then is positioned outside of either of these periods, that is, in the period
after the end of the Cold War, but before the election of Labour as the party of
Government. When locating this thesis in the wider historiography the works that are
of most relevance here, are those by Eugene J. Meehan, Michael R. Gordon, and
Rhiannon Vickers.16 These all offer suggestions as to the trends that the Labour Party,
or in its widest sense the British left wing, has followed in the area of international
relations, and the effectiveness that the party has shown in basing foreign policy on
the principles of its ideology. Meehan has observed that "the evidence supports the
view that strict adherence to the principles of an ideology is not really compatible
with the responsibility of high office.,,17 This view is echoed by Gordon in his
commentary of the Attlee Government and its foreign policy, his analysis outlines
four principles of socialist foreign policy: internationalism; working class solidarity;
ant-capitalism; and anti-militarism. IS After an assessment ofthe 1945-51 Government,
Gordon questioned "whether the party would adapt to the inescapable realities in
foreign policy to which the Labour Government itself readily adapted.v'" This again
shows a stress between the realities of office and the dogmatism of ideology. Vickers
has given a similar assessment of such difficulties, stating that "the Labour Party itself
has had great difficulty theorising and analysing the nature of its ideological stance on
foreign policy.,,2o The one key principle that she does highlight is the issue of
internationalism. This, Vickers argues, has been "espoused by Labour leaders from
University Press, 2003) are all examples of work that focus on Labour Party foreign policy in the first
half of the twentieth century; Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones, New Labour's Foreign Policy
- A new moral crusade? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000); and John Kampfner,
Blair's Wars (London: The Free Press, 2003) focus on the period since 1997.
16 Ibid.
17 Eugene J. Meehan, Op cit., p175.
18 Michael R. Gordon, Op cit., pp13-43.
19 Ibid, p286.
20 Rhiannon Vickers, Op cit., p192.
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Keir Hardie to Tony Blair.21 These particular works then provide a political, historical
and ideological context for this thesis.
Of most importance for this study, with regard to the break-up of Yugoslavia,
is Brendan Simms's work, Unjinest Hour - Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia. 22 A
broad-scale study, it examines the actions of the British government, key British
figures such as David Owen, and 'experts' who offered opinions on the Balkans. He
considers that these individuals and groups, and others, all failed in their responses to
the war in Bosnia. A wide-ranging work, his analysis offers a damning indictment of
how all sections of the British establishment failed the people of Bosnia. In many
cases, this is indeed a fair analysis of events. However, my work will show that within
the Labour Party, there were politicians who spoke out against the status quo, and
who campaigned for a more assertive policy to be taken vis-a-vis the Balkans. What
is interesting, is that the motivations behind these M.P.s varied considerably; these
included, promoting Britain's national interest, others wanted to avoid a late twentieth
century episode of appeasement, whereas another group used their speeches to
criticise John Major's Government, using the opportunity to show that the
Conservative Party was very much on the decline. It is not unfair to say that, in certain
cases at least, Simms's argument offers a much too general, comprehensive
condemnation of British thinking on the break-up of Yugoslavia. Therefore, this thesis
positions itself between the aforementioned works on Labour Party foreign policy and
Brendan Simms's specific work on the war in Bosnia. The intention of this study is to
bridge this gap in the current historiography. This research then is located within the
broad area of contemporary British political history; more specifically the study
focuses on Labour Party debates on one particular aspect of British foreign policy,
21 Ibid, p193.
22 Brendan Simms, Op cit.
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namely the break-up of Yugoslavia. The thesis examines the way in which different
politicians reacted to international institutions, and how these organisations were
either favoured or dismissed. The analysis of the issue of intervention, and the way in
which a 'sliding scale' of policies was discussed, demonstrates how Labour Party
M.P.s reacted to changing British involvement in the region. Finally, the thesis
demonstrates how images from the Second World War were used to 'frame' the
contemporary conflict, and highlights the way that politicians used events from the
past to inform their understanding of the formulation of a coherent policy towards the
break-up of Yugoslavia.
In this thesis I use several key terms which must now be defined. Firstly, the
use of ideology herein is employed to describe a broad set of political ideas. My use of
the term is through a truth-neutral, non Marxist definition as explored by Martin
Seliger. 23 Thus, no judgement is being offered on the merits or otherwise of the
ideologies under discussion here; the use of the word is merely to identify a particular
political viewpoint. Further, the use of the word herein "avoids making value-based
judgements as to what is or is not ideological. ,,24
The use of the terms traditional or old when referring to the Labour Party
denotes the party that existed from its inception in 1900 through the majority of the
twentieth century until the mid-1990s. The often used, even hackneyed, notion of the
party being a 'broad church' fits well into this definition of Labour. Thus the Attlee
Government of 1945-51 would be a literal example that best exemplified this belief
system. For the purposes of offering a definition here, the phrase New Labour will be
used to identify the Labour Party that has existed since 1994 and the death of the
party's former leader John Smith. Whilst he was in the process of modernising the
23 See Martin Seliger, Jdeology and Politics (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1976)
24 Hugo Frey, Teach Yourself 10J Key Jdeas History (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 2002) p44.
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party, the emergence of Tony Blair as the new Leader of the Opposition hastened the
party's evolution into that with which we are familiar today.
The thesis is composed of six chapters, the first being a survey of the existing
literature in this field, whilst the remaining chapters offer a thematic analysis of
Labour Party deliberations and debates. Chapter one maps out both the historiography
pertinent to this thesis, and that which informs the broader picture. To this end, the
literature covered within the chapter includes more general surveys of the nature of
the Labour Party, alongside works that examine the party's stance on highly specific
foreign policy issues. As well as this body of work, the chapter will also focus on
writers who examine the Balkans, and Britain's relationship with the region. To that
end, the literature review will focus on four key areas: firstly, studies of the
relationship between Britain and the Balkans at the time of the break-up of
Yugoslavia between 1991-1995; secondly, depictions of the Balkans which are
informed by the use of various stereotypes, either in the way in which the author has
written about the area, or analyses which outline how such ideas have maybe been
significant in international relations, affecting the manner in which other countries
have perceived the region. The third area of literature to be examined is the growing
historiography on New Labour foreign policy. These works chart the way in which
the New Labour strand of the party emerged over the last ten or so years and explore
the very essence of its policies. As one would anticipate, within the last few years the
historiography has dramatically expanded. This analysis will serve to strengthen this
definition regarding the nature of the party, and its ideological composition. The final
body of work considered are those historians who have written about traditional
Labour Party foreign policy, typically presenting a comparison of the struggle
between ideology and practice.
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Following the literature review, the thesis moves on to its thematic analysis of
Labour Party politicians and their responses to the break-up of Yugoslavia. Chapter
two examines the way in which the Labour Party debated the role that international
institutions could, or should, play during the conflict in the Balkans. There I argue that
Labour has a tendency to follow an internationalist approach to foreign relations with
an enduring belief in the effectiveness of the United Nations. However, as I explain,
the Parliamentary party also spent considerable time debating the merits or otherwise
of both the European Union and NATO.25 Indeed what quickly became apparent is the
way in which the party was split in its regard of both organisations. Speeches on the
European Union show the party to be split between Europhile and Euro-sceptic
groupings. Historically, this is a tendency that has traditionally divided Labour
politicians.i" Similarly, the party's appraisal of NATO fits within a broader context.
My research indicates that there is a very real divide between those in support of the
defence organisation, and those, normally from the back benches, who viewed the
organisation with suspicion. This position emanates from the time of the Cold War
when M.P.s from the left of the Labour party questioned the validity of the alliance,
due to a marked tendency to show a loyalty with the Soviet Union.27 Amongst these
M.P.s this could alternatively be interpreted as a long-held antagonism or suspicion
towards the United States of America. Indeed, the end of the Cold War, and the
25 The parameters of this study encompass the period when, in 1992, the European Community was
given greater powers and became known as the European Union. For the purpose of clarity and
consistency, this institution will be known as the European Union throughout the entire thesis.
26 Hugo Young's This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe/rom Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan,
1998 Papermac edition 1999) provides a detailed study of the often problematic relationship that has
existed between Britain and Europe, and also examines how the issue has manifested itself within
Britain's major political parties. Also see George Robertson, 'Britain in the new Europe' in
International Affairs (66, 4,1990) pp697-702.
27 The Labour Party's relationship with NATO, as well as more general defence issues, is covered in
the following: David Edgerton, 'Tony Blair's Warfare State' inNew Left Review (230, July/Aug, 1998)
ppI23-130; Bruce George with Timothy Watson, and Jonathan Roberts, The British Labour Party and
Defense (Washington DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1991, and New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1991); and Peter M. Jones, 'British Defence Policy: The Breakdown of Inter-Party
Consensus' in Review Of International Studies (13,2, 1987)ppl11-131;
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dominance of the USA as the sole remaining superpower could be seen to have done
much to perpetuate this position. Interestingly then, distrust for NATO amongst the
Labour rank-and-file continued well after the collapse of the Berlin Wall. However, in
parallel with this group was the rise of those M.P.s offering the same robust support
for the alliance that was apparent during the later NATO action in Kosovo in 1999.
Already then, from 1991 the antecedents of this movement were clearly visible. The
final issue considered in this chapter is the manner in which the concept of a 'new
world order' was debated within Parliament by the Labour Party." As the study
shows, what quickly became clear - cynics may argue that this was always the case -
was that this was very much an abstract concept with little evidence of reality in the
international relations arena. Instead, what became apparent, was that deliberations
surrounding international institutions were rooted around long established
organisations, with the natural Labour Party affinity for the work and ideology of the
United Nations underpinning all other discussions. There was a great desire by all in
the party that the wars in the Balkans offered the opportunity for the U.N. to come of
age. Only the failure of that institution led some to seek answers elsewhere.
The next three chapters of the thesis focus on the complex and often
controversial issue of intervention. In the post Cold War period, intervention has
dominated the foreign affairs agenda in a way unthinkable during the days of
bipolarity. The term itself is problematic due to the myriad of options that it presents
and offers to the international relations arena. The concept is one that has been
intensely studied in the last ten years.29 Indeed, its very essence is one that lends itself
28 A thorough analysis of the entire concept ofa 'new world order' appears in Henry Kissinger,
Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1995) p804.
29 The following collection, Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones (eds.), New Labour's foreign
policy - A new moral crusade? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) provides a range of
studies on intervention both from a theoretical perspective to the actual application of such a policy.
Work from the collection that examines intervention as theory includes Michael W. Doyle, 'Ethics and
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well to abstract, theoretical studies on foreign affairs and ideology. However,
problems arise in the real and actual application of interventionist policies, leading to
the vast range of debates and contributions apparent in the House of Commons during
the break-up of Yugoslavia. The single question dominating the agenda regarded the
extent to which the 'international community' should intervene in the Balkans and
this exact dilemma is what is studied here, across three chapters.
Interventionist policies appear very much on a 'sliding scale' of extremes,
from the more benign - at least to the external states involved - notion of sanctions,
to, at its most acute, full-scale military action. Thus, these chapters will examine the
debates that surrounded the degrees of intervention. Chapter three will study the most
limited form of action, that is, normally the type of policy most acceptable to the
public of any states taking such a position. The focus here then will be on the issues of
sanctions, and the arms embargo which were applied respectively to Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and to all of the states that had previously
been part of the federation.3o Here I suggest that even with seemingly limited policies,
there was still intensive debate within the Labour Party. In fact there was no cohesion
in the politicians' responses. Broadly, the Labour Shadow Cabinet took a stance
almost identical to that of the Conservative Government. Discrepancies occurred on
the party back benches, with dissent from key figures such as Dennis Skinner, Calum
MacDonald, Tony Banks and Kate Hoey. Apparent in this section is that the back
foreign policy: a speculative essay', and Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'The Blair doctrine:
advancing the Third Way in the world'. Studies that examine specific examples of intervention within
the same collection include: Will Bartlett, "Simply the right thing to do': Labour goes to war' and
Angela Bourne and Michelle Cini, 'Exporting the Third Way in foreign policy: New Labour, the
European Union and human rights policy'. A separate title that examines intervention is Karen E.
Smith and Margot Light (eds.) Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2001). Of specific interest to this thesis is chapter ten within that collection; Tim Dunne and Nicholas J.
Wheeler, 'Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world.' A further useful title to consider is Mervyn
Frost, Ethics in International Relations - A Constitutive Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University
ioress, 1996. Reprinted 1997.)
The states which had comprised the Yugoslav federation before the onset of hostilities were:
Slovenia; Croatia; Bosnia; Serbia; Montenegro; and Macedonia.
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bench critiques were based on a variety of different motivations. There was no
homogeneity in the opposition to either the policy of sanctions or the arms embargo.
Concerns centred around a variety of factors, for example, the debate against
sanctions included comments that the policy was: 'too little, too late'; unfair as it was
not applied uniformly across the region; and finally, that it was an example of
interference too far in the affairs of a sovereign state.
Chapter four examines a range of further policies on the interventionist scale,
namely military options which pose either little or a reduced threat to the nations
involved in prosecuting any such action. Examples considered here are the imposition
and implementation of a no-fly zone, and the introduction of air strikes. As one would
perhaps expect, these types of policy provided a multitude of contributions from
Labour Party politicians. As is apparent from those on either the front or back
benches, the party provided a rich seam of opinion on this particular topic. Comments
emanating from the Labour Party front bench pre-empted the views of politicians
within John Major's Government. That is, broadly speaking, the Opposition offered
suggestions which were taken up by the Conservative front bench at a slightly later
point. However, back bench Labour politicians offered no such cohesion in their
responses to these policies. These M.P.s could be split into two groups, those in
favour of such policies, and those firmly opposed. However, of most interest is the
manner in which this divide crossed the Parliamentary Labour Party. Thus, it is
Incorrect to assume for example, that all those figures traditionally viewed as being on
the left of the party held the same position. Two people to consider here are Tony
Banks and Tony Benn. Both are politicians that one would identify as being typically
'old' or traditional Labour, however, on both the issue of the no-fly zone, and the
policy of air strikes they were diametrically opposed to each other. On the issue of air
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strikes, for example, the former supported such a stance, and the latter was firmly
opposed. Divisions and rifts within the party then on the issue of intervention did not
recognise traditional groupings or cliques within the British Labour Party. The
alliances which emerged can in no way be described as displaying shared reasons for
the promotion of a more proactive policy in the region. However, as will be
demonstrated within the chapter, a range of motivating factors were at play which led
these M.P.s to take the position that they did. Thus, it would not be accurate to
describe this group as a clique or faction as they were not all reaching a particular
policy position because on shared opinions.
This observation is equally valid in chapter five. Here the thesis examines the
views of Labour politicians when debating an even more enhanced type of
intervention, namely full scale military action, involving the deployment of ground
troops. Again, divisions and distinctions within the party provide for perhaps
somewhat surprising conclusions. The Shadow Cabinet was shown to be in unison
with the actions taken by the actual Government. However, those politicians on the
back benches offered a diversity of opinions. As with the previous chapter, the
traditional wing of the party provided perhaps the most fascinating of the examples
regarding the manner in which Labour responded to events in the Balkans. Even one
example goes some way to highlight the dichotomies that existed within the party.
With regard to the implementation of ground troops both Ken Livingstone and Chris
MUllin, neither of whom it is possible to classify as belonging to the modernising
'New' Labour wing of the party, advocated the introduction of ground troops to the
Balkans in a bid to bring the conflict to an enforced conclusion. In contrast to these
figures, fellow back bencher Tony Benn, also from the traditional wing of the party,
spoke strongly against the escalation of international involvement in the region.
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Clearly then, this one example highlights the complexities and myriad of
interpretations that surrounded the issue of intervention in the Balkans. The
explanation behind either stance will be explored more fully herein. However, here it
is worth stating that whilst all three figures are seen to be on the left of the party, their
interpretation of what should be a priority differed wildly. For Livingstone and
Mullin, what was shown was a more assertive stance that exemplified the belief in
fighting for an important principle. This bears a striking resemblance with the stance
taken by the Labour Party during the period of appeasement in the 1930s. Conversely,
Benn's position showed him to be regarding a traditional left-wing belief in
internationalism as his overriding principle. Thus, all three figures are from the same
strand within the party, but they showed a clear divergence on the issues with which
they held to be the most significant when applying themselves to an international
relations issue.
The role played by individuals in shaping discussions surrounding the concept
of intervention is left behind in chapter six. Here the focus is on how the 'weight of
history' hung over Parliamentary discussions on the break-up of Yugoslavia. As
debates on the disintegration of the region progressed, what became clear was the
manner in which politicians used historical references to substantiate their comments.
Mention of the Second World War ensured that a variety of analogies were used to
heighten awareness of the more recent conflict. References to the Holocaust were
regularly made during debates that took place regarding the issues of ethnic cleansing
and genocide. Whilst this is not surprising as the wars of secession in Yugoslavia
Were the first to take place within Europe since 1945, what is perhaps more striking is
that despite these references, which generally took the guise of being used to support
arguments for 'more to be done', in fact neither the British nor the broader
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international response seemed to be swayed by these extremely powerful comments.
However, what does occur herein is an analysis of the way in which both the
Holocaust and other episodes from the past were used to ground the arguments of
politicians taking part in debates on the Balkans.
It should be anticipated that alongside these comments regarding parallels with
specific events from the past, there was also considerable mention of certain countries
within the region, or more particularly the way in which various Labour Party
politicians viewed other major participants on the world stage; normally basing their
views on long-held attitudes influenced by the historical record. This is a theme which
mirrors the analysis in chapter two regarding the way in which certain M.P.s viewed
either NATO or member states of the European Union. Thus, chapter six further
examines how members of the Parliamentary party brought their views on other
countries into debates. What becomes apparent is how various resentments were
employed within discussions surrounding the break-up of Yugoslavia. The chapter
shows then how, as well as analogies based on episodes from the past, debates were
also informed to a greater or lesser degree - depending on ones perception of the value
of the contribution - by opinions held by the various politicians towards other key
ethnic national groups in the ensuing conflict. As is shown in both this chapter, and
indeed chapter two, these views were often based on long standing prejudices towards
particular countries, and informed by imagery of the Second World War.
Interestingly, what this demonstrates is that alongside traditionally held views by the
West (that is, the notion of 'otherness' or an Edward Said-style 'orientalism') with
regard to the Balkans, there were also long-standing prejudices present amongst
Labour politicians with regard to countries, namely western powers, involved in the
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diplomatic efforts. 31 Thus, whilst the attitudes of some national governments towards
the Balkans were seen to inhibit an effective international policy for the region, it can
also be argued that certain unhelpful opinions held by some within the Parliamentary
Labour Party, albeit directed against countries of western Europe, and indeed the
USA, were equally at work.
31M.ana Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). See also Edward
w. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 1991. Reprinted with a new Afterword 1995. First
published by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1978).
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CHAPTER ONE
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews the existing scholarly literature relevant to this thesis. The
historiography will be presented within four key areas: namely, works that examine
the role played by Britain during the wars of secession in Yugoslavia; studies on the
Balkans which either depict the impact of war, or which feature discussion on the way
in which the region has been depicted within Western Europe, thus introducing the
use of stereotypes; literature which charts the impact of New Labour on foreign
policy; and, finally studies which outline the traditional stance taken by the Labour
Party within the sphere of international relations. The literature review will
demonstrate that each of these four core strands are of use to the wider thesis, and that
the thesis which follows, draws on aspects of each ofthe areas included and discussed
herein.
BRITISH POLITICS AND THE BREAK-UP OF YUGOSLAVIA
Brendan Simms provides an extremely detailed examination of Britain's response to
the break-up of Yugoslavia, specifically Bosnia, in his work, Unjinest Hour: Britain
and the Destruction of Bosnia. 1 As the title suggests, he is damning in his assessment
of how this country reacted to events in the Balkans. The book examines a range of
groups and charts their actions during the break-up of Yugoslavia. Simms studies the
role played by: the British Government; Lord Owen, who was the E.U. envoy during
the Balkan wars of secession; the British military commanders working in the region
under the peacekeeping remit; writers and intellectuals who offered commentary on
1
Brendan Simms, Unjinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Allen Lane, The
Penguin Press, 2001)
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the events; and the British Parliament. Chapter by chapter, Simms offers a damning
critique of each of the different agencies and their response to the war in Bosnia. The
picture that he describes is one of abject failure on the part of all of those who had
either the responsibility or opportunity to make a difference to the situation in Bosnia.
Of most use to this thesis, is Simms's analysis of the Parliamentary response
to the break-up of Yugoslavia? As one would expect, by virtue of being the then party
of Government, John Major's Conservative Party is subjected to a high level of
criticism. Simms writes extensively about what he sees as a lack of will that was
demonstrated by Government ministers in their quest to find resolution to the various
crises. Of relevance to this thesis is the way in which he identifies a minimal lack of
involvement by the Labour Party in attacking the Government's record on this issue.
Simms explains:
The number of Labour critics [... ] included Peter Mandelson, Peter Hain,
Clare Short, Calum MacDonald, Max Madden, Malcolm Wicks, and Kate
Hoey. They harried the government as best they could; but they were
never more than a doughty minority, even in their own party.'
As will be shown within the following chapters, these figures, as well as other Labour
Party politicians played a regular part in debates. Simms also highlights those
Opposition M.P.s who were reluctant for Britain's role within the conflict to be
expanded, and who, by extension, help to support his argument that Bosnia was left
by the outside world to implode. The recurring theme then throughout the earlier part
of his study is that, despite the interventions of a few individuals, the Labour Party
failed to provide effective opposition to the policies of the Conservative Government.
However, Simms heralds the arrival of Tony Blair and New Labour with a cautiously
more optimistic tone:
2 •
3 tu« Pp273-313.
Ibid, p276.
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The Labour policy on Bosnia which emerged under Tony Blair and the
new shadow Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, in 1995 was a great
improvement on that of 1992-4, but it lacked the clarity and steely resolve
which became the hallmark of their Balkan stance in the late 1990s.4
In his concluding chapter, Simms makes further comments about British
Parliamentary responses towards events in the Balkans, this time in the years that
followed Labour's election victory in 1997. In his remarks, he is much more buoyant
about the role played by the new British Government: " ... by contrast with Britain's
conduct during the Bosnian war, the trio of Prime Minister Blair, Foreign Secretary
Robin Cook, and the Defence Secretary George Robertson proved extremely
impressive."s Thus, he is able to finish his book on a slightly more positive note.
Brendan Simms's work is extremely useful to this study in that it offers a very
broad analysis of the Labour Party's response to events that occurred within the
Balkans, specifically during the Bosnian War. However, as this thesis will show, it is
important to stress that whilst there might not have been cohesive widespread
Opposition support for enhanced British intervention in the region, the break-up of
Yugoslavia did matter, and was an important issue to those politicians within the
Labour Party who spoke on the subject, either for or against wider British
involvement. Whether speaking in support of, or in opposition to, the Government's
policies, many Labour politicians, especially on the back benches, spoke regularly on
all manner of issues relating to the Balkans. Although the outcome of the debates may
not have resulted in a more positive outcome for the former Yugoslavia, the
discussions that took place were, in the main, informed by a degree of commitment,
passion and interest amongst those who took part; this will be demonstrated in the
chapters which follow.
4 .
5 Ib,d, p299.
Ibid, p345.
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In addition to Simms's contribution, Carole Hodge has also offered an in-
depth analysis on Britain's relationship with the Balkans from 1991 unti12006.6 Her
study covers the different events and diplomatic endeavours that took place during the
Yugoslav wars of secession, and also the years of peace and resolution which
followed the Bosnian ceasefire of 1995. Whilst there is some analysis of the Labour
Party's role during the period 1991-1995, the majority of this earlier period is
focussed on the Government's position and subsequent policies that were
implemented. However, Hodge does offer a detailed study of the Labour
Government's role during the Kosovo crisis, outlining the determined stance taken by
Tony Blair.7 She explains how during the earlier conflict the Labour Party had, by and
large, adopted a bi-partisan approach to solving the crises, in the main, supporting the
Government's position. The election of New Labour thus heralded a new start in
foreign affairs, and Hodge describes how a supposed 'ethical' dimension was to be
introduced in Britain's dealings with the world. Her detailed analysis of the New
Labour period covers both what she sees as the positive elements, such as more
committed support for the International Tribunal at the Hague; along with more
problematic episodes, such as the various controversies generated by Robin Cook's
visit to Bosnia.8
Her chapter outlining the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo leading to
the eventual NATO military campaign against Serbia is an extremely detailed analysis
of the events that took place. Due to their political positions at the time of that
conflict, Tony Blair, Robin Cook and George Robertson feature prominently.
6
Carole Hodge, Britain and the Balkans: 1991 until present (London: Routledge, 2006)
7 Ibid, Chapter 9.
g Ibid, pp139-151. Robin Cook visited Bosnia in July 1997. His trip coincided with criticism being
levelled at the Republika Srpska for its violation of the Dayton Accords. Whilst in the region, Cook
implored all sides, making no distinction, to stick to the principles outlined in the peace plan. He also
reassured the Republika Srpska President, Biljana Plavsic, that Britain would not arrest any more Serbs
in the British controlled area of Bosnia.
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However, the study focuses more on wider geo-political events than on responses
within the domestic British political scene. Carole Hodge's work is useful for this
thesis in that it provides a good overview of events that were taking place in the
Balkans during the period of study. The inclusion of the analysis of the Kosovo
conflict offers a contrast to the policy pursued by the British Government at the time
of the earlier wars within the former Yugoslavia. Hodge provides a highly detailed
account of Britain's relationship with the Balkans over a fifteen year period. The key
theme throughout her argument is of the British Government, of either main political
party, consistently failing the region, either in major ways, such as during the wars of
secession during the early 1990s, or in less overt areas, such as in diplomatic efforts
during times of relative stability. Essentially, Hodge's work follows in the traditions
laid down in the publication written by Brendan Simms, examined previously here."
Although she does examine key figures from Labour's front bench, and their response
to what was taking place in the Balkans, she does not offer a detailed analysis of the
variety of back bench responses that took place. Thus, although comments similar to
those made by Hodge regarding the near unanimity shared by- Government and
Labour front benches on the break-up of Yugoslavia are also demonstrated within this
thesis, due to the examination herein of the Labour back bench response this thesis
will provide a more detailed picture of how the party reacted to events in the
Balkans.l''
9
loBrendan Simms, Op cit.
Carole Hodge, Op cit. For examples of her analysis of the Labour Party Shadow Cabinet, see p91
(John Cunningham), and p89 (David Clark).
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THE POWER OF STEREOTYPES? DESCRIBING THE BALKANS
The use of rather hackneyed stereotypes on studies of the Balkans is commonplace.
The various authors of the body of work studied herein have helped to either
perpetuate or examine such ideas. The thesis will examine the way in which such
attitudes affected Parliamentary debate, and by extension, possibly influenced British
policy during the crisis. The use of stereotype regarding the Balkans is most apparent
in chapter six of this thesis, in the examination of the impact of the Second World
War on Parliamentary debates.
The literature that follows can be divided into two groups: works that have
somehow suggested, through heavily descriptive narratives, the notion of the Balkans
being somehow 'different', thus outside of the norms which would be expected for
other European countries and playing on popular perceptions of the region; and those
works which study these stereotypical ideas. Writers within the former category
studied herein are Rebecca West and Robert D. Kaplan. I I The latter group focuses on
work by Maria Todorova and Lene Hansenl2
Rebecca West's epic book Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through
Yugoslavia, and Robert D. Kaplan's more recent title, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey
through History are both relatively well known works of reportage describing the
Balkans.!' Each is a heavily descriptive account of the authors' travels in the region.
The richness of the language helps to create an impression of an exotic place, very
different from other countries in Europe. West describes her initial view of Sarajevo
in the following way:
II
Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon: A Journey through Yugoslavia (Edinburgh: Canongate
Books Ltd., 1993, Reprinted 1995 and 1997. First published London: Macmillan London Ltd., 1942.)
~obert. D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: Vintage Books, 1994);
Mana Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1997); and Lene
~ansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (Oxford: Routledge, 2006);
Ibid.
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We noted then, and were to note it again and again as we went about the
city, that such sites gave it a special appearance. The costumes which we
regard as the distinguishing badge of an oriental race, proof positive that
the European frontier has been crossed, are worn by people far less
oriental in aspect than, say, the Latins; and this makes Sarajevo look like a
fancy-dress ball.14
Although this book was written over sixty years ago, it is a well known text, and has
presented and helped to promote a certain view of the Balkans. Lene Hansen has
described how Rebecca West's pro-Serbian position has been assessed and
critiqued. IS According to Hansen, Richard Holbrooke, the key US diplomat involved
in the search for peace in the Balkans during the 1990s viewed West's work as a key
reason behind the failure of a coherent Western policy.!"
Published at the end of the twentieth century, Robert D. Kaplan's book fulfils
a very similar role to that of the previous work; indeed, he makes frequent references
to West and her joumey.l ' His work is an account of his travels around the Balkans,
and details the sights that he sees, and the people that he meets. Kaplan's choice of
title does an extremely good job of alluding to the tone present throughout the work:
"I arrived in Zagreb by train from Klagenfurt. The last decade of the century was
Upon me. My ears were tuned to smoldering (sic), phantom voices that I knew were
about to explode once again.?" Even the description on the back of the book cover,
which is there to attract the buyer, gives an extremely clear idea about the tone of the
book: "From the assassination that triggered World War 1 to the ethnic warfare now
sweeping Serbia, Bosnia, and Croatia, the Balkans have been the crucible of the
twentieth century, the place where terrorism and genocide first became tools of
14 Ibid, p297.
IS
I Lene Hansen, Op cit.
I~ Ibid, pI57.
I Robert D. Kaplan, Op cit.
8 Ibid, p5.
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policy.t'" The inclusion in this literature review of these books by West and Kaplan
serves to illustrate the nature of popular works on the Balkans that are available to a
wider audience. Notions about the supposed mysterious nature of the area present in
these texts - and indeed other works - serve to suggest that the region is in some way
different, and maybe even warranting special treatment by the international
community. The hyperbole which dominated some speeches during the break-up of
Yugoslavia in many ways mirrors the language used to describe the region in such
works. Thus, the depiction of the area as in some ways being 'different' is perpetuated
by works such as these.
Analysis of these stereotypes, rather than their promotion through the type of
works analysed previously, has been conducted by Maria Todorova and Lene Hansen.
Maria Todorova's book, Imagining the Balkans, examines the way in which the
region has been viewed both from within and from without.2o Central to her work is
the key question: "How could a geographical appellation be transformed into one of
the most powerful pejorative designations in history, international relations, political
science, and nowadays, general intellectual discourse'Z" She examines the use of the
term 'Balkan' and describes how it is used to convey a sense of difference:
It was the ethnic complexity of the Balkans that proved the most
frustrating characteristic. Unlike Western Europe where nations lived in
more or less homogeneous blocks, in the East they were jumbled in a way
that added the word macedoine to the vocabulary of menu writers ..... The
complex ethnic mixture was held responsible for the instability and
disorder of the peninsula, which was diagnosed as afflicted by "the
handicap of heterogeneity." ,,22
Todorova also provides analysis of the evolution of the term 'balkanization', showing
how the expression has become used to denote a negative and chaotic geo-political
~:Ibid,. back cover.
21 Mana Todorova, Op cit.
22 Ibid, p7.
Ibid, p128. The "handicap of heterogeneity" cited by Todorova is from Joseph S. Roucek, Balkan
Politics: International Relations in No Man's Land (Westport, Conn: Greenwood, 1948) p3, 7.
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situation, of an area that has broken down into smaller units. As she argues in her
book: "(w)hile a significant part of the American reading public would find it difficult
to demonstrate even a remote geographical competence on the Balkans, it clearly
understands the allusion to balkanization as the antithesis to the melting pot
ideal. .. ".23
Todorova's analysis then is despairing at the simplistic way in which such terms
as 'Balkan' and 'Balkanization' have been appropriated. The final sentence of her
work provides a fitting conclusion to the analysis of her argument:
If Europe has produced not only racism but also antiracism, not only
misogyny but also feminism, not only anti-Semitism, but also its
repudiation, then what can be termed Balkanism has not yet been coupled
with its complementing and ennobling antiparticle.i"
Thus, Todorova's work illustrates the way in which a single term, that is, 'Balkan',
can be used as shorthand for particular stereotypes, and for our purposes herein, it is
used to influence decisions made within the international relations arena. This point
will be examined in detail when studying the different motivations and reasons behind
the various stances taken by different politicians: to what extent did their assumption
of these ideas inform their rhetoric and vision regarding the type of policy that should
be implemented in the Balkans?25
The final work to consider within this group of books is Lene Hansen's study,
Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War.26 The book is divided
into two parts, with the first half examining the ways in which discourse analysis can
affect the decision making process within international relations. The second part of
23 Ibid, p35.
24 Ibid, p189.
25 Further analysis of the ideas raised by Todorova, and how they tie in to the break-up of Yugoslavia,
are explored by Joseph Sanders Pearson, in his thesis, British Press Reactions to the onset of war in ex-
Yugoslavia. Pearson examines the break-up of Yugoslavia, and how the nature of 'the other' affected
the reportage in the British media. He examines three events, namely the ten day war in Slovenia, the
siege of Dubrovnik, and the discovery of the concentration camps in Bosnia, and analyses the ways in
which the region was presented as being somehow 'not of Europe'.
26
Lene Hansen, Op cit.
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the book is of most relevance to this thesis, offering a discourse analysis of the
debates that took place in the West regarding the war in Bosnia. After presenting a
history of the term 'Balkan', Hansen explains how the ideas and prejudices behind the
term went on to influence the debates which took place regarding events within
Bosnia. She explains that "(t)he construction of 'the Balkans' as incapable of change
and with the capacity of entrapping the West functioned to legitimize a Western
policy of inaction.,,27 Attitudes such as this would clearly have prevented any type of
coherent approach being utilised by the international community in the search for
resolution to the conflict. The analysis of Parliamentary debates which follows within
this thesis will demonstrate how such views were to considerably influence
contributions made by some members of the Labour Party. Notions of stereotype,
leading to a feeling that there was a certain 'inevitability' about the events that were
taking place in the former Yugoslavia did much to colour the various discussions
which took place in the House of Commons. At this point, it is important to consider
that in addition to the attitudes held by various British politicians towards the
'Balkans', in the sense of being somewhat different through the use of stereotypes,
similar views were also demonstrated with regard to other national groups, for
example, 'the Germans'. An understanding and an awareness of the use of these ideas
IS extremely relevant in the analysis of the Parliamentary speeches herein, in that it is
not exclusively confined to the Balkans, but also to other groups. In summary, such
attitudes were almost a form of shorthand for attributing, and explaining, certain
behaviours with specific nationalities.
In addition to the 'Balkan' discourse, Hansen also examines the idea of a
'Genocide' discourse, and how this affected the West's policy towards Bosnia. She
27 •
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explains how discussions surrounding the use of the term 'genocide' vis-a-vis Bosnia
led to a sense of 'ethical responsibility' within some quartersr" Accordingly, the use
of the term 'genocide' acted as a catalyst for some, leading to calls for different forms
of intervention. The chapters within this thesis will demonstrate how such demands
made by Labour Party politicians regularly mentioned the atrocities that were
committed in Bosnia. Thus, their case for intervention would be considerably
strengthened. Hansen's work is important in that it demonstrates how two key terms
were appropriated in different ways during the war in Bosnia. Specifically, chapter six
of this thesis show how 'Balkan' and 'Genocide' became important parts of the
discourse that took place within Parliament in debates concerning the break-up of
Yugoslavia. Labour Party politicians speaking either in support of or against the
different policies implemented by the Conservative Government frequently
substantiated their contributions with a reliance on these remarks. As Hansen shows,
the subtext of these remarks had considerable impact on the types of action that were
taken by the West. The forthcoming chapters outline the extent to which the issue of
stereotypes became a factor in contributions made by Labour Party politicians in
Parliamentary debates concerning the break-up of Yugoslavia during the years
between 1991-1995. In addition to this, the thesis will demonstrate the way in which
the debates that took place on the break-up of Yugoslavia were an opportunity to
promote domestic political issues, such as highlighting deficiencies in the Major
Government, or displaying a position that would been seen as sympathetic to local
constituency concerns.
28
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NEW LABOUR FOREIGN POLICY
There is a wide range of material available on New Labour and the foreign policy that
it has undertaken since its election to office in May 1997. The volume of literature
available suggests to the reader that the election of the Blair government twelve years
ago produced a somewhat different foreign policy to that which is traditionally
expected from a Labour government. Appraisals regarding the extent to which the
new incarnation of the Labour Party has succeeded and how it can further develop its
ideas within the sphere of foreign affairs are increasingly common. The 'war on
terror' which has led to British involvement in wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq has
further encouraged publications within this field. The inclusion of this literature here
is important in that it shows how Labour Party foreign policy developed in the years
after the break-up of Yugoslavia. Thus, these texts have been included to help better
distinguish the evolving attitudes to foreign policy that were taking place in the first
half of the 1990s. Even in the years between 1991-1995, it was already apparent that
Participants in debates surrounding the break-up of Yugoslavia were displaying
attitudes and approaches to international relations with which we associate with Tony
Blair's premiership. Thus, one can argue that the genesis of the New Labour approach
to international relations can be identified in many of the comments made during the
Wars of secession in the earlier part of the decade; before the party carne to power.
The existing literature that focuses on New Labour and foreign policy can be split into
three sub-groups: studies that provide general overviews of New Labour's foreign
policy; secondly, those works that focus on one particular aspect of foreign policy;
and finally, general works on New Labour which include material relevant to the
study of foreign policy.
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An article by Denis MacShane, an edited collection of essays by Richard Little
and Mark Wickham-Jones, and a monograph by Paul D. Williams all provide
overviews of New Labour's foreign policy.r" Each writer offers an examination of
the general principles behind the New Labour Government's approach to international
relations. Denis MacShane presents a good summary of New Labour foreign policy in
his article for Oxford International Review.3o It is to be anticipated that MacShane as a
Labour politician puts a considerable gloss on the actions of the Labour Government.
However, the article undeniably provides us with a useful outline of traditional
approaches to British foreign policymaking. The issues that MacShane examines
include traditional diplomacy - the Westphalian model - and Britain's long-standing
relationship with Europe.i' The article then examines the way in which, as MacShane
at least believes, Blair's Labour Government is approaching this sphere of policy-
making from a different angle. Among the key points outlined by MacShane is the
changing attitude to what takes place within the sovereign state. He explains how
"(w)hat happens inside a state is no longer a private matter for the sovereign whether
literally a monarch or the people as sovereign as in a republic".32 This point is used by
MacShane to help explain the end of non-intervention in foreign policy. An associated
point is when he examines what is possibly the most widely recognised aspect of New
Labour's approach to international relations, that is the issue of 'ethical foreign
policy'. MacShane outlines the speech where Robin Cook first raised the idea. In his
analysis, he explains how Cook did not use the now notorious phrase, and goes on to
29n .ems MacShane, 'New Labour, New Foreign Policy? A Labour Perspective', Oxford International
Review, vol9, no 1, Winter (1998/99), Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones (eds.), New Labour's
foreign policy: A new moral crusade? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), and Paul D.
Williams, British Foreign Policy Under New Labour, 1997-2005 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005)
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interpret what was actually said: "There is no big bang or grand declaratory approach
to this new emphasis on asserting democratic values, the visions of Wilberforce rather
than the gunboats of Palmerston as part of Labour's new foreign policy.,,33 Again, it is
necessary to remind us of MacShane's position within the Labour Party and this
should maybe temper our reading of his commentary. However, this point aside, his
article is a good overview of New Labour foreign policy principles and acts as a
useful starting point in this particular area of research. For this thesis, the article
clarifies what a New Labour foreign policy purports to be, thus providing a useful
yardstick by which to measure the subsequent actions of the Blair government. This is
useful in that it illustrates how some of the ideas expressed within the Parliamentary
debates discussed herein, were later developed into actual policy when the party was
elected to government.
One of the most comprehensive examples to date ofa study of New Labour's
foreign policy is the edited collection compiled by Richard Little and Mark Wickham-
Jones." This wide-ranging work covers both the theory and practice of the Blair
government's foreign policy. The four-part study examines how the theory of foreign
policy has developed, and then studies the actual application of the policy by New
Labour. New Labour's policy is sited within a historical context and various examples
are provided to show how the government has dealt with different issues, for example,
topics such as the Anglo-American relationship, and arms sales.35 Of particular
relevance to this study are the chapters by Mark Wickham-Jones, Michael W. Doyle,
Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Jim Buller and Vicky Harrison, and Will
33 Ibid, p29.
34 Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones (eds.), Op cit.
35 Richard Hodder-Williams, 'Reforging the 'special relationship': Blair, Clinton and foreign policy'
pp234-250, and Neil Cooper, 'The pariah agenda and New Labour's ethical arms sales policy' pp147-
167, both Ibid.
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Bartlett.36 These chapters focus on issues of intervention and refer to the much
vaunted ethical nature of the foreign policy of New Labour. A more detailed analysis
of Dunne and Wheeler's work follows later on in this chapter. However, the chapters
by the other writers provide the thesis with a range of relevant material. In this
analysis of the break-up of Yugoslavia during the 1990s, the points raised on the
theory of an ethical foreign policy and intervention are particularly relevant, as is the
detailed chapter by Bartlett on the NATO action against Serbia. Thus, this edited
collection gives a good overview of New Labour's foreign policy and plays an
essential part in this review. An extremely important noteworthy point is that due to
its sole focus on New Labour there is no opportunity to directly compare New
Labour's foreign policy with that which preceded the arrival of Tony Blair as leader.
However, it still presents the opportunity to examine how notions of an ethical
approach to foreign policy developed and grew during the first Blair Government.
Thus, this thesis will show how these such ideas developed during the years prior to
1997, and how the break-up of Yugoslavia possibly acted as a catalyst for the
promotion of such a policy.
Paul D. Williams's monograph examines three areas: namely, the nature of
Labour Party foreign policy; the party's relationship with three key partners in
international relations, that is the USA, Europe and Africa thus redefining Churchill's
three circles argument for the end of the twentieth century; and finally, key issues that
affect the party's position in foreign affairs, such as its stance on the defence industry,
36
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and the party's foray into aid and the developing world. 37 Of most interest and
relevance to this thesis is Williams's chapter analysing the Labour Government's
involvement in 'other people's wars. " Although Williams's book examines the
Labour Government and its foreign policy in the years 1997-2005, thus covering the
period immediately after the focus of this study, his observations are still useful in that
they highlight the way in which the Blairite interventionist style of international
relations developed. Areas that Williams highlights as being crucial to this evolution
are; the motivating factors behind the Labour Government's various interventions, as
well as the methods that the said actions used. Issues that he considers include Great
Britain's desire to maintain its standing in the world community. Linked to the
country's position in international relations was the legacy of Empire, so, some of the
Wars that prompted either involvement or interest from the Blair Government had
some type of tie to colonial times, for example, Sierra Leone and the Israeli
Palestinian conflict. Another observation that Williams makes ties in with the general
theme of Labour Party foreign affairs:
Labour's commitment to liberal internationalism placed it in a position
familiar to other powerful liberal democracies, namely, the need to argue
that sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention should be conditional
upon sovereigns fulfilling certain basic obligations to their populationa."
His chapter then examines the nature of the various interventions that took place,
dividing them into military and political engagements. Williams's book is an
extremely useful study of New Labour foreign policy. Although it focuses on a later
period, namely, when the party was in government which is in contrast with the
parameters of study here, his work shows how ideas that were promoted during the
37
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break-up of Yugoslavia were later developed into actual policy. So, whilst not
covering the same period, it illustrates how approaches that had their genesis earlier in
the same decade eventually developed when the Labour Party finally achieved office.
Aside from the aforementioned general studies of New Labour's foreign
policy, there exist a number of works that focus on one particular aspect of the party's
foray into international relations. Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler present in the
previously stated collection, David Edgerton, Colin McInnes, and Kirsty Hughes and
Edward Smith, feature in this particular group of literature.l'' Interestingly, with the
exception of the Dunne and Wheeler material, all of these studies were published in
1998. Thus, the majority of the literature is not so much an assessment of New Labour
policy but instead a stated intention of aims, for a government that had only recently
been elected to office.
New Labour's 'ethical foreign policy' is covered extensively by Tim Dunne
and Nicholas J. Wheeler in a number of different articles. In a chapter in the edited
collection Ethics and Foreign policy, they present an analysis of the term, and an
assessment of the extent to which the government has achieved its goals within this
field." Exploring the idea of 'good international citizenship', the authors trace the
ideological development of ethics within foreign policy. The study then focuses on the
issue of humanitarian intervention. Dunne and Wheeler define this term and highlight
difficulties that exist with implementing such a policy, such as in China and
Indonesia. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the NATO intervention
40N· hIC olas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 'Good International Citizenship: a third way for British foreign
policy', International Affairs, vol 74, no 4, (1998), Tim Dunne and Nicholas 1. Wheeler, 'The Blair
doctrine: advancing the Third Way in the world' in Little and Wickham-Jones (eds.) Op cit., Tim
Dunne and Nicholas 1. Wheeler, 'Blair's Britain: a force for good in the world' in Karen E. Smith and
Margot Lights (eds.), Ethics and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001),
David Edgerton, 'Tony Blair's Warfare State', New Left Review 230, July/August (1998), Colin
McInnes, 'Labour's Strategic Defence Review', International Affairs, 74, 4, (1998); and Kirsty Hughes
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against Serbia in the spring of 1999, action that occurred because of the human rights
abuses carried out by the Serbian forces on the Kosovo Albanian population. They
subsequently give an appraisal of the extent to which the New Labour Government
has followed a new agenda that is different from that of its Conservative predecessor,
within the realm of pursuing human rights in the foreign affairs arena. The chapter is a
development of the ideas that they first presented in an edition of International Affairs
in 1998, and latterly in the edited collection by Little and Wickham-lones.42 Their
work has thus been expanded to include the impact that NATO action over Kosovo
has had on the debate regarding the pursuit of human rights within international
relations.
Another of the writers to focus on one particular aspect of the foreign policy of
the New Labour government is David Edgerton, who concentrates on the area of
defence, in his article 'Tony Blair's Warfare State' .43 As has been mentioned earlier in
this review, the inclusion of an analysis of defence is relevant here because of the
intrinsically close relationship that it shares with foreign policy. Accordingly, defence
is so often the mechanism by which foreign policy is implemented, albeit in its most
extreme, assertive or aggressive form. Edgerton analyses the content of the Strategic
Defence Review, which took place in 1998, and writes what is essentially a critique of
how the party has departed from a traditional left-wing foreign policy. He argues that
the review is a missed opportunity by the New Labour Government to introduce a
move away from the previous Conservative policies. His disappointment is apparent
throughout. This view is especially evident in the final paragraph of the piece when he
outlines New Labour's position on nuclear weapons. The Labour Government
advocates, in extreme cases, the possibility of a British first strike of nuclear weapons.
42N· hIC olas 1. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, Op cit., (1998) and Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler in
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Edgerton concludes the piece, thus: "In other words, first use of nuclear weapons,
even against non-nuclear nation. Like to (sic) much about New Labour: incredible,
but true. ,,44
Colin McInnes's article provides an assessment of the Strategic Defence
Review (SDR).45 Against the background of post Cold War foreign and defence
policy by the previous Conservative Government, he examines the aims of the Labour
Party review, and the suggestions proposed within the document. In addition to this,
and of relevance for this thesis, is the manner in which he explains the relationship
that exists between foreign policy and defence planning.
Another aspect of New Labour foreign policy, namely Britain's relationship
with Europe, is explored by Kirsty Hughes and Edward Smith in an article in
International Affairs." Hughes and Smith outline Labour Government policy on this
issue and suggest ways in which it differs, or is similar, to its Conservative
predecessors. The article outlines an early assessment of Labour's European relations,
and for the purpose of this study provides another example of an in-depth analysis of
one aspect of New Labour's foreign policy.
The final body of work to consider here are those general studies of New
Labour which study the ideological development and history of the party as a whole,
and include an assessment of its stance on international relations. This literature is
useful to include within this review as these titles demonstrate how some of the ideas
and policy positions which had previously been promoted by Labour Party politicians
during the break-up of Yugoslavia were later developed when the party reached
government. Will Hutton, Anthony Giddens, Tony Blair, Gerald R. Taylor, Andrew
: Ibi~, p130.
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Rawnsley, Steve Ludlam and Martin J. Smith, Anthony Seldon, and Polly Toynbee
and David Walker have all contributed studies to the debate.47
As one would expect from the politician who is so easily identifiable as the
public face of New Labour, Tony Blair has published work on the ideological
development of the party, some of which includes an analysis of international
relations. One of his essays, published by the Fabian Society, maps out the principles
and politics of the new left. In The Third Way - New politics for the New Century he
gives a detailed explanation as to what defines his vision of the party." In this work,
Blair takes the opportunity to examine the global role that the Third Way could
potentially play in politics. The Third Way is depicted as being internationalist rather
than isolationist, with a firm belief in the power of international institutions.49
Peacekeeping is seen as important in promoting the values that are of such importance
domestically. Thus he writes, "we support the efforts of peace-makers and
peacekeepers abroad as an extension of our mission at home.,,5o The essay provides us
with a good overview of the general principles of the 'Third Way', and of most
relevance to us here, how this can be applied to foreign policy.
Further examples of this type of literature are the two volumes on the 'Third
Way' written by Anthony Giddens.51 His illustration of the changing landscape of
social democratic politics was the ideological basis for Tony Blair's Labour Party.
47 Will Hutton, The State to Come (London: Vintage, 1997), Anthony Giddens, The Third Way - The
Renewal of Social Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998. Reprinted 2000), Anthony Giddens, The
Third Way and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000. Reprinted 2000), Tony Blair, The Third Way
- New Politics for the New Century (London: The Fabian Society, 1998, reprinted 1999), Gerald R.
Taylor (ed.), The Impact of New Labour (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), Andrew Rawnsley, Servants
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The first publication is a study of social democracy and how it needs to adapt to the
changing political environment. For the purpose of this study, Chapter 5 'Into the
Global Age', is of most relevance.Y Among the concepts that Giddens examines are
how the 'third way' can be applied within the international arena, the concept of
nationhood in the modem world, and the idea of cultural pluralism. Of special interest
to this study are Giddens's views on 'Cosmopolitan Democracy', where he examines
the changing face of international diplomacy and warfare, and how democratic ideas
are inextricably linked to interstate relations. 53 He makes the point that democracies
rarely go to war against each other, and that democratic belief systems are becoming
closely tied with approaches to foreign affairs. Giddens also discusses the impact of
international institutions on foreign policy, stating that from 20 international
government organizations in 1900, at his time of writing there now existed 300 such
institutions. 54 This, he argues, demonstrates the developments that have already taken
place within a global approach to governance.
Giddens develops his ideas further in the second of his essays, The Third Way
and its Critics. 55 This volume is an opportunity for Giddens to respond to his critics.
Aside from the more domestic aspects of social democracy, such as economic and
social issues, he explores in greater depth his ideas on global matters". Of particular
relevance here is Giddens's position on the concept of old and new wars.57 He
discusses the rise in the number of states, due to the increased demand among ethnic
groups for self-determination. The changing face of warfare is discussed, that is, how
globalisation has affected conflict. He explains that:
52 Ibid, pp129-153.
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states may be multiplying, but territory is not as important to their power
and prosperity as it once was, since natural resources count for less. . ..
The new sources of ideological conflict, such as those involving religious
fundamentalism, for the most part stretch across, or affect specific regions
within, nations.58
The new form of warfare raises many issues, for example, the rise in the number of
refugees. These wars present a variety of new questions, and are thus dealt with in a
way different to those conflicts which preceded them:
The conflicts that have happened in ex-Yugoslavia, for example, are not a
throwback to the history of the Balkans, but were much more of a
contemporary phenomenon. The new wars are physically localized, but
they typically involve a diversity of transnational agencies and
relationships - international TV crews, foreign advisors, UN groups and
non-governmental organizations. 59
Giddens argues that the 'third way' has to tackle foreign affairs in a way different
from traditional methods. Thus, the 'third way' presents an opportunity to bring a
fresh approach to international relations. He stresses the importance of improving
methods of preventing conflict. Essentially what is required is a major change in
attitude in foreign affairs. This is illustrated by the point that "(s)ince the new wars
differ from nation-state conflicts, we cannot apply traditional thinking to them.,,6o
Giddens thus suggests that emphasis should be placed on "the enforcement of
cosmopolitan principles", rather than traditional approaches to diplomacy and
peacekeeping.61 Giddens's work gives the opportunity to identify the ideological
context in which to place 'New Labour'.
Will Hutton has also published work which is of extreme importance when
understanding the political development of Blair's party.62 Hutton's book The State to
Come is essentially a study of economic policy and related issues. However, he
58 Ibid, pI53.
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examines Britain's relationship with Europe, and relates the theme to the earlier
chapters on the economy. For Hutton, Europe and the questions it poses are linked to
the general economic thread of his argument. He writes that:
(t)he deeper problem is that Europe's political structures are so far
undeveloped in relation to its economic ambitions - and are difficult to
develop further given that the peoples of the European Union do not yet
share a common cultural and political consciousness.i"
Hutton thus provides an essay on what he identifies as being the way forward for
British success, that is a position inextricably linked with Europe. His argument is
useful in providing us with a theoretical example of how, in his view, British politics
needs to change. For Hutton, being aligned on the left of the political spectrum, this
would obviously most likely be achieved by a Labour Government.
Gerald R. Taylor's edited collection, The Impact of New Labour, provides us
with an analysis of various ideological aspects of Blair's party. 64Of most relevance to
this study is Russell Holden's chapter, 'New Labour's European Challenge: from
Triumphant Isolationism to Positive Integration' .65 Holden examines how New
Labour inherited the problematic issue of Anglo-European relations from the Major
government, and outlines how the new government has tried to tackle the subject with
a different approach. He states that "the challenge is to win over public opinion rather
than to be driven by it".66 For Blair's government then, it was crucial to present a
coherent policy on matters relating to Europe in order to have the best possible chance
of Succeeding in this area. This gives the government the opportunity to show that it is
In control of policy, rather than just formulating a selection of ad hoc responses to
external factors. Holden's contribution to this collection gives just a small insight into
one aspect of New Labour's policy on international relations.
: Ibid, p94.
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Another study that offers an account of New Labour's first term in office is
Servants of the People - The Inside Story of New Labour by journalist Andrew
Rawnsley.f" His book provides us with an expose of various episodes and events that
occurred during the lifetime of the first Blair government. As a political journalist for
The Observer, Rawnsley obviously has a vast array of contacts which enable him to
provide an account of the Labour Government that differs from other more traditional
works in this field. This approach thus provides us with sources that would not
normally be accessible to the conventional political studies writer. Although he does
not write about the break-up of Yugoslavia in the period 1991-1995, of most
relevance to this thesis is an analysis of NATO intervention in KosovO.68 His account
begins with the decision to take military action against Serbia and what follows is a
report of subsequent events. Rawnsley outlines how Blair's fortunes changed during
the period of military action, and describes his ongoing role in the international
diplomatic effort, including his relationship with the President of the USA, Bill
Clinton. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the Prime Minister's
performance during the campaign against Serbia:
This was a 'tempering experience' for Tony Blair. He learned that the
judgement of mentors in the White House and professionals in Whitehall
was not to be relied on. He had to make his own decisions. Blair invested
great emotional and political capital in the enterprise and would have paid
massively in both for failure. A man most often portrayed as a skilful
opportunist exposed the moral, stubborn, zealous dimensions of his
character. He took a stance and, as others scurried for cover, he held to
it.69
Rawnsley's book is a useful account of New Labour's first term in office. Perhaps the
one weakness of the work, and this is a reflection of his journalistic career, is that
many of the references are simply credited as 'private information' or 'private
67
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interview'. This obviously makes it difficult, or well nigh impossible, to investigate
his arguments in more detail. On balance though, this is a helpful illustration of New
Labour in office. As with some of the other works in this field, the inclusion here of
this title gives us the opportunity to examine how ideas that were first disseminated by
some Labour Party politicians during the earlier Balkan conflicts developed into
actual policy following the 1997 General Election.
Steve Ludlam and Martin J. Smith's edited collection focuses on a variety of
ISsues pertinent to New Labour following their arrival in Government. 70 The
development of ideological debate is covered along with assessments of specific areas
of governmental policy. Chapter Twelve for example, written by Jim Buller, is
entitled 'New Labour's Foreign and Defence Policy: External Support Structures and
Domestic Politics,71. Buller examines previous Labour foreign policies and
subsequently presents a critique of New Labour's attempts within this field. Through
an examination of British foreign policy since 1945, he is able to provide a context to
the foreign policy offered by New Labour. There are two key issues that are
highlighted: firstly, Britain's relationship with Europe; and secondly, the now
infamous 'ethical foreign policy' credited with the ultimate aim of 'cleaning up'
Britain's role in international relations. For the purpose of this study, the latter point is
possibly the more relevant of the two. Buller highlights two areas as warranting
Particular attention:
The first is New Labour's intention to put the worldwide pursuit of human
rights at the centre of its diplomatic actions. ... Second, at the domestic
level, an ethical foreign policy meant 'opening up' the process and
making it more transparent to the outside world.72
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Overall, Buller feels that there has been progress within this particular area. However,
he does raise the various criticisms that have been levelled at New Labour in foreign
affairs, that is the dichotomy that exists between continued arms sales and the
promotion of an ethical foreign policy, and also the claims of cultural imperialism that
were raised over NATO intervention in KoSOVO.73
A further part of the literature that seeks to provide an assessment of the
Labour Government, elected in 1997, is Anthony Seldon's edited collection of essays,
The Blair Effect - The Blair Government, 1997-2001.74 A far-reaching study, this
collection assesses Labour's performance in its first five years in government. Foreign
policy is covered in a chapter by Christopher Hil1.75 The chapter is divided into five
sections covering ethics, intervention, domestic issues, development and foreign
policy, and special relationships. As with the other literature in this group, this essay
provides a thorough example of both an outline and a critique of the actions of the
New Labour Government. So, we read of Robin Cook's speech on the hopes of
introducing an 'ethical dimension' to foreign policy, and then a catalogue of the actual
policy pursued by the government, for example, Britain's changed position on
landmines, continued arms sales, relations with the Chinese government, and the
detention of General Pinochet. Of particular interest to us is Hill's examination of the
issue of 'intervention'. He outlines the theoretical arguments in favour of intervention
that were put forward by Blair in the now famous 'Chicago' speech. 76 This provides
us with a model against which to measure the subsequent actions of the government.
Hence, Seldon's edited collection provides useful material relevant to this thesis, in
that it demonstrates how ideas that were first mentioned during the wars of secession
:: Ibid, pp230-232.
75 Ant?ony Seldon (ed.), Op cit.
76 ChrIstopher Hill, 'Chapter 16: Foreign Policy', pp33l-353 in Ibid.
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in the former Yugoslavia, developed into actual policy some time later, once the party
had reached government.
A study that pays reference to the theme adopted by Labour for the 1997
General Election, Things Can Only Get Better, offers an assessment of the party's
performance in office during their first term.77 Polly Toynbee and David Walker
assess various policy areas so as to provide an appraisal of Blair's government.
Essentially they try to compare policy rhetoric with actual policy implemented. For
the purpose of this study, the most relevant example of this approach is their chapter
on foreign policy, 'Blair Abroad'i '" Again, they present the well-documented notion
of an 'ethical' foreign policy and measure the policy ideas against the reality. One
example of this is Robin Cook's condemnation of human rights abuses in Iraq and
Nigeria, but his omission to mention Chinese human rights abuses in Tibet. 79 As
Toynbee and Walker argue:
Labour went to war in Kosovo (and Iraq) in pursuit of moral goals; but it
stood and watched in Chechnya. Labour upped the ante with ethical talk,
but when all was said and done there remained scores of Labour MPs with
defence installations in their constituencies who knew what the military-
industrial status quo was good for. 80
The general tone of this critique then is that, although Labour made a good start in
office, there was still plenty to do in order to fulfil its potential and early promise.
This body of literature offering an assessment of the Labour Party's first term
in power is useful for this thesis in that it illustrates how ideas which were formed and
promulgated in Parliament during the break-up of Yugoslavia in the years 1991-1995,
went on to become part of Government policy once the Labour Party had achieved
~7 Polly Toynbee and David Walker, Op cit.
8 Ibid, p122-141.
79 Ibid, P 126.
80 tu« 123I ,p .
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power in 1997. Thus, the inclusion of these works shows the evolution of ideas from
when the party was in opposition to when it was in government.
PRAGMATISM VS IDEOLOGY: STUDIES OF THE LABOUR PARTY'S
TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY
Aside from general studies on the British left wing and its relationship with the
Labour Party, much has been written on the specific area of foreign policy and the
awkward relationship enjoyed by the Parliamentary party on this issue. The key
argument often offered by scholars centres on the extent to which the Labour Party
has pursued a foreign policy that can be identified as traditionally left-wing. This
introduces a debate regarding the identification of such a foreign policy and thus an
analysis of what Labour Governments have actually achieved in this field. The
historiography in this area can be broadly divided into two schools of interpretation:
analyses of the relationship between ideology, foreign policy and the Labour Party;
and studies on specific policy issues.
There are a number of works that fall within the first of these two groups,
namely those which compare and contrast Labour Party ideology with the pragmatism
of policies implemented when serving in government. The literature provides an
illustration of the party's activities when in office and shows the tensions that can
exist when politicians present policies which are not necessarily sympathetic with
their political ideology. Accordingly, these ties between ideology and practice are
explored by a number of different writers.t' However, this chapter will focus on a few
81
Eugene J. Meehan, The British Left Wing and Foreign Policy: A Study of the Influence of Ideology
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1960), Kenneth E. Miller, Socialism and
Foreign Policy - Theory and Practice in Britain to 1931 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967),
Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1914-1965 (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1969), John F. Naylor, Labour's International Policy - The
Labour Party in the 1930s (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), John Saville, The Politics of
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key studies, namely, work by Eugene J. Meehan, Michael R. Gordon, Henry R.
Winkler, Rhiannon Vickers and Mark Phythian. These texts tend to follow a particular
model; namely an analysis of left wing or Labour Party foreign policy, that is, the
theory behind the practice, with subsequent chapters examining various episodes in
Britain's role in international relations, and identifying the extent to which actual
events mirrored the party's ideological stance.
It could be argued, perhaps justifiably at first glance, that it is of questionable
value to include literature in this survey which examines a period some fifty years
before the chosen remit of this particular study. Nevertheless, Eugene J. Meehan and
Michael R. Gordon, although writing in the 1960s, offer some of the most useful and
relevant examples from within the literature surveyed for the purposes of this study;
this will be shown later in the analysis.82 Thus, the inclusion of these earlier works
provides an intellectual context for the arguments which follow later within this
thesis. In addition to those titles, Rhiannon Vickers and Mark Phythian provide a
good analysis of the problems of formulating an identifiably Labour Party foreign
policy. They illustrate the ways in which principle has often been overridden on the
grounds of pragmatism. 83 As well as examining actual policy and events, they offer an
ideological context in which to base Labour Party foreign policy making. Henry R.
Winkler's work is important in a different way, as it demonstrates the ways in which
political personalities can affect policy outcomes.i" As will be shown later within the
Continuity - British Foreign Policy and the Labour Government, 1945-46 (London: Verso, 1993),
Henry R. Winkler, Paths not Taken - British Labour and International Policy in the 1920s (Chapel
HilI: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), Dan Keohane, 'Labour's International Policy: A Story
of Conflict and Contention' in Brian Brivati and Richard Heffernan (eds.), The Labour Party - A
Centenary History (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Party
and the World, Volume 1: The Evolution of Labour's Foreign Policy 1900-51 (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2003), Mark Phythian, The Labour Party, War and International Relations, 1945-
28 006 (London: Routledge, 2007).
2 Ibid.
83 Rh'
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thesis, individual Labour Party M.P.s played a consistently important role in
promoting certain policies and presenting particular opinions during the debates that
were played out during the break-up of Yugoslavia.
Within the literature that compares left-wing theory against actual left-wing
foreign policy, Eugene J. Meehan's study, published in 1960, is extremely useful. 85
He examines the period from 1945-51, the Attlee government, and seeks to illustrate
the problematic relationship that existed between the traditional left wing, and the
foreign policy of the Labour administration. Focussing on groups such as the left-
wing press, left-wing M.P.s, and the left wing outside of Parliament, for example,
writers, educators and publicists, he demonstrates the many tensions that existed
between those who believe in an ideology and a set of principles, and those having to
deal with the reality and pragmatism of office. The period chosen by Meehan is
especially interesting due to the numerous stresses and strains thrown up within the
British Left by the onset of the Cold War, and the subsequent changing relationship
between London and Moscow. Meehan's work thus demonstrates how principles can
be compromised when holding office. What he shows is that the further from actual
power, in this case, serving in Government, and political decision-making one gets,
the easier, or at least more straightforward it becomes to retain a strong sense of
political idealism. Thus, through analysis of various episodes from the period 1945-
51, Meehan is able to demonstrate how different elements of the British left wing
reacted to particular policy pronouncements from the Labour Government.
Michael R. Gordon examines the nature of socialist foreign policy in Britain
from 1914 to 1965.86 He outlines what he sees as being the definition of a 'truly'
socialist policy, identifying four key principles: namely internationalism, international
85
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working-class solidarity, anti-capitalism, and anti-militarism.87 Gordon then explores
the extent to which this policy was followed in the specified period. In his view:
whenever Labour has been in office, its foreign policy has invariably been
controlled not by socialist ideology but rather by continuous adjustment to
environmental determinants - in other words, by the logic of externally
imposed demands and pressures.f
Essentially, as with the other works on this topic, this is an essay on the struggle
between belief and pragmatism, an issue that has so often befallen Labour
Governments within the realm of foreign policy. Through analysis of different
episodes in British international relations, Gordon is able to demonstrate the way in
which the Labour Party reacted to foreign policy. He shows how different elements
within the party responded to particular events, and demonstrates the complexity of
theory retaining a close relationship with practice.
Labour foreign policy during the post-First World War period is covered in a
work by Henry R. Winkler. 89 He illustrates how foreign policy was developed in the
aftermath of the Great War and shows how the party's position was formulated by a
process of discussion. Crucial to the emergence of the party's stance on foreign policy
was the influence of various individuals in the shaping of political ideas. Winkler
highlights the leading role played by Arthur Henderson and Ramsay MacDonald.
Alongside this point, Winkler's study depicts how the party reacted to international
events and how foreign policy thus became an important area for debate. Following
on from the opening comments in this section regarding the merits, or otherwise, of
including literature that examines such an early period, Winkler's work is useful in
that it clearly demonstrates the impact that personalities can have on the formulation
of foreign policy. Later chapters in this thesis will illustrate the important role played
87 Ibid, Chapter One.
88/b·d .89 1, pIX.
Henry R. Winkler, Op cit.
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by various politicians in the promotion of key causes. Frequently, in the Parliamentary
debates which have been analysed, different M.P.s regularly promoted a particular
position, meaning that it becomes possible to identify a specific policy stance with the
various same individuals. Indeed, one of the outcomes of this study has been the
identification of a cohort of figures making frequent, consistent contributions to
debates relating to the break-up of Yugoslavia. Figures such as Max Madden, Alice
Mahon and Tony Benn, although on the back benches, were regular participants in
Parliamentary debates. Thus, Winkler's work gives us an earlier example of the way
in which particular approaches in policy can be attributed to specific M.P .s.
Rhiannon Vickers writes about the history of Labour Party foreign policy in
her work, The Labour Party and the World, Volume 1; The Evolution of Labour's
Foreign Policy 1900-51.90 She outlines the evolution of the party's approach to
international relations, and then examines different 'events' in the first part of the
twentieth century and considers the way in which Labour politicians reacted to them.
Vickers demonstrates the different ways that the party responded to international
affairs, and outlines how divisions existed on a number of issues. For example, the
stance taken by the Labour Party with regard to the First World War shows the splits
that existed within the party with regard to British involvement in that contlict.
Vickers shows that internationalism is a key principle for those within the Labour
Party. However, she highlights that differences occur in the achievement of this goal;
thus, principles are very often in direct contlict with the actual process of international
relations.
90 Rh' . klannon VIC ers, Op cit.
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Mark Phythian's work on Labour Party foreign policy focuses on the second
half of the twentieth century, and includes the years up to 2006.91 His book is
extremely useful in that it offers the chance to examine the way in which New Labour
has conducted its foreign policy, as well as assessing the party's stance from before its
evolution into that incarnation. In common with the other texts in this section of the
literature review, he outlines the principles which he identifies as being intrinsically
linked to Labour's approach to international relations. In his case, Phythian focuses on
the issue of warfare and the troubled relationship that the party has had with related
policies. He assesses the way in which the Labour Party, either in Government or
Opposition, has responded to conflicts such as the Korean War, the Falklands War,
and, latterly, the second Gulf War, and British intervention in the Balkans. Phythian
presents the second Gulf War as a controversial break with the Labour Party's
traditional support for the United Nations, vis-it-vis, the troubled relationship which
that institution enjoyed with both the USA and Great Britain in the build up to the war
against Saddam Hussein. He illustrates how Tony Blair will be unable to escape the
legacy of Iraq, and the aftermath of that particular conflict. However, the contentious
details of that episode aside, Phythian shows that for the Labour Party, the issue of
War has long been a complex and difficult one; frequently the Parliamentary
politicians have been split along lines of principle and pragmatism, theory and
practice.
Alongside these general chronological studies of Labour's foreign policy,
there exist a number of works on specific policy issues. One such theme examined in
the literature is the Labour Party's stance on defence. This is of interest due to the
party's long held views on pacifism. The problematic relationship between the party
91 Mark Phythian, Op cit.
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and defence is explored by Bruce George, Timothy Watson and Jonathan Roberts, and
Peter M. Jones.92 Whilst not focussing specifically on foreign affairs, these studies are
still relevant due to the at-times controversial policy that the party has exercised in
this area and the ongoing relationship that exists between the implementation of
foreign policy and defence matters. This is particularly germane with regard to the
policy held on unilateral disarmament which was widely viewed as extremely
unpopular by the electorate. Undoubtedly this would have had impact on Anglo-US
relations at a time when the Cold War was still under way.
The British Labour Party and Defense by Bruce George, Timothy Watson and
Jonathan Roberts provides a clear illustration of the tensions that have existed within
the Labour Party on this particular topic." The dichotomy that exists between the
ideology of a party and the policy of a government is outlined, with the authors
highlighting the problems that Labour have faced with regards to adhering to even a
vaguely socialist policy in what appears to be a most incompatible area, that is,
defence. The authors show how Labour policy is formulated and thus demonstrate the
tensions that exist during the policymaking process. The study shows how defence
policy has changed and developed. One of the best examples of this is the party's
stance on unilateralism and how this was addressed by the Kinnock leadership.
Peter M. Jones covers the issue of defence in an article for the Review of
International Studies.94 He illustrates how defence had been a political issue that
enjoyed cross-party consensus, and explains how the 1983 General Election and the
changing Labour policy on issues such as the Bomb and defence spending heralded a
92 Bruce George with Timothy Watson and Jonathan Roberts, The British Labour Party and Defense
(Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 199 I and New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1991); and Peter M. Jones, 'British Defence Policy: The Breakdown oflnter-Party
Consensus', Review of International Studies, vol 13, no 2, (I987).
93 Ibid.
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new era for defence policy in Britain. Although the article covers the actions of the
three major British political parties, it is very useful in providing us with a glimpse of
the difficulties that affected the Labour Party at that time, specifically with regard to
the change in ideological direction undertaken by the party - that is, the influence held
by the left wing of the party at that time - and the impact that this had on their
electoral success.
CONCLUSION
The thesis which follows draws on the approach taken by each of these four strands of
literature. Clearly, Simms and Hodge are useful to this study in depicting the position
taken by the British Government and the wider Parliament at the time of the break-up
of Yugoslavia. Both authors demonstrate the role played by the Labour Party at the
time of the wars. Clearly Simms is critical of the position taken by the Labour Party
during the conflicts. However, what will be shown within this thesis is the degree and
level of debate that was undertaken by different politicians. Through close analysis of
Hansard, my research enables a detailed picture to be presented of how individual
M.P.s developed and adjusted their particular position in debates over the period of
study. Thus, although the outcome was not favourable to the position held by Simms,
what is demonstrated is that M.P.s from the Labour Party were frequent and regular
participants in Parliamentary discussions. The thesis then provides a more
comprehensive study than hitherto undertaken of how members of the Parliamentary
Labour Party responded to a foreign policy episode over the course of a four year
period.
The portrayal of the Balkans and accompanying academic debates that exist
surrounding the use of somewhat stereotypical and contentious terms is another area
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of literature which is drawn upon within this thesis. The arguments presented in the
secondary literature draw on the work undertaken by Edward Said, in his work on
'orientalism' .95 What becomes apparent herein is that the use of stereotypes is not
restricted to hackneyed descriptions of the Balkans. Instead, what is demonstrated is
that a variety of groups or nationalities are described in a way which suggests a
considerable degree of separation from the respective politician in Parliament. For
example, alongside familiar language used to describe anything 'Balkan', there are
also stereotypical descriptions of NATO as the 'world's policeman'.
An analysis of the historiography of New Labour foreign policy is included
here so as to show how ideas that were presented during the break-up of Yugoslavia
in the years between 1991-1995, evolved to become actual policies during the
subsequent Labour Governments which followed the landmark election of 1997. What
is evident is that arguments on intervention and the role of NATO in international
relations had their genesis during the earlier period, and gained currency and effect
once Tony Blair became Prime Minister. The three chapters within this thesis which
chart the different debates on various types of intervention demonstrate the way in
which supposedly New Labour approaches to foreign affairs were apparent even
before the election of Tony Blair as the party's leader.
The final area of literature considered here, that is, the historiography
examining 'traditional' Labour Party foreign policy presents an opportunity to show
the relationship between theory and practice in foreign affairs. What becomes evident
during the period of study is that elements of traditional left-wing foreign policy were
frequently promoted by certain politicians during Parliamentary debates on the break-
up of Yugoslavia. However, in reality, these positions were not pursued by the
95 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin Books, 1991. Reprinted with a new Afterword
1995. First published by Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1978)
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Shadow Cabinet. This thesis thus charts the continuing tensions that exist between a
dogmatic belief in ideology, and a more pragmatic role in the formulation of foreign
policy. To that end this work sits comfortably within the wider historiography which
examines this issue. The thesis is thus informed by each of these four strands of
analysis.
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CHAPTER TWO
POSITIONING THE CONFLICT IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA
This chapter will map out the various responses of Labour politicians to the actions of
the international community during the Yugoslav crisis in the early 1990s. In it I will
argue that whilst original concepts such as the 'New World Order' were frequently
mentioned, more traditional institutions, notably the United Nations, were the
preferred means to find an initial solution. However, other issues will be shown to
have been at stake. Discussion of the potential role of the European Union was
marked by traditional divisions between Europhile and Euro-sceptic factions.
Likewise, discussion by Labour politicians on the role of NATO proved divisive. The
chapter concludes by showing that the germs of a 'New Labour', pro-NATO,
interventionist stance were evident, if not unopposed.
LABOUR PARTY AND THE 'UNITY' AROUND THE UNITED NATIONS
The role played by the United Nations throughout the entire break-up of Yugoslavia
between 1991 and 1995 was to be an ongoing subject of Parliamentary debates.
Firstly, it is interesting to note the relationship that exists between the Labour Party
and the United Nations. Traditionally, left-wing foreign policy operates on a bedrock
of internationalism, most obviously espoused by the very institution under discussion
here.! In a debate on the United Nations in December 1992, Ernie Ross outlined the
links that exist between the two organisations. " ... .It is specifically written into the
I See Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1914-1965 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1969), Kenneth E. Miller, Socialism and Foreign Policy - Theory and
Practice in Britain to 1931(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967) and Eugene J. Meehan, The British
Left Wing and Foreign Policy: A Study of the Influence of Ideology (New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press, 1960). These titles all provide studies of the relationship that has existed
between left-wing ideology and foreign policymaking decisions of the Labour Party. They all provide
good historical examples.
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Labour party's constitution that we not only support the formation, the work and the
activities of the United Nations, but we are committed to its expansion and
support ..... ,,2 This point was also highlighted in a speech by front bench spokesman
Dr David Clark in a 'Statement on the Defence Estimates' almost one year later:
.... The House knows Labour's historic commitment to the United
Nations, which is enshrined in clause IV of the Labour party's
constitution. We have always had our concerns and criticism of the United
Nations, but they have always been used to support our calls for reform.
In the past few years, our belief in the United Nations has grown stronger
and our position was set out recently by my right hon. and learned Friend
the member for Monklands, East (Mr Smith), when he said:
"Our commitment to a strong United Nations must be the foundation
stone of our foreign policy." 3
As this remark suggests, discussions on the general role of the United Nations
occurred on a regular basis throughout the period, either as dedicated debates, or in
the course of deliberations on related topics such as intervention in the Balkan wars. It
was felt by the majority of Labour M.P.s that participated in such discussions that
these events, specifically the war in Bosnia, were the types of occasion which were
the raison d'etre of the United Nations. In a debate on Yugoslavia in March 1992,
Ted Rowlands outlined his view of the United Nations's purpose in international
relations:
... .1 agree with hon. Members - including my right hon. Friend the
Member for Blaenau Gwent (Mr Foot) - who said that we have at last
rediscovered the real function of the United Nations. It is now beginning
to play the role that those who built and promoted it after the war meant it
to play. It is a major international role, and I wholeheartedly support the
commitment that we are making as part and parcel of the United Nations
force. However difficult the task and whatever mire the force may go into,
2 Ernie Ross (Dundee, West), United Nations (Official Report, Hansard: 4 December 1992) Vol: 215,
Columns 499-564. Throughout this thesis, any reference to a politician's comments in Hansard will
always include their constituency in parentheses after their name. Although many of the M.P.s included
herein are well known and have a strong public profile, some figures are not as immediately
recognisable, so it has seemed sensible and helpful to give the reader some more information about
them.
3 Dr David Clark (South Shields), Statement on the Defence Estimates (Official Report, Hansard: 18
October 1993) Vol: 230, Columns 49 - 50.
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it could at least create some stability, but we must go further and offer
other alternatives.4
As will become apparent, this fairly 'upbeat', optimistic view of the role of the United
Nations would be seen to diminish by many politicians, and indeed other
commentators, as the war in Bosnia developed. However, at the start of the conflict,
politicians viewed the organisation, and the way in which it could handle the hostile
situation, with a fair degree of confidence. In particular this was the preferred
institution to shape the still forming post Cold War world.
Thus in a debate on the United Nations, Tony Banks expanded on this very
theme:
The end of the cold war has highlighted the work and role of the United
Nations in a changed world. I am sure that all hon. Members agree that the
United Nations is the hope for the future because of all its international
roles. At the moment, its peacekeeping role is the most significant. As a
result of the way in which the world has changed in recent years, the
peacekeeping role of the United Nations is now putting enormous
demands on that organisation. The United Nations has done as much
peacekeeping in the past four years as it had done in the previous 40 years.
That is the scale of peacekeeping facing the United Nations .....
....I believe that the UN should have the right to interfere in the domestic
affairs of other countries. I know that there are Conservative and Labour
Members who disagree. In a world that purports to be civilised - I do not
believe that we can call ourselves civilised, but I hope that we are moving
towards a more civilised world - we cannot allow the political leaders of a
country to massacre their own people while we stand aside and claim that
that is a matter of the internal affairs of another country. I cannot see how
the people who are being massacred will be grateful for that legal advice'
The value placed here by one particular Labour politician on the very essence and role
that should be endowed on the United Nations was by no means unique in the history
of the relationship shared between those within the party, and that particular
institution. Existing literature illustrates clearly the belief invested in that organisation
by the Labour Party, right from the inception of the United Nations in the dying days
4
Ted Rowlands (Merthyr TydfiJ and Rhymney), Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 5 March 1992)
Vol: 205, Columns 484-486.
5
Tony Banks (West Ham), United Nations (Official Report, Hansard: 4 December 1992) Vol: 215,
Columns 533-534.
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of the Second World War. Rhiannon Vickers has written about the part played by
leading members of the party in the creation of that organisation." She describes how
Clement Attlee and other leading Labour figures that were part of the wartime
coalition, such as Ernest Bevin and Hugh Dalton, became:
increasingly involved in the development of the post-war international
order .... (I)t had been the Labour ministers who had responded to the
American plans for the establishment of a multilateral regime .... Thus,
Labour's ideas for a new, more regulatory framework for international
relations coincided with those of the Roosevelt and Truman
administrations, even if they differed somewhat in their ideological
origins, and helped shape the post-1945 international economic order.i
Labour's inherent belief in an internationalist approach to foreign policy was
employed during the aftermath of the war to shape the founding of the United
Nations; an institution still the focus of discussion some fifty years later. After
winning the 1945 General Election, the Labour Party was yet ever more closely linked
in the development of that particular organisation. In returning then to the 1990s and
the break-up of Yugoslavia, Banks's appraisal of the potential that the United Nations
offered the world in a peacekeeping capacity was by no means unique, nor an original
stance to take.
The way in which the United Nations acted in Bosnia, and the relative success
- or not - of their specific operation was in fact an ongoing feature of debate in the
Houses of Parliament. Whilst there was never a doubt about the fact that the U.N.
should intervene in the conflict, there was constant assessment and analysis as to the
means which that intervention should take. The notion of humanitarian intervention in
this case meant that the United Nations was providing supplies, and the troops that
were deployed to the region were there to ensure that the relief reached the people that
were most in need. As the war developed, the United Nations was also present to
6 Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Party and the World, Volume I: The Evolution of Labour's Foreign
Policy 1900 - 51 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).
7 Ibid, p160.
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guarantee the integrity of the now infamous 'safe areas'. For example, as early as
September 1992, the House of Commons discussed the way in which the U.N. was
dealing with the conflict in the Balkans. In a debate on United Nations Operations,
Ernie Ross, a Labour backbench politician, offered an assessment of the situation:
... .It is widely acknowledged that the UN relief agencies are buckling
under the strain of responding to the Balkan tragedy. The costs of this and
any UN operation must be met in full by UN member states. The Foreign
Secretary claims that British medicines are supplying hospitals in
Sarajevo, but nightly television pictures show a gross lack of provision of
medical care. That is something else that the Government have to tell us;
they must explain the gap between what is claimed to have been provided
and what we see on our television screens each night. ....
The reason is simple enough. In an area of such deprivation, food and
medicine have become strategic weapons. Until the UN and non-
government organisations have sorted out proper attitudes to humanitarian
aid they will struggle against impossible odds. It is clear that there is a
greater role to be played by the UN. Indeed, if the new world order is to
be effective it must be interventionist. 8
The problems faced by the United Nations force in Bosnia, UNPROFOR (United
Nations Protection Force), were partly as a result of the limitations of its mandate
there. The relief effort was very much at the mercy of the various warlords and
warring parties on the ground. This point is illustrated by a comment made by Clare
Short in a debate on 'Bosnia' in 1993:
.... The authority of the United Nations is being undermined. We have
forces on the ground wearing United Nations helmets and operating under
the United Nations flag yet the Serbian fighters are saying, "You cannot
come here. You cannot bring food in here. We will not let you through."
The United Nations is being belittled and humiliated and that is serious for
the future of any order and decency in international law and world
bili 9sta ility .....
The issue of ensuring that supplies were reaching those most in need was to be an
enduring concern for the politicians for the duration of the war.
8E .rme Ross (Dundee, West), United Nations Operations (Official Report, Hansard: 25 September
J992) Vol: 212 Columns 155 - 158.
Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 1237 - 1240.
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As has been said throughout this section, although the mandate was often
viewed as being inadequate, there was always praise for the way in which the U.N.
soldiers carried out their role in the Balkans. This can be further illustrated by two
different extracts from House of Commons debates. On 31 May 1995 in a debate on
Bosnia, John Home Robertson gave the following assessment of the role of the United
Nations forces in the Balkans:
.... We have heard a lot about the failures and difficulties ofUNPROFOR,
and especially about the shortcomings of the so-called safe areas, which
are plainly not safe .....
I want to highlight the spectacular successes of UNPROFOR, which are
not spoken of enough in the press or anywhere else ..... (N)ever let us
forget that 3 million people who are, in effect, under siege in central
Bosnia - including half a million people who are literally under siege in
Sarajevo - have been kept supplied, at least with basic materials, for the
past three years. That would not have been possible without
10UNPROFOR .....
A similar statement was made by Frank Cook in the July of that year. He stated:
.... What sickens me is the amount of criticism that is levelled at the
United Nations. Members of both Front benches have made the valid
point that the UN is us. Having visited Bosnia three times during the past
two years, I can tell the House that the United Nations is coming of age
through this bloody awful mess. Two years ago, it was chaotic. Twelve
months ago, huge improvements were to be seen. This year, the UN is a
very good organisation. It is not perfect, but it has real determination and
high morale.
Instead of using the UN - and Britain is a member of the Security Council
- as some kind of whipping boy to expunge our feeliny;s of guilt and
shame, we ought to give it credit for doing a first-class job. 1
These examples all show how the United Nations was perceived to be a force for good
in the Balkans, if it had only had an opportunity to operate with unilateral, cohesive
international support.
However, frustration at the effectiveness of the U.N. presence in Bosnia was
apparent as the conflict progressed. This criticism was understandably intensified at
10 John Home Robertson (East Lothian), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260,
Columns 1027 - 103011 •
Frank Cook (Stockton, North), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 July 1995) Vol: 263, Columns
1773 -1774.
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times of extreme cnsis or atrocity. The shelling of a Sarajevo market place in
February 1994, in which 69 people were killed, led the House of Commons to debate
the situation in Bosnia the following week.12 David Winnick, a backbench Labour
politician offered this assessment of the United Nations's achievements. He argued:
Is not it clear, even to this Government, that Saturday's butchery, in which
nearly 70 people were murdered, occurred because, as with previous
atrocities, the Serbian warlords believed, to a large extent, that they were
secure from any form of western intervention and retaliation? Is the
Minister aware of the feeling of deep betrayal that is felt by people in
Bosnia, who believe that they have been let down by the United Nations
and by western Governments and are the innocent victims of aggression?
Unlike what happened with the Gulf war, in which action was rightly
taken, the Bosnian people are being allowed to be murdered without any
intervention from the western community and international
organisations.l''
Assessing the United Nations mandate and the effectiveness of its prosecution
were constant themes in parliamentary debates. What was undisputed was that British
troops were carrying out the mandate to the best of their ability. However, praise for
their actions was almost always tempered by caution, or even criticism of what the
United Nations was expecting to achieve in the area, with what many of the speakers
regarded as a limited mandate. Additionally, it is important to stress that politicians
were not criticising the concept of the United Nations; but showing disappointment in
the way in which its constituent parts were operating; such an organisation is
obviously only as effective as its member states, and the type of mandate that they had
chosen to authorise. Here, elements of the Labour Party found it to be lacking. John
12 The market place in Sarajevo was shelled on 5 February 1994. There were 69 fatalities, and over 200
people were wounded. Within Bosnia-Herzegovina, the scale of the atrocity made it an issue of
controversy between the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serb politicians, with either side blaming
each other. For a detailed account of the aftermath see Laura Silber and Allan Little's highly detailed
study on the break-up of Yugoslavia; The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin Books and BBC
~ooks, 1995. Revised 1996) Chapter 24.
3 David Winnick (Walsall, North), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 7 February 1994) Vol: 237,
Columns 19 - 20.
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Hutton was one such speaker, and contributed the following comments to a debate on
Bosnia:
Whilst accepting that all the units which have contributed to the
UNPROFOR mission in the former Yugoslavia have performed their tasks
extremely well, does the Foreign Secretary accept that this miserable and
depressing episode reveals a deficiency in the way that the United Nations
considers a deploying force in support of Security Council resolutions?
What thoughts and proposals does the Foreign Secretary have about
finding a way to improve the delivery of force to support United Nations
Security Council resolutions? What consideration has he given to the
permanent convening of the Military Staff Committee of the United
N· ?14atrons.
This type of comment, critical of the manner in which the United Nations mandate
was being enforced, was also apparent in speeches by the Shadow Foreign Secretary,
Robin Cook. At a time when U.N. mandates such as the protection of 'safe areas'
were being routinely threatened and jeopardised, he launched this attack on the
ineptitude demonstrated by the international community in its prosecution of its
responsibilities in Bosnia:
... .1 find it disturbing that none of (these) challenges to the UN mandate
has been met with a UN response. It is only too clear that some parties to
the conflict have used the last four months of ceasefire to apply the three
Rs of regrouping, refunding and rearming. The question is, what has the
UN been doing during those four months? What has it done to prepare the
safe haven for the likely resumption of hostilities? What has been done to
try to achieve the best of all outcomes for the safe havens -
demilitarisation - so that they do not provide legitimate military targets
within the UN areas?
.... The Foreign Secretary said that the Government and the UN would
support a proportionate response to violations of the UN mandate. I
understand that and I fully share that view. We have to ask the Foreign
Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence why there has been no
response because, at present, the reaction of UN and UNPROFOR forces
does not appear to be proportionate to the events of the past week'".
14 John Hutton (Barrow and Furness), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 7 December 1994) Vol: 251,
Column 320 - 321. Douglas Hurd's response to Hutton's questions about improving the efficiency of
the United Nations mentioned sending the Labour M.P. details of proposals that the Foreign Secretary
had regarding improvements that could be made to that institution. Hurd did not, at this stage, elaborate
as to what these ideas were, but agreed with Hutton with regard to making the United Nations better
equipped to deal with such crises; Douglas Hurd (Witney), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 7
Rece~ber 1994) Vol: 251, Column 321.
Robm Cook (Livingston), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: May 1995) Vol: 259,
Columns 589 - 592.
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Cook's criticism of the manner in which the United Nations acted in the
Balkans was common of many speakers on the issue. Again, it is important to stress
that it was always the extent of the mandate at fault, rather than the actions of the
various armed forces charged with the duty of enforcing the said policy, or even the
concept of the United Nations itself. However, in an example that clearly
demonstrates the increasingly contradictory nature of much of the debate that took
place for the duration of the Bosnian war, just two months after the previous speech,
Robin Cook attacked those criticising the U.N. policy, specifically the way in which
they presented their discourse:
.... A commitment has been made by British forces in the fulfilment of the
UN mandate in Bosnia. I find it a rather curious feature of some of the
discussion about the crisis in Bosnia in the past few weeks that some
people refer to the UN as if the UN were somebody else. They talk about
the UN as if it were some other country, whose Government are to blame
for the problem .....
The UN is ourselves. It is made up of countries such as us. Indeed, Britain
has a leading responsibility in the UN as a member of the Security
Council. We ourselves supported in the Security Council the very
mandates that we are now fulfilling within Bosnia. We cannot put
ourselves forward as that leading member of the UN if we do not also
accept the duty to fulfil the mandates .
.. ..Our response to the setbacks in Bosnia should not be to accept defeat
and pull out, but to show a new determination to carry out the UN
mandate. Two months ago, the international community demonstrated
unity and resolve in delivering freedom from fear and oppression to
Bosnia's civilians. The fate of the eastern enclaves raises doubts about the
resolve of the international community, and doubts will have been raised
in the minds of the Bosnian Government and the Karadzic Serbs.16
This extract bears all of the hallmarks of the criticism directed at the United Nations
throughout this part of the thesis. Thus, the Shadow Foreign Secretary criticised the
lack of will of the member states to act with regard to Bosnia. He also drew attention
to the ineffective mandates that had been put in place with regard to solving the
16R b·o In Cook (Livingston), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 July 1995) Vol: 263, Columns 1748
-1749.
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conflict in the Balkans.17 As well as offering a critique of the United Nations, Cook's
comments were also a vehicle with which to attack what he saw as the ineffectual
foreign policy of the Conservative Government. However, at no time in this speech
did Cook criticise the very raison d 'eire of the organisation; for him, the weaknesses
were due to the poor resolve of its members. Thus, for the Shadow Foreign Secretary
it was important for the United Nations to be successful; this would only happen if the
member states gave it their total commitment.
To summarise, one can be sure that the United Nations found understandable
support across the Parliamentary Labour Party. As Michael R. Gordon, Eugene J.
Meehan, and Rhiannon Vickers have shown in their work, this was the historical
tradition in which Labour politicians stood. IS They had looked to the U.N. before and
I have shown how this perspective remained in the early 1990s. Nonetheless, different
and new attitudes evolved in the Parliamentary Labour Party. A relatively significant
number of M.P.s expressed concerns regarding the precise role that the United
Nations could, and indeed was, playing in Bosnia. Its perceived failures were debated.
Rather subtly the suggestion to protect the U.N. from humiliation surely also
underlined how some M.P.s, for example, Robin Cook, as shown in the last extract,
felt its credibility was being diminished.
THINKING ABOUT A NEW WORLD ORDER - A GENUINE SOLUTION?
In many ways running in parallel to discussions on the role and response of the United
Nations to events in the Balkans, was the issue of the so-called 'New World Order'.
The end of the Cold War, embodied by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, saw
17
The impact of the ineffectual U.N. mandate in Bosnia was strongly felt in western Europe even some
years after the end of the Bosnian War. In Apri12002, almost seven years after the fall of Srebrenica,
~heDutch Government resigned, following the publication ofa report into the role of Dutch troops
~vo~ved in the protection of the Muslim safe haven.
MIchael R. Gordon, Op cit., Eugene J. Meehan, Op cit., Rhiannon Vickers, Op cit.
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President George H Bush give a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, in
which he stated: "We have a vision of a new partnership of nations that transcends the
Cold War. A partnership based on consultation, cooperation, and collective action,
especially through international and regional organizations.t'" The end of the bipolar
world meant, in Bush's eyes, optimism for a 'new world order'; a place where, as
communism would no longer be a divisive ideology, a more collective approach
towards international relations could be taken. This concept could be seen as a slight
shift away from a U.N. based type of intervention. Whilst Bush's speech
acknowledges the part to be played by various institutions in international relations,
the defeat of Soviet sponsored communism meant that the USA held an unchallenged
position of dominance, as the world's sole surviving super power.
However, instead of this, what emerged after 1989 was a world riddled with
conflict that appeared to be driven by a new force; that of a particularly aggressive,
virulent form of nationalism. The void left by communism had been filled by that of a
different challenge. As the Soviet Union retreated from Central Europe, back into its
own borders, newly freed peoples looked to the goal of national self-determination for
their lands. Within Europe, this happened either peacefully, for example with the
division of Czechoslovakia in January 1993, or, as our subject here all too often
illustrates, with the break-up of Yugoslavia this process also occurred through the use
of force.
These developments led Labour Party politicians, in common with those from
across the House, to discuss new approaches to foreign policy. The particularly
virulent form of nationalism visible in the Yugoslav states, meant that these issues
Were particularly pertinent to the Balkans. In the House of Commons the nature of the
19 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Touchstone, 1995) p804. Bush's address to the U.N.
General Assembly took place on 1 October 1990.
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changed threat to global stability was debated on a number of occasions. Bruce
George, a leading member of the Defence Select Committee and frequent
commentator on defence matters, offered this typical observation on the changing
world climate in a debate on United Nations Operations in September 1992_2o He said:
... .It might seem perverse to view the cold war as anything other than a
negative phenomenon, but in many ways it was simple. Not only did
soldiers know who the enemy was; they knew which dug-out they would
be fighting in, and they probably knew the name of the tank commander
who would come against them. In those days policy makers did not need
to think much. The world was a simpler and stable place. All those
conditions have changed, not always for the better.
The turbulent, volatile and conflict-ridden world in which we now live
surely requires much more thinking - fresh ideas are needed. One thing is
certain: anyone who believes that we are entering a wonderful new era
without war, in which armed forces can be reduced to negligible levels, is
deluding himself. Such aspirations will be thwarted.i'
This idea of a changing world with new problems needing different solutions had
been mentioned in a speech in the previous year by Bob Wareing, a backbench
Labour M.P. who was to spend a considerable amount of time and effort keeping the
issue of the break-up of Yugoslavia alive in the chamber. In a speech on 'Foreign
Affairs and Defence', he raised both the issue of aggressive nationalism, and how it
was relevant in a specifically Yugoslav context:
It is true that 45 years of cold war have now come to an end and that
everyone is appreciative of that, but a new spectre is haunting Europe -
that of an unthinking and often mischievous nationalism .... .Indeed the
nationalist card, like sometimes the racist card, is played for political
ends .....
. . ... . . .1 started by saying that there was a new spectre haunting Europe. If
the Tudjmans and the Milosevics of this world are allowed to show that
they can win with the nationalist card, their example will be emulated in
other parts of Europe. I applaud the granting of independence to the Baltic
states, but parts of the Soviet Union - or is it the old Soviet Union? - have
problems similar to those in Yugoslavia. We have to give our fullest
support to Mr Gorbachev and others in the Soviet Union who want to
avoid those problems. It was the old nationalism of eastern and central
20
Bruce George has been a member of the Defence Select Committee since 1979. In 1997 he became
the chairman of the committee.
21
Bruce George (Walsall, South), United Nations Operations (Official Report, Hansard: 25 September
1992) Vol:212, Columns 163 - 165.
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Europe that gave rise to the fascist threat which embroiled so many of us
in the years between 1939 and 1945 .... 22
This idea of a different type of conflict threatening global and in this case European
security in the post Cold War years was a theme which was to repeatedly recur in
House of Commons debates during the period of the break-up of Yugoslavia (1991-
1995). Even towards the very end of the conflict in May 1995, in a debate on the
former Yugoslavia, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, made reference to the
new type of crisis facing international relations:
.... (The Foreign Secretary) was absolutely right to say that while the
House debates the specific and particular problems of the former
Yugoslavia, we should not regard them in isolation. The tragedy that we
should recognise is that the problems of the troubled former Yugoslavia
are only too representative of the new nature of the threat to the security
of Europe and the world.
Conflicts between ethnic groups and civil war within states are now more
frequent than war between states. In the past four years, the UN has
recorded three wars between states, but has also recorded 70 conflicts
within states. Dealing with the complexity and bitterness of a civil conflict
is much more challenging than dealing with the simple morality required
to denounce aggression between states. It is a challenge that we cannot
avoid because it is now a more common threat to world peace .... _23
Thus, alongside the traditional Labour Party focus on the United Nations, the conflicts
in the former Yugoslavia became an area of consideration within the broader debates
on the state of the world which followed the ending of the Cold War. President Bush's
notion of a 'new world order' was given ample opportunity to be assessed during the
Wars in the Balkans. As illustrated herein by the comments made by different
members of the Labour Party, on each occasion the concept was found to be without
actuality and bearing little resemblance to either the situation in the former
Yugoslavia, or the manner in which the international community had responded to the
developing crises. The conflict in the Balkans thus presented a very real opportunity
22
Robert N Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby), Debate on the Address: Foreign Affairs and Defence
~?ffici.al Report, Hansard: I November 1991) Vol: 198, Columns 150-153.
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for the international community to act under the guise of the so-called 'new world
order', but as has been demonstrated by the politicians here, this chance was found to
be wanting; this sentiment was reflected in the contributions to debate that were made
by the various members of the Labour Party.
A EUROPEAN SOLUTION?
EUROPHILE AND EURO-SCEPTIC UNDERCURRENTS
The main issue worth examining here is how the Parliamentary Labour Party reacted
and responded to the actions of the European Union, and its policy towards the former
Yugoslavia.i" As one would expect, given the contentious way in which this
organisation is viewed within the British political community, assessments by Labour
Party politicians towards the E.U. ' s handling of events in the Balkans were many and
varied. It is possible to group these responses into two camps, namely Europhile and
Euro-sceptic. As will become apparent herein, the general attitude taken by different
politicians towards the concept of some type of European organisation did much to
inform their individual assessment of the E.U.'s approach to dealing with the break-up
of Yugoslavia.
At the very beginning of the conflict it is interesting to note the optimism with
which the E.U.'s actions were greeted by the then Leader of the Opposition, Neil
Kinnock. These comments followed the initial efforts made by the E.U. to intervene
in the break-up. Kinnock stated:
.... I begin by expressing my strong support for the initiatives taken by the
European Council to try to achieve stability, a secure ceasefire and
productive discussions in Yugoslavia. I also express the hope that the
efforts will be continued and that all the agencies of the Community and
24
During the period of study for this thesis, 1991-1995, the European Community evolved into the
~uropean Union. This was as a result of the Treaty of Maastricht (1991). The European Union came
into effect on 1 November 1993. For the sake of consistency in this thesis, the term 'European Union'
will be used throughout.
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of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe will be
employed in trying to secure a speedy, ~eaceful and enduring outcome to
the turmoil and divisions in Yugoslavia. 5
Hindsight tells us that these were to prove to be prematurely optimistic sentiments.
A further overt show of support for the policies undertaken by the European Union
was apparent in a speech made by Calum Macdonald on 5 March 1992. His remarks
provide a good illustration of the divergent views, in this case very pro-European,
that were held by politicians not just within the Labour Party but right across the
political spectrum. He said:
... .1 shall keep my remarks brief by focusing on one issue which has been
mentioned during the debate - the implications of the crisis and the series
of events for the attempts of the European Community to develop a
common foreign and security policy. One thread of argument has run
through the debate, implying a criticism of the Community in those
attempts, and saying that what has happened with regard to Yugoslavia
represents a failure on the part of the Community. I wish to argue strongly
against that imputation.
The most remarkable aspect of the approach of the various countries of
the Community towards the events in Yugoslavia is the way in which they
have bent over backwards to maintain a united and common approach to
the problem. They have tried to march in step when tackling the problem.
Why have the various European countries done that, despite the obvious
tensions? We have all mentioned the German angle, Germany's influence
and its attitude to the recognition of Croatia. Despite that, there has been
an attempt to maintain unity. Why? 26
Macdonald then makes two points. Firstly, that any likely success in remedying the
problems arising from the break-up of Yugoslavia relied upon the unity of the
European Union in finding a solution to the situation. This was due to the influence of
a group of nation states being more powerful than the single voice of an individual
state. Secondly, in Macdonald's view, if member states of the European Union had
taken different approaches towards the crisis in the Balkans, there would have been a
25N 'IK'ei mnock (Islwyn), European Council (Luxembourg) (Official Report, Hansard: 1 July 1991)
Vol: 194, Column 23. The 'European Council' refers to the Heads of State of the EU member
countries
26 •
Calum Macdonald (Western Isles), Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 5 March 1992) Vol: 205,
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danger of different countries outside of the region being on opposing sides of the
conflict, due to divided loyalties, leading to a fear of an escalation of hostilities. This
view contrasts strongly with the position taken by politicians later in this section.
Concern regarding the nature of 'new' conflicts around the world led many
commentators to use the example of membership of an international institution as a
means of persuading warring states to stop their fighting. Ceasefires would lead to
new states being allowed to join the 'hallowed' club of countries in organisations such
as NATO and the European Union. This particular view, specifically here in relation
to the new European states, is illustrated by an extract from a speech by the
backbench Labour M.P., Ted Rowlands, speaking in a debate on Yugoslavia in March
1992:
.... We should make it a condition that, to belong to the European
Community in its broader sense, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council
or to CSCE, those communities should accept a series of values, a form of
behaviour and a way of resolving conflicts different from the way in
which conflicts have been resolved in Yugoslavia. We should use the
desire to belong to broader communities to change behaviour. Surely that
is the great political value of the European Community.
Even in my political lifetime, Spain, Portugal and Greece have been
governed by dictators. However, they will no longer accept dictatorship,
because they realise that they cannot have a dictatorship and also belong
to the broader European Community. If we can create the same
meaningful relationship between the new smaller states and communities
that will emerge as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union in respect
of the broader community of Europe and NATO, and at the same time,
impose the condition that those communities should resolve their conflicts
differently from what has happened in Yugoslavia, there is real hope for a
new European order.27
What is of interest here, is that, at a time of real concern and disillusionment with how
any of the aforementioned organisations had dealt with the war in Bosnia,
membership of such bodies was still seen as appropriate means with which to
persuade various warring factions to stop fighting.
27
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The use of membership of an organisation such as the E.U. being such a force
for good was echoed by another Labour politician in the same debate. This more
pragmatic view of the European Union, held with considerable optimism, was
outlined by Donald Anderson. He outlined how that institution could be employed to
hasten a swift end to hostilities. In a debate relatively early on in the break-up,
Anderson explained how the European Union could be used as a force for good in the
Balkans. In line with the bigger theme of the 'end of communism', and the range of
'newly emerging countries' wanting to become members of various international
organisations, Anderson offered this view on how peace could be secured in the
former Yugoslavia:
.... A key card that was not played, at least not openly, was the fact that all
the combatant republics in Yugoslavia would eventually, at the end of the
fighting and when the dust had settled, be looking to the EC for financial
assistance. That key leverage aspect was available to the Community, and
had the EC, possibly earlier in the conflict, said in terms that any financial
assistance would come only when the status quo ante in terms of frontiers
had been established, that would have given a clear signal to the
combatants and forced them to ask whether their fighting was worth
while. That point ma~ have been made forcefully in the corridors. It was
not made openly ..... 2
Again then, as with regard to the United Nations, an international body was put
forward. This time it was the European Union suggested by the Europhile members of
the Labour Party.
Criticism towards the European Union was apparent throughout the period
1991-1995. The first comments to consider here are by politicians who, whilst
praising the various attempts at diplomacy that were being undertaken by the E.U.,
Were of the opinion that not enough was being done to help the region affected by the
break -up of Yugoslavia. In a speech to Parliament in 1991, Gavin Strang began in an
28
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optimistic vein when outlining his views on policies pursued by the European Union,
but then went on to illustrate the sentiment that would become common to many
speakers over the next four years, namely that something more should be done, and by
implication that the European Union was inadequate. He commented:
While I support the invocation of the emergency mechanism of the CSCE
with respect to Yugoslavia, are not there sound reasons for believing that
if any international institution can avert civil war in that country, it is the
European Community? I welcome the freezing of EC aid to Yugoslavia,
but are there likely to be direct talks between the Council - through the
three Foreign Ministers - and the federal army of Yugoslavia? Will
consideration be given to any other sanctions that the European
Community might bring to bear to try to avert a tragedy in that country?29
A further example of the perceived short comings of the E.U. being highlighted is
apparent in a speech given by Tony Banks on the issue of the European Union
implementing sanctions. This was a topic which was to be discussed on a regular basis
in the House of Commons, as will be shown in more detail in the following chapter.
Banks, while broadly supporting the E.U. 's actions, outlined the difficulties which
were apparent in implementing policy based on sanctions. He said:
.... It is a European problem that must have a European solution. We
cannot sit idly by and watch Yugoslavia tear itself to pieces, watch people
being killed in vast numbers, and watch the wonderful archaeological and
architectural gems being destroyed, while saying that there is nothing that
we can do. We cannot even get the Government to say that they will fully
support oil sanctions against Yugoslavia. The Minister of State said that
the Greeks would not be too happy about imposing oil sanctions. That is
not acceptable. It is no good doing one thing in Iraq and something
completely different that the Western European Union could
undertake ..... 30
Whilst the comments of the previous two speakers do not demonstrate the more
overtly hostile and critical sentiments which one associates with the Euro-sceptic
wing of British politics, many of the following politicians to be considered
29 G .
avm Strang (Edinburgh, East and Musselburgh), European Council (Luxembourg) (Official Report,
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demonstrate sentiments which are often associated with those who dislike, or have a
distrust of Europe as a political institution. A further strand of criticism directed
towards the European Union, and its diplomatic efforts in the Balkans, came from
politicians who felt that the intrinsic problems of the politics peculiar to the E.U., that
is different member states having allegiance, or at least preferred clients, within the
Balkans was one complication in formulating a coherent policy. This was an issue
which was to exercise debate amongst members of the Parliamentary Labour Party. It
is neatly illustrated in a speech given by Mike Gapes in September 1992:
Contrary to what an American academic said a few years ago, history is
not dead; it is back with a vengeance. What we see in the former
Yugoslavia is due to historic animosities and feuds, but I regret to say that
it has also been contributed to by the mistakes of a number of countries in
Europe and internationally.
I want the Minister to explain why, if 11 European Community countries
are against recognition and one is in favour, a state is recognised; while if
11 are in favour and one against, the state is not recognised. A series of
tragic mistakes have been made over the past two years, which have
encouraged disintegration and prompted fanatics on all sides to sweep
away the secular, democratic and pluralistic forces. As a result, it is now
very difficult for democratic socialists of any kind in the former
Yugoslavia to obtain a hearing anywhere. Religious fundamentalism and
ethnic hatred are the dominant forces in all the republics."
The extract refers to the divided manner in which the European Union responded to
the break-up of Yugoslavia. Germany had been a leading voice in the call for Slovenia
and Croatia to gain independence. For Slovenia, with a mainly ethnically homogenous
population this was fairly non-contentious. However, in neighbouring Croatia, which
had a large Serbian minority population, this decision would prove to be catastrophic,
with no provision being made for that group's security. Alternatively, recognition for
Macedonia was not forthcoming due to Greek opposition to the idea, based on the
traditional cultural and historical Hellenic links to the name 'Macedonia'. This
31 Mik e Gapes (liford, South), United Nations Operations (Official Report, Hansard: 25 September
1992) Vol: 212, Columns 178 - 179.
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highlights a weakness in the solution proposed by the Europhile group within the
Labour Party.
More radical and far-fetched criticism of the lack of unity in the European
approach is best illustrated in a speech by Dennis Skinner, the backbench Labour
politician. He argued:
Does the Minister appreciate that western Governments are partly to
blame for all the slaughter on the street of Sarajevo? Does he agree that
when former Yugoslavia was in the throes of splitting up, Germany
wanted to recognise Croatia? That was confirmed by Lord Carrington at
the time and since. The Government and the House were wary of the
possibility of that happening. Bosnia followed because Germany twisted
the British Government's arm and a quid pro quo deal was done on the
two opt-outs for Maastricht, and we have finished up with this mess. If
there is any guilt - there is a lot of guilt around the conflict in the Balkans
- does the Minister agree that the Government's hands are not clean?32
The relationship between the German-led demand for recognition of Croatia and the
British opt outs granted by the Maastricht treaty is a point that was often made by
those critical of both eventa " The most outspoken critics suggested that the future of
the former Yugoslavia had been sacrificed for the national interests of individual E.U.
member states. In the case of Skinner and also Tony Benn, who made similar remarks,
their views can be linked to the traditionally Euro-sceptic stance which they took in
the House of Commons.
Nonetheless, not all of this body of discourse was as colourful. Perhaps a more
measured critique of the E.U. is provided here by Bruce George, a prominent speaker
on defence issues, in a debate on United Nations Operations in September of the same
32
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year. In assessing the achievements of the international community in dealing with the
situation in the former Yugoslavia, George makes the following comment:
... .1 regret to say that the roles of the UN, the EC, the Western European
Union, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, NATO
and various national Governments have been far from encouraging;
indeed, usually they have been dispiriting. I hope that that experience will
serve to quash the idea that Europe is capable of looking after its own
security, let alone anyone else's'"
Again, this extract provides a striking contrast with the enthusiastic support for the
E.U. shown earlier by key Europhile members of the party.
These contributions to the debates regarding the role in the Balkans played by
the institutions of Europe are indicative of the wider literature covermg the
relationship between the Labour Party and the European Union. As with the
Conservatives, the Labour Party has enjoyed a somewhat problematic relationship
with Europe in all of its institutional guises. Britain entered the European Community
under the Tory Government of Edward Heath. The election of the Wilson government
in 1974, saw the Cabinet divided in its support of British membership. John W.
Young has stated that "left-wingers Tony Benn and Michael Foot ranged against
social democrats such as Roy Jenkins.,,35 In an essay written' in 2001, Tony Benn
outlined his opposition to the closer integration of European states:
The integration of Europe is a political and not an economic
question. It must be seen as such, since each step taken in that direction
shifts power from the elected to the unelected, and this raises fundamental
democratic questiona."
Importantly he differentiated his position from Euro-sceptics on the right of the
political spectrum:
34
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It is very important that those on the Left who oppose this [integration of
Europe] do so because it represents a steady erosion of the power of the
electors who are not taken in by the crude nationalism of the Right, with
their dislike of foreigners and strange commitment to the Queen's image
on banknotes. What are the alternatives for those of us who are socialists,
democrats and internationalists who do want to cooperate closely with
European neighbours?37
For Benn then, his difficulties with European institutions lay with what he considered
to be anti-democratic consequences of closer political integration amongst member
states. The opposing side of the argument vis-a-vis Labour support for the European
Union is exemplified by Hugo Young, in his study of the impact that Tony Blair's
arrival had on the party's policy towards Europe.'" Using a speech made by Blair at
Chatham House on 5 April 1995, Young outlined the value that the Labour leader
placed on Britain and its relationship with Europe:
Britain should be 'at the centre of Europe', 'should set about building
alliances within Europe that enable our influence to grow'. This, he
thought, was about more than fulfilling our national interest. To hesitate
before our European destiny, he rather more boldly said, was 'to deny our
historical role in the world'. The role was to be 'a major ~lobal player',
and would be forfeit unless we accepted Europe as our base. 9
What this example thus shows is the major gulf that existed between two strands of
the Labour Party with regard to their respective stances on the' role of Europe within
British politics. The differences espoused here on a more general level become much
more apparent when applied to a local, specific situation, such as the conflict in the
Balkans. Hence, studying the arguments surrounding the part played by the European
Union in the break-up of Yugoslavia provides us with a succinct summary of the
potentially divisive nature of the debate, and the general confusion that existed during
the entire four-year period on the issue of how the international community should act
during the Balkan wars. Looking to the European Union was natural for some.
37
3slbid, p119.
Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair (London: Macmillan,
!?98. Papermac edition 1999)
Ibid, p485.
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Kinnock et al were New Europeans. Just as natural was a conspiratorial Euro-
scepticism. What Bosnia did was accentuate this tension in the Party and thus make it
too divisive a potential solution.
PRECURSORS TO BLAIR? THE LABOUR PARTY AND NATO
The part played by NATO during the conflict in the Balkans is worth discussion here
because although easily fitting into the dominant theme of the debates on how the
international community responded to the crisis, it also shows how discussions
emerged on the redefinition of the alliance's mission in the wake of the end of the
Cold War. Now I will examine NATO's role in the Balkans, and how the discussions
on this topic evolved in the House of Commons, alongside contributions made to the
debate on any future role for the alliance in the post Cold War world.
Any concern regarding NATO action in the Balkans was dismissed just over a
year after the Bosnian conflict started by the Labour front bench spokesman, Dr
David Clark. In the November of 1993, he welcomed the opportunity given to NATO
forces to intervene in Bosnia.4o This was within the context of a broader examination
of issues arising from the end of the Cold War. For NATO to survive following the
collapse of communism it had to adapt and adjust its original remit. Itwas to this that
Dr Clark referred when addressing the alliance's role in the Balkans; thus NATO's
longer term survival would be guaranteed.
George Robertson, a front bench politician who later went on to become
Defence Secretary in the Labour Government elected in 1997, and following the
military intervention in Kosovo, became the Secretary General of NATO, outlined his
40
Dr David Clark (South Shields), Foreign Affairs and Defence (Official Report, Hansard: 19
November 1993) Vol: 233, Columns 175 -177.
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view of a changing role for that organisation In a debate on International
Peacekeeping in 1993:
.... Peacekeeping means newly reinforcing old institutions. It means giving
life to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and making
it work well. It means seeing what new role NATO can play. NATO
exists, so it has a value beyond the simple institutions which it represents
today. Therefore, its new role must be developed to encompass its wider
responsibilities beyond the military role which it had previously."
This idea of an enhanced role for the alliance was also apparent in a speech
given by Dr David Clark over one year after his colleague's comments. Clark
highlighted the part that Labour played in both the creation of NATO (during the post
war Attlee government), and the way that the party supported its existence during the
Cold War. In his speech, Clark acknowledged the need for NATO to change to fit the
different world order, and urged others to support this development:
....... .1 often hear debate in the west about whether NATO has a role. It is
interesting that I hear that question only in the west. I do not hear it in the
east because people there are certain that NATO has a future. They know
that if it had not been for NATO, we would not be in the position that we
are now in. They know the effectiveness of NATO. The great challenge
for us in the west is how to change NATO. It has to change, yet it must
retain its effectiveness.
The Labour Government were instrumental in the formation of NATO.
We have always stood by our commitment to NATO. We regarded it in
the past as the linchpin of our defence strategy. We still regard it as such,
but it has to change. It has to move with the world. It is a great pity that
Her Majesty's Government have not taken the lead in pressing for changes
in NATO. There have been movements in the past two weeks. We
welcome late conversions, but I feel that the enthusiasm is not there.
Surely we ought to take much more positive steps to bring some of the
former eastern European Warsaw pact countries into NATO.42
This extract, provides a neat summary of the divergence of views that existed within
the Labour Party on the issue of NATO. Clark and Robertson's suggestions regarding
a more interventionist role for NATO provide a hint of what was to follow, with
41
George Robertson (Hamilton), International Peacekeeping (Official Report, Hansard: 23 February
1(93) Vol: 219, Columns 849 - 852.
Dr David Clark (South Shields), Orders of the Day: Debate on the Address, Foreign Affairs and
Defence (Official Report, Hansard: 17 November 1994) Vol: 250, Columns 218 - 222.
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regard to a more proactive foreign policy following Labour's victory at the 1997
General Election. The sentiments behind this view of a further enhanced role for
NATO are apparent in a speech given by Tony Blair in 1995. By then, he was Leader
of the Opposition and the extract demonstrates the type of measured language with
which the British Parliament and public is by now very familiar. Blair said:
.... There is no doubt - there is no point in denying it - that this has been a
profoundly unhappy experience for the international community. Yet, the
errors and the uncertainty have arisen from the nature of the conflict itself.
The choice is, has been and remains: do we stay out and let the conflict be
resolved by force or do we become involved in order to provide at least a
chance for a diplomatic solution to be found? However long this conflict
h hoi . h 43goes on, t at c oice remams t e same.
Although Blair's comments seem careful not to offend or to offer too extreme an
opinion, with no firm detail, they do provide a glimpse of the future interventionist
foreign policy that he would later advocate in amongst other places, Kosovo and
Sierra Leone.
However, m the first half of the early 1990s and the earlier break-up of
Yugoslavia, the Labour Party was in no way unanimous in its support for any
extension of a role for NATO. Instead, by way of a contrast, concern at a more highly
visible and proactive position for the defensive alliance was apparent throughout these
conflicts. The issue of its involvement in the Balkans was raised by Labour politician
John Spellar, whose speech in April 1993 highlights many of the concerns which were
raised about extending the terms of intervention in the area:
If this were not a United Nations operation, would a UN-sanctioned
NA TO force be involved? Is it proposed, even, that if United Nations
agreement could not be secured, a NATO force should act on its own
account? ...
NATO would be taking a dramatic step if it moved from being part of a
defence pact to being a world policeman, able to intervene throughout the
globe. It would have to take a far greater step than any taken in the Gulf
43 Tony Blair (Sedge field), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns 1007 -
1009.
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war, which involved a clear military objective, a clear international
principle and a simple and straightforward issue. Favouring intervention
in a civil war in Yugoslavia would represent a dramatic change in
NATO's terms of reference, which would require serious consideration
and a major debate before any action was taken.44
This caution was mirrored in comments made by Tony Benn, speaking on the same
subject later on in the Bosnian war, in 1995. Benn was concerned about the apparent
dichotomy of British and French troops, under the guise of the United Nations,
distributing humanitarian relief, and then other troops, under NATO command, being
involved in air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. He stated:
... .1 have already put this point to the Prime Minister; let me put it again,
as vividly as I can. We cannot have British or French soldiers in blue
berets acting as humanitarians, and pilots in blue helmets bombing: that is
not a sustainable position. That issue must be clarified.
I am also not happy about NATO's taking over the role of the United
Nations. We are about to celebrate the so" anniversary of the
establishment of the United Nations, which - as the House must know -
was set up to secure the peaceful settlement of differences. I was much
moved at the time, as I still am when I reflect on the UN's charter. NATO
cannot take over the agency responsible for the UN; if it does, I envisage
many other dangers. NATO may, for instance, aspire to playa larger part
in what it calls out-of-area functions, as part of the new world order. That
is not at all what the United Nations is about. ... 45
Berm's latter comments regarding the role that NATO could play in a 'new world
order' tie into the general debate that had taken place regarding the function of the
alliance in the post Cold War world. Further remarks by the stalwart of the Labour
back benches, made at the end of the Bosnian war, do more to illustrate his opinion of
the defence alliance:
Is the Secretary of State aware that there are other interpretations of what
has happened? The break-up of Yugoslavia was brought about by the
recognition of Germany, and has been followed by the arming of Croatia
by the United States, the use of massive air strikes - in which more bombs
were dropped by NATO than by all of the other parties throughout the war
- and the ultimatum at Dayton. Is it really the case that a NATO
44 John Spellar (Warley), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223, Columns 1215 -
1217.
45 Tony Benn (Chesterfield), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns 1021
-1022.
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occupation of former Yugoslavia - for that is what is involved, with about
60,000 troops deployed to keep the peace - and the requirement to
introduce a market economy constitute anything other than a very unstable
future which sidelines the UN? That is one of the anxieties that many
people will feel when they hear what the right hon. and learned Gentleman
has said.46
The reader is left in no doubt at all as to the position that the older politician takes
with regard to how the international community has dealt with the situation in the
former Yugoslavia. Thus one can see a broadly internationalist pacifist discourse
emerging to challenge the growing claims to use NATO in the Balkans.
The Labour Party's reaction to any potential role for NATO in the Balkans is
split between those welcoming the alliance into the arena, and those displaying either
caution or clear opposition. It is perhaps no surprise that those in favour of an
enhanced place for NATO in the region were figures that loomed large on the Labour
Party front bench after the 1997 election victory. However, it is more difficult to
provide a neat summary of those in the second group, that is, the politicians who
voiced concern about the increased role for NATO in the aftermath of the break-up of
Yugoslavia. Tony Benn is clearly a figure of the 'traditional' left, who would have
had a natural antipathy to the American led alliance. However, the other figure
mentioned here, John Spellar, went on to become Minister of State for the Armed
Forces, and voted in favour of the Iraq war.47 It is not incorrect to suppose then, that
he is difficult to position as one who would typically oppose military action.
46 Tony Benn (Chesterfield), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 22 November 1995) Vol:
267, Column 664.
47 John Spellar served as a junior minister at the Ministry of Defence between 1997-1999, and was
Minister of State for the Armed Forces between 1999-2001. More details of his political career are
available on http://politics.guardian.co.ukiperson/parliamentlO,,-4912,00.htmIHis voting record on Iraq
is available at the following website: http://theyworkforyou.com/mp/john spellar/warley
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown how the Labour Party analysed the way in which international
institutions could solve the crisis in the Balkans. The extracts that have been selected
can be taken as a wider summary of the divergence of opinions that existed
throughout the Labour Party. There are, of course, elements of difference between
front and back bench politicians. This is something that one would expect in any
analysis of the way in which a Parliamentary political party responds to a crisis.
However, and as has been shown in this chapter, what is apparent here, is the
complexity of the contrasting positions which existed between party colleagues, and
the possible motivating factors which could explain such varied views. Differing
opinions also manifested themselves on the backbenches between politicians of the
same party. What has been shown here is that alongside traditional left-wing
responses to the break-up of Yugoslavia, perhaps best epitomised by strong support
for the role of the United Nations; there was already apparent a more pro-
interventionist strand within the party, displaying characteristics that fully manifested
themselves in its foreign policy once Labour was elected in 1997.
In summary then, there were a variety of responses by Labour politicians to
the part played by the different international institutions within the Balkans. As has
been shown here, there was support across the party for the role played by the United
Nations. This was a common sentiment for those across Labour. Where differences
lay however, was in the practical failures of this institution; the U.N. as a concept was
supported by all, but frustration grew at its inability to manage the conflicts
effectively. In particular, of those highlighted here who were more critical of the
United Nations, two figures, Robin Cook and John Hutton, went on to hold senior
Cabinet posts in Tony Blair's different governments. By virtue of their close links
86
with him, they will be inextricably linked to his more interventionist style of foreign
policy.48 Likewise, the idea of a 'new world order' raised debate within the House of
Commons. What was lacking however was any real substance arising from such a
theory. Of interest here is that two of the politicians to speak with some scepticism
about this new departure for foreign affairs were, or became, prominent figures within
the world of international relations and defence; Robin Cook obviously as Foreign
Secretary, and Bruce George as a senior figure in the House of Commons Defence
Committee. The European Union proved similarly divisive amongst politicians within
the Labour Party. As has been shown, this institution had historically provoked a
variety of responses, and this was no less the case at the time of the dissolution of
Yugoslavia. Those in favour of the E.U. and its policy were from front and back
bench alike. The group that was critical of the institution and its policy towards the
break-up of Yugoslavia does not include high profile front bench figures. However, it
is important to state that this group is by no means homogenous in its criticism, and in
the observations that it made in debates. Some of these politicians do not employ the
strongly held 'Euro-sceptic' language of their colleagues. Therefore, it is too
simplistic to label these discussions as being between Europhiles and Euro-sceptics.
Finally, NATO proved to be an equally difficult issue for Labour M.P.s. Whilst long-
held hostilities prevailed, there were also the antecedents to the more interventionist,
supportive stance taken by the Blair Government, elected in 1997. Of the four areas
under discussion then, there was a distinct group of politicians speaking either in
favour, or against a particular institution's role in trying to resolve conflicts in the
Balkans. Thus, the multitude of views held by politicians within the Labour Party
mean that it can be seen as being no different to other elements of the British left
48 Although Robin Cook did resign from the Government in 2003 due to his opposition to the war in
Iraq, he was Foreign Secretary and thus played a prominent role in earlier Blair outings into foreign
affairs, namely, the NATO action against Serbia to name just one (1999).
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wmg, or indeed wider across the entire political establishment, in its multilateral
approach to positioning the Yugoslav conflict in the international arena.
Of further relevance to the general themes outlined in the thesis, this chapter
has also shown the way in which the use of stereotype was used in these debates
regarding the role of the different international institutions. Very often, colourful
phrases and convenient labels were used to reinforce the various speeches made in
Parliament on debates relating to the break-up of Yugoslavia. Thus, negative
comments regarding NATO as well as colourful phrasing to describe aspects of the
European Union's policy are all apparent herein. This observation ties in to a general
trend that is visible throughout this thesis, that is regarding the use of stereotype and
other labels. What has become clear is that this device was not restricted with regard
to describing the Balkans, but was employed when discussing other countries and
international institutions.
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CHAPTER THREE
STARTING TO INTERVENE - SANCTIONS AND ARMS EMBARGOES
The purpose of this and the following two chapters will be to outline the various
debates that surrounded the different types of intervention implemented or discussed
at the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. This very subject
was at the core of the deliberations by the international community regarding their
reaction and response to events in the Balkans. The multi-layered debates that took
place perfectly encapsulate the complexities and difficulties that were highlighted by
the broader issue, namely what the world should do in the former Yugoslavia.
The first point for consideration here is the very definition of the term
'intervention'. I would suggest that at the very least, and with a minimum level of
contention, the term can be defined, in the context of international relations, as the
delivery of humanitarian relief, for example food and medical supplies, to an area
affected by disaster, either natural or, as in this case, manmade, such as war. At its
most extreme, intervention is when full-scale military involvement, even through the
use of ground troops, is used to bring resolution to a conflict. Obviously, the former
type is more likely to be implemented by national governments due to domestic
political considerations than the latter; a full-scale military campaign would normally
prove to be much more problematic to 'sell' to an electorate.
The debates on the very issue of intervention are so extensive that the topic
will be divided between the next three chapters. Firstly, in this chapter, I will examine
Labour responses to the initial policies that were implemented by the Conservative
Government, normally when acting collectively as a member of an international
institution such as the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO. Typically,
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these interventions were non-combative and revolved around policies not directly
involving military action, such as the implementation of economic sanctions. The
chapter which follows will outline debates surrounding the implementation of more
active types of intervention. As will be demonstrated, this focussed on military action
such as air strikes with minimal risk for the external states involved. The fourth
chapter of the thesis will focus on a series of debates that reflected the desperate
escalation of events on the ground, with the proposal of more audacious policies of
intervention. Typically, for reasons that have been mentioned, this and the following
chapter discuss actual, implemented policies belonging to the milder end of the
interventionist scale. More extreme types of action, and suggestions on policies that
were much more problematic, and unlikely to be implemented, for example, the issue
of introducing ground troops, form the basis of discussion in the third of these
chapters examining the issue of intervention.
Within this thesis there are arguments both for and against the different types
of intervention. Contained within either group, Labour politicians are further split
between the front and back benches. The various divisions are important in that they
highlight the vast range of responses and myriad of opinions that existed during this
period. As will be shown, there was little consistency amongst the groups which
emerged on either side of the intervention debates. Proponents for or against particular
policies were not necessarily driven by the same reasons. Indeed, the very issue of
intervention, the way in which the definition was used in different - and very often,
emotive - ways, cannot be wholly isolated to specific strands of the Labour Party.
Instead, what will become apparent is that this was a topic that cut across traditional
ideological currents within the Party, leading to divisions in somewhat surprising
places. For example, the response of those on the more pragmatic, consensual front
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bench did not always mirror the VOIces of the 'traditional' left wmg on the
backbenches. Similarly, those of the so-called 'old' left did not always share the views
of other traditionally left leaning politicians. Some of these politicians thus held
somewhat surprising views on how the break-up of Yugoslavia and the subsequent
issue of intervention should be resolved. What is certain is that the issue of
intervening in the Balkans is one that provoked a multitude of responses; and the
contributors to these debates cannot be formed into convenient, ideologically similar,
tidy groups. In order to demonstrate this, this chapter will now look at the debates on
policies that were implemented in the Balkans by the international community. After a
general discussion of the notion of 'humanitarian intervention' this chapter will
examine debates over actual "limited interventionist" policies such as economic
sanctions and the arms embargo. What becomes apparent is that whilst it is easy to
agree on the implementation of vague, general terms such as 'humanitarian
intervention', differences of opinion manifest themselves when discussing specific
policy ideas. So, for example, debates surrounding the issue of economic sanctions are
characterised by a mixture of front bench and back bench figures supporting the
policy, or calling for an extension of such an approach, or using the policy as a means
to criticise the Conservative Government. Whatever the motivation, these Labour
Party politicians were all in favour of economic sanctions. However, opponents of the
policy were drawn from the back benches and did not have a clearly defined argument
supporting their position: each politician used a different reason when opposing the
implementation of sanctions. Different motivations included viewing sanctions as a
threat to the sovereignty of a country, feeling that it was not the right time to
implement such a policy, and arguing that they should be applied universally across
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the region. Thus, identifying a core group with a coherent line of argument becomes
difficult. This is a trend which is apparent throughout the thesis.
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION - THE WIDER DEBATE
The types of intervention actually implemented in the Balkans tended to be those that
produced as little risk as possible for external states wary of involvement in, what
many perceived to be, a civil war. Normally, general discussions on the role that
humanitarian intervention could play in the Balkans produced widespread agreement.
After all, at its broadest, and as has been mentioned in the introduction, this policy
includes the distribution of relief, that is food and medicine, and it is somewhat
unlikely that politicians would argue against the implementation of such a strategy. As
will become apparent later in this, and subsequent chapters, disagreements occurred
when discussing highly specific ideas of how to resolve the Yugoslav crisis. Though
the term 'humanitarian intervention' covered a plethora of options, the phrase itself
was vague enough to provoke unanimous agreement. In these early days of the break-
up of Yugoslavia, for example, up to 1992, use of the term 'humanitarian
intervention' presented none of the problems apparent in scholarly definitions of the
phrase, for example, Nicholas J. Wheeler's observation that "(h)umanitarian
intervention poses the hardest test for an international society built on principles of
sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force.") Of similar contrast before the
war in Bosnia started, was the view of RJ. Vincent that humanitarian intervention
was an "(a)ctivity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states, or an
international organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of
1 Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics' in John Baylis and Steve Smith
(eds.), The Globalization of World Politics - An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997. Reprinted 1999) p392.
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another state.,,2 These more contentious views of humanitarian intervention were not
necessarily relevant at this early stage of 'relief effort' based assistance. As I will now
show, attention to detail tended to be a divisive factor in discussing intervention in the
Balkans; the vagaries of general terms were not problematic. The tensions raised in
both Wheeler's and Vincent's definitions manifested themselves only when more
proactive, interventionist strategies were introduced at a later date.
The early Westminster debate on United Nations Operations in September 1992
outlined the official Labour Party position on the use of relief convoys to the former
Yugoslavia. Dr David Clark, the Shadow Defence spokesman stated that:
.... We do not demur from the Government's decision to involve British
troops in Bosnia. Indeed, we called for such action early in August. If the
United Nations considers it appropriate to deploy troops to support
humanitarian convoys in their efforts to get vital food and medicine
through to beseiged (sic) citizens and to protect the released detainees, the
Labour party believes that we should do so. As a permanent member of
the Security Council, we have a responsibility to ensure that British troops
play that part, although I emphasise that that has to be under the aegis of
the United Nations and has to be limited to the protection of convoys .... 3
Of note here is the unequivocal support that Clark gave to the United Nations and its
humanitarian role in the Balkans. This is a clear link to the importance placed on the
United Nations by the Labour Party as has been outlined in the previous chapter of
this thesis. It is also important to note that Clark stressed the importance of Britain
playing a role in the Balkans under the authority of the United Nations. It was not
Shadow Cabinet policy for Britain to playa unilateral part in resolving the conflict in
Bosnia. Calls for Britain to playa leading role only developed when it was apparent
that international measures to deal with the Balkan wars were at best inadequate or at
2 From R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1974) quoted in Ibid, p393. The war in Bosnia began in 1992. Until that point, the debates on
intervention in the Balkans were not as vociferous as they would later become. However, the ferocity
of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina led to a rising number of demands for more punitive forms of
intervention.
3 Dr David Clark (South Shields), United Nations Operations (Official Report, Hansard: 25 September
1992) Vol: 212, Columns 179 -182.
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worst failing. Also noteworthy is the emphasis that Clark placed on the extent of the
intervention. At this stage, he underlined that the role of the United Nations was
confined to ensuring the safety of the relief convoys. As will be shown in later
chapters, this is in marked contrast to the calls for a more assertive, interventionist
policy that were made as the conflict developed.
Shadow Cabinet support for the humanitarian, non-military nature of the
involvement of the United Nations was further stressed by Clark in a debate on
Bosnia at the start of January 1993. He stated that:
(W)e were gratified when in September the Government announced in the
House their proposal, which the Opposition had advocated, to detach a
group of British soldiers to protect the United Nations convoys carrying
humanitarian aid to the stricken people in Bosnia. I am glad to have the
assurance of the Secretary of State today that the sole purpose of our
troops deployed in Bosnia is to provide that humanitarian aid.4
This example further emphasises the belief held on the Labour front bench that, at that
time, military intervention was not the answer to solving the crisis in the former
Yugoslavia. Clark's comments show that at this stage of the conflict, on the issue of
humanitarian intervention, the front benches of both major parties held the same view.
However, it is worth repeating that it is somewhat unlikely that politicians would
argue against the provision of relief for refugees and other victims of war: divisions
and heated debate only became visible when more detailed policies were discussed.
Further Labour Party support for limited international humanitarian
intervention, this time from the Shadow Foreign Secretary Dr John Cunningham, was
apparent by April 1993. In a debate on 'Bosnia', Cunningham made clear both his
support for the humanitarian intervention policy already under way in the Balkans,
and his annoyance at those criticising what was being achieved in the region. He
4 Dr David Clark (South Shields), Bosnia (Further Deployment) (Official Report, Hansard: 14 January
1993) Vol: 216, Columns: 1058-1059.
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showed his agreement with the Foreign Secretary's position regarding the work of
Britain's troops in the region. Cunningham strongly contested the view held by
commentators suggesting that 'nothing was being done'. His riposte to that position
was that such a stance undermined the extremely valuable work that was carried out
by the British forces in the region; Cunningham urged everyone to support the relief
effort.' Again, Cunningham's view illustrated that in the early stages of the conflict,
the Opposition front bench was in agreement with the policies being implemented by
the Conservative Government. Of further interest here is the use of the phrase 'our
troops' in Cunningham's speech. Pre-1997, the Labour Party cannot argue that it was
viewed as the party of foreign affairs and defence. The 1980s, for example, were the
era of unilateral disarmament. This particular policy was disastrous for party support,
and Labour spent the 1980s in the wilderness of opposition. Eric Shaw has written
that: "Strategists recognised that defence could never be a vote-winner - hence the
aim of the campaign was to reassure floating voters who were contemplating backing
the Party by calming their anxieties about defence.,,6 At that time, fears about
Labour's position on defence were contrasted with the robust foreign policy of the
Conservatives, perhaps as best exemplified by the then Prime Minister, Margaret
Thatcher. In short, Labour was seen as gambling with Britain's security on the global
stage. However, some ten years later, in Cunningham's speech, the language
employed was that which had a clear resonance with that from the Conservative front
benches; there was little to divide the Opposition from the stance taken by the Major
Government. Efforts had been made to align the Labour Party with a positive aspect
of foreign policy, namely humanitarianism. In addition to this, the strongly displayed
5 Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 23 - 24.
6 Eric Shaw, The Labour Party Since 1979 - Crisis and Transformation (London: Routledge, 1994)
p73.
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praise for Britain's troops ansmg from the Labour Party side of the House of
Commons had the result of giving the party some much needed patriotic kudos.
Cunningham's view would change just a few weeks later, when, in line with
growing back bench calls for a tougher international stance, he urged the Government
to re-examine its policy towards the former Yugoslavia:
.... We now face circumstances where the credibility of the United Nations
itself is being questioned, not just by hon. Members and not just by people
in the West as a whole but by many people in Muslim countries, and
people in Muslim Governments too.
I want to begin, therefore, by making it clear to everyone that any action
that Opposition Members would support, any new departure that we
would endorse, would have to be firmly authorised under the provisions of
chapter 7 of the United Nations charter, specifically article 39 which says:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security."
I do not believe that we should depart from those provisions.'
Cunningham's speech demonstrated considerable caution, again with an emphasis on
the importance of acting under the auspices of the charter of the United Nations. As
chapter two demonstrated, a key tenet of contemporary left-wing foreign policy,
indeed possibly the only principle on which Labour Party politicians usually agreed in
this period, was the reliance and belief placed on the role of that particular institution.
This fits within a traditionally internationalist approach to foreign policy as
demonstrated in Michael R. Gordon's study, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's
Foreign Policy 1914 - 1965.8 He argues that, in relation to the Labour Party and its
approach to internationalism: "It was thus necessary to go beyond the nation-state, to
aim at a more encompassing community.l'" On the face of it, Cunningham follows this
7 Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 1178 - 1180.
8 Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1914 -1965 (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1969)
9 Ibid. p14.
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tradition. He asserts that it is the 'encompassing community' - embodied in the
United Nations - that must prevail. However, the U.N., particularly the five
permanent members of the Security Council, is not that encompassing. One could
argue that Cunningham therefore moves away from the global, internationalist voice
as described by Gordon, and resorts to a narrower, traditional power-based real-politik
style of foreign policy thinking.
The complexities of the nature of 'humanitarian intervention' were debated in
the House of Commons as late as the final year of the war in Bosnia. In a general
debate on the former Yugoslavia, Dr David Clark, the Shadow Defence spokesman,
highlighted the very problems inherent in the term 'humanitarian intervention',
making particular reference to the issue of peacekeeping and the real problems raised
by that general term. Referring to a British Army document entitled "Wider
Peacekeeping", Clark explained subtleties of difference that existed between
peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping and peace enforcement. He used the example of
Corporal Mills, a British soldier awarded the Conspicuous Gallantry Cross, who had
described his experience in Bosnia thus:
"Working for the United Nations in Bosnia is an extremely difficult job.
You are not there to fight a war. Your aim is to ensure that the food and
other supplies get through to the Bosnian population - the victims of the
war. You never know when one of the warring factions is going to take a
dislike to the UN and start taking pot shots. You have to be prepared for it
and respond to the situations as they occur."
Corporal Mills puts in clear terms Britain's mandate in Bosnia. It is
incumbent on us all to make it clear to our constituents that restricted
mandate and the fact that we do not have a peace enforcement role. Our
rule is to get the humanitarian aid through, and we have been most
successful in that. As long as British troops can continue to do that, we
ought to support them .... 10
10 Dr David Clark (South Shields), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol:
259, Columns 582 - 650.
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What is striking about this extract is that, even in the last six months of the Bosnian
war, a leading figure of the British Shadow Cabinet was clearly espousing the view
that Britain's role in the intervention in Bosnia was restricted to that of a humanitarian
mission. In the same speech, Clark went on to pay a particular tribute to the efforts
played by British troops in the region during the crisis. He said:
We believe that our troops and UNPROFOR have been doing sterling
work. We believe that they have kept alive tens of thousands of people,
and that they are giving us the breathing space during which we can
pursue diplomatic solutions. We equally accept that there may come a
time when the risks to our troops are so great that we cannot justify them
being there. If we can keep our troops there, and if they can continue
doing a worthwhile job, the Government will have our support, as do the
troops. I I
Thus, even in the May of 1995, when war had been raging in Bosnia for over three
years, Britain's prosecution of a strictly humanitarian role was of key importance to
the Shadow Defence spokesman; even to the extent of withdrawing troops if the
situation on the ground there became too dangerous.
Such opinions were not restricted to the front bench. Continued support for
humanitarian intervention at this late stage of the now bloody and genocidal conflict
was visible from back bench Labour M.P. Mike Gapes. Speaking in a debate on
Bosnia on 31 May 1995, he gave his ongoing support to this type of policy in the
Balkans:
I believe in humanitarian intervention by the United Nations and Ibelieve
in internationalism and support for people who are suffering from
starvation and oppression. However, I do not believe in being used and
manipulated to fight somebody else's war whether it is being done from
across the Atlantic or from our own continent. Therefore, we should not
allow the justifiable increase in our forces going in to provide protection
for our own peacekeepers to become an incremental escalation towards a
I . d fi' . I 12onger-term, m e mite mvo vement.
11 Ibid.
12 Mike Gapes (liford, South), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns
1084 - 1085.
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These comments clearly show that extending the role of troops in Bosnia was not on
the agenda, at least as far as Mike Gapes was concerned. For him, military
involvement was as part of an enhanced relief effort rather than anything more
comprehensive: certainly, more proactive military action was not an issue. Thus
remarks on humanitarian intervention were all obviously in favour of the role played
by the United Nations in terms of delivering the relief effort. Opposition to the
provision of food, medicine and other supplies was unlikely.
This fairly limited view of intervention led Brendan Simms to offer a damning
critique of the way in which the Labour Party acted during the initial stages of the
break-up of Yugoslavia. He states: "The most striking thing about the parliamentary
response to war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was the absence of any concerted
attack by the opposition on government policy. Instead, during the early stages, the
Labour Party was a retardative factor.,,13 Simms argues that there was very little to
distinguish the responses of either of the two main British political parties. This
comment fits the model that we have seen thus far, that is, both Labour and
Conservative front bench politicians held a united position on the issue of support for
intervention; this was centred very much on the provision of relief supplies for the
local population, with little support for a more intensive and proactive stance.
However, it would be wrong to depict all Parliamentary members of the Labour Party
as being 'retardative'. As will be shown throughout this thesis, for the duration of the
wars in the former Yugoslavia, there were repeated interventions by politicians on the
Opposition benches, calling for tougher action from the Major Government. It will
become extremely clear in the chapters which follow that there was a cohort of figures
who regularly called for a more comprehensive British policy towards the Balkans.
13 Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour - Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: AJlen Lane, The
Penguin Press, 2001) p297.
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This will be explored in more depth herein. I will now outline the various debates
concerning more specific examples of intervention during the break-up of Yugoslavia,
firstly the implementation of sanctions, and then the arms embargo.
DOING SOMETHING - INTRODUCING SANCTIONS
It is important to clarify what is meant by the general term 'sanctions'. Sanctions were
imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on 30 May
1992. U.N. Resolution 757 (1992) included a full trade embargo, ban on flights and a
ban on Serbian and Montenegrin participation in sporting evcnts.l" Sanctions were
further strengthened with the implementation of two subsequent resolutions.P Not
surprisingly then, the majority of discussions about this policy took place in the earlier
stages of the period of study. In 1992, during a debate on sanctions in Yugoslavia,
Gerald Kaufman spoke about the issue in some depth. At that stage he was the
Shadow Foreign Secretary. Kaufman said:
We give our full support to United Nations Security Council resolution
757, and we urge that the United Nations sanctions should be rigorously
enforced. As the right hon. Gentleman will recall, Opposition Front-Bench
Members urged such comprehensive United Nations sanctions many
months ago. It is possible that the situation might not have got so
tragically out of hand if action had been taken sooner, but now that action
has been taken, we must hope and work for its success.i"
Thus, a clear difference of opinion was emerging, with the Labour front bench raising
subtle criticism of its Conservative counterparts. This sentiment, that is, the idea of
cross-party division, was further repeated in a later debate by Gerald Kaufman who
returned to the issue of sanctions in a discussion on the European Council.
14 U.N. Security Council Resolution 757 (1992) 30 May 1992.
15 U.N. Security Council Resolution 787 (1992) 16 November 1992: This banned the transportation of
fuel, and steel through the area, unless approved by the sanctions committee. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 820 (1993) 17 April 1993 reinforced the existing sanctions.
16
Gerald Kaufman (Manchester Gorton), Yugoslavia (sanctions) (Official Report, Hansard: 2 June
1992) Vol: 208, Column 715.
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"(S)anctions should have been brought in sooner and been much more
comprehensive. We advocated that. 1 am sorry that our advice was not followed.,,17
His comments show the division between Labour and Conservative front bench
attitudes, with the Shadow Foreign Secretary expressing regret that such measures had
not been taken earlier in the conflict. This particular example suggests that it would be
difficult to agree entirely with Simms with regard to his comment describing the
Labour Party as being a "retardative factor".18 Thus, certainly with regard to the issue
of sanctions, this example shows a departure from the front bench bi-partisanship
previously displayed over the break-up of Yugoslavia. Instead, there were the first
glimpses of party political point-scoring regarding events in the Balkans.
With regard to the adversarial nature of the House of Commons, it is prudent
here to mention the role of the third party of British politics, that is, the Liberal
Democrats, with regard to the break-up of Yugoslavia. Their leader, Paddy Ashdown,
was a constant presence in debates discussing the wars in the Balkans.19 Bringing his
previous experience in the armed forces very much to the fore, Ashdown was a
continued advocate of a much tougher policy of intervention than that which was
being supported by the British Government. His strength in foreign affairs, whether
actual or perceived, was not enough to protect him from barbed comments across the
Dispatch Box in Parliament. One such example dates from 20 October 1992. After a
speech where Ashdown outlined a number of ways in which the British Government
had failed in the prosecution of a sensible policy in the Balkans, John Major retorted
with the following: "I have rarely heard a more arrogant assertion of inaccuracies. As
the leader of the party that barely is, the right hon. Gentleman ought to be better
17
Gerald Kaufman (Manchester Gorton), European Council (United Kingdom Presidency) (Official
~eport, Hansard: 2 July 1992) Vol: 210, Columns 988 - 989.1:Brendan Simms, Op cit., p297.
Paddy Ashdown was Leader of the Liberal Democrats from 1988 until 1999. Following this, he
Worked as the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
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informed about what this country has done. ,,20 What is important to consider for this
thesis, is that the high profile enjoyed by Paddy Ashdown as a leading figure both in
calling for firmer action in the Balkans, as well as a critic of the Government's
position, could very well have acted as a catalyst in getting some members of the
Labour Party to present a more assertive stance. Political point scoring would not just
have been aimed towards the Conservative Government, but also in a rearguard action
against the Liberal Democrats. Due to the difficulty in assessing the impact of cause
and effect, this is an issue which is difficult to measure with any exactitude. However,
it would seem sensible to assert that Ashdown's presence in offering a highly visible
alternative to the policy as espoused by the Tories would surely serve as some
encouragement to the Labour Party front bench to play an active part in this foreign
policy discussion.
The appointment of a new Shadow Foreign Secretary later in 1992 saw a
continuation in Labour front bench assertion of a sanctions policy. In a debate on
United Nations Operations, John Cunningham gave the House of Commons a detailed
appraisal of the situation in the former Yugoslavia. After cataloguing various
violations of sanctions such as claims that Greece had been breaking the embargo
with supplies for Serbia, and Iran supplying arms to Bosnia, Cunningham went on to
explain that strict implementation was the only way in which the sanctions policy
could be made to work. He explained:
If we are to resolve such problems or to have some significant effect on
them without resorting to military intervention, sanctions have to be made
to work. We need much more effort from the Foreign Secretary in his role
as president in the Community and from the Community as a whole to
give effect to UN decisions .....
.. . .In May, the United Nations voted for mandatory economic sanctions. I
emphasise yet again, before I move on to other matters, that the Secretary
20 The Prime Minister, European Council (Birmingham) (Official Report, Hansard: 20 October 1992)
Vol: 212, Column 323.
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of State and the British Government, in the role of presidency, has a major
responsibility in the European context to see that that United Nations
resolution is given real effect. I understand that some people are calling
for a relaxation of sanctions against Serbia. I say that there should be no
such relaxation until the Serbians use their undoubted influence in Bosnia
to help to bring about a ceasefire. 21
The extract again shows how economic sanctions became grounds by which to attack
the Conservative Government for its handling of the situation. At that time,
September 1992, there was a clear demand from Cunningham that the Government
should be taking a tougher line on this issue. He made the point that in order for
sanctions to work, and to bring stability to the Balkan region, they had to be
rigorously implemented. However, the violation of sanctions continued, and these
developments did not see the introduction of a harsher system for policing the
economic embargo. In April 1993, John Cunningham made a further speech, based on
the same two factors, namely recommendations on how the situation could be
improved, as well as implicitly criticising the way in which the Conservative
Government had dealt with the crisis. He criticised the delay in strengthening the
sanctions that were already in place against Serbia. This was, Cunningham argued,
despite the ongoing demands that had been made by politicians from across the House
of Commons, demanding a toughened stance on such a policy. He spoke of the way
that money laundering had become a significant factor in the region. For
Cunningham, that this was carried out within the European banking system, was a
further area of concern, and should be stopped. His speech concluded with a thinly
veiled criticism regarding the expectations of those who felt that the pressure brought
solely by enhanced sanctions would lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict. For
21
Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), United Nations Operations (Official Report, Hansard: 25
September 1992) Vol: 212, Columns 131 - 134.
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him, it was futile to believe that that policy alone would bring the Serbs to the
.. bl 22negotiating ta e.
Further criticism from the Shadow Foreign Secretary was apparent later in the
same month when the House of Commons again debated the issue of Bosnia.23 In the
one exchange, Cunningham offered an even harsher appraisal of the situation. He
clearly outlined how the Government, and the wider European Community, had failed
in ensuring that the sanctions policy was applied effectively.
What appears then is a consistent pattern of Cunningham praising the
Government for the actions and policies that it has implemented, whilst all the while
criticising it for the inadequacy of its efforts. In short, according to Cunningham, there
was always more that the Conservative Government could have attempted in its quest
to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. Cunningham was positioning himself in a
particularly skilful way; his comments showed that he was neither a war-monger, nor
a pacifist, but they left him enough scope to criticise the actions of the Conservative
Government. Obviously, this was a position that he could enjoy by virtue of being on
the Opposition benches, and thus not responsible for formulating British foreign
policy. However, he had the opportunity to present himself in a better light than his
Conservative counterparts; this showed that Cunningham was capable of employing a
high degree of rhetorical skill.
Comments on the efficacy of sanctions were not limited to the Shadow Foreign
Secretary. It is worth considering here the views of other leading figures on the
Opposition front bench. The Labour leader John Smith displayed similar criticisms in
22
Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard:19 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 23 - 2423 •
Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard:29 April 1993 Vol: 223,
Columns 1178-1179.
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a speech made during a debate on the European Counci1.24However, in this example,
as well as criticising the policing of sanctions, in the light of the deteriorating
relationship between Croatia and Bosnia, he argued for the extension of sanctions
within the region. "(Is) it not the case that sanctions are still wholly inadequately
enforced? Should not they now be extended to include Croatia in view of the recent
deplorable activities of the Croats towards their Muslim neighbours?,,25 Another
leading Labour Party figure to mention is the third Shadow Foreign Secretary who
served during the period of this study. Robin Cook, who took the role following the
death of John Smith and the subsequent Shadow Cabinet reshuffle, outlined his own
views on sanctions in May 1995:
I hope that there will be no step to reduce sanctions on Serbia until Mr
Milosevic has at least recognised Bosnia and accepts full closure of his
border with the Bosnian Serbs. To do anything that would relax sanctions
until we achieve that outcome can only encourage the Bosnian Serbs to
believe that, in the fullness of time, the world will come to live with the
present distribution of territory inside Bosnia.26
Cook's views echo those of his colleagues who have already been mentioned; that is,
giving clear and unequivocal support for sanctions in the region, speaking in favour of
a firm implementation of such policy, and finally, presenting a resolve markedly
different from that of the Major Government. Thus, this stance implies that the Labour
Party was capable of greater rigor and efficiency vis-a-vis foreign affairs, and that in
this specific example, it was showing greater concern to what was happening on the
ground within the Balkans.
The other significant front bench Labour figure that has not yet been included in
this discussion on sanctions is Tony Blair. Blair became Leader of the Opposition
24 Included in Mark Stuart, John Smith - A Life (London: Politico's, 2005) are some general
observations on Smith's stance on issues relating to the break-up of Yugoslavia.
25 John Smith (Monklands, East), European Council (Copenhagen) (Official Report, Hansard: 23 June
1993) Vol: 227, Columns 310 - 312.
26 Robin Cook (Livingston), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol:259.
Columns 593 - 595.
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following the death of John Smith in 1994, and contributed to a debate on Bosnia at
the end of May 1995. As part of a long speech outlining Labour's stance on the more
general situation, Blair stated the importance of ensuring the enforcement of the
economic embargo, and asked whether there were enough monitors along the Serbian
border to ensure that supplies did not slip through undetected.t Again, this fits within
the model that we have seen of unequivocally supporting sanctions, with a
determination to ensure that the embargo was effectively enforced and policed. As we
will see in chapter five of this thesis, Tony Blair's appointment as party leader saw
him take a firm stance on the situation in the former Yugoslavia, demonstrating a
more muscular approach to the situation than had previously existed. Indeed, as we
now know, this highly interventionist approach to foreign policy became ever more
noticeable after he became Prime Minister in 1997.
As a postscript to his remarks here, it is interesting to note that on arrival in
Downing Street, Blair spent time analysing Bosnian history. According to John
Kampfner, Blair "had shown little interest in opposition, but wanted to make up for
lost time.,,28 Blair "concluded that Bosnia had constituted primarily a failure of nerve
- one, he insisted to his advisers, that must not be repeated in Kosovo. He confined
himself to the broad outline, leaving the detail to the Foreign Office, which was
adamant that diplomacy had to run its course.,,29 As we now know, in 1999 NATO
acted in anger against the Serbs, over their actions in Kosovo. Blair's role in
mobilising the action is widely recognised as being pivotal to the success of the entire
operation. Anthony Seldon has argued that "Kosovo ingrained in Blair that he was the
bridge between the United States and Europe, and that he uniquely could explain the
27 Tony Blair (Sedgefield), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns 1011-
1012.
28
29 John Kampfner, Blair's Wars (London, The Free Press, 2003) p 37.
Ibid, pp38-39.
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one to the other. ,,30A further assessment of the Prime Minister's performance during
the later conflict comes from John Rentoul. Of Blair's touch stance over Kosovo, he
writes: "(H)e behaved out of character, risking humiliation for no significant political
gain. If it had not been for his insistence that NATO's determination was total and
that all military options were open. Milosevic might have succeeded.v'!
Back at the time, early robust support for the economic embargo was not
restricted to the Labour front bench. Key back bench figures also spoke in favour of
the policy. Ken Livingstone raised the issue of sanctions in a debate on Yugoslavia in
July 1991, asking whether they would be introduced if the situation in Slovenia
deteriorated.f Another Labour politician to express their support for the
implementation of sanctions was Tony Banks. In a debate he expressed his support for
their introduction, but also wanted reassurance regarding their successful
implementation:
Does the Foreign Secretary recall that, about eight months ago, some of us
argued for sanctions to be taken against the then Yugoslavia, especially
against the Serbs, and that we met with blank refusals? Will he tell the
House what attempts will be made to monitor sanctions? He just
mentioned oil and, as there are no natural oil resources within Serbia, if oil
can be cut off clearly sanctions will work. What monitoring will take
place?33
Aside from questioning the stringency of the sanctions, in this extract Banks also
drew attention to the split between Conservative and Labour position on this
particular policy issue. This fits within the type of comments that we have previously
seen, where discussion on foreign policy can also afford an opportunity for political
'point-scoring' against one's political opponents.
30 Anthony Seldon, Blair (London: Free Press, 2004. Paperback edition 2005) p407.
31 John Rentoul, Tony Blair: Prime Minister (London: Little, Brown and Company. Paperback edition,
Time Warner Paperbacks 2002) p531.
32 Ken Livingstone (Brent, East), Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 3 July 1991) Vol: 194, Column
332.
33
Tony Banks (West Ham), Ibid, Columns 717 -718.
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What is thus apparent from this study of those who supported the introduction
of economic sanctions to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) is that, without exception, all of the leading front bench figures serving
in the Labour Party Shadow Cabinet at that time were unequivocal in their support for
the policy. As has been outlined throughout this section, their stance was based on
three key factors, namely firm support for the policy of sanctions, secondly, demands
for a more effective embargo to be implemented, and finally, as the crisis became
more prolonged, criticism - either implicit or explicit - of the position taken by their
Conservative counterparts on the very same issue. This stance was echoed by some of
their back bench Parliamentary colleagues. Taking such a position was good
strategically in that, as Labour was in Opposition rather than Government, it was
impossible for the party to substantiate its claims regarding policy initiatives. They
did not have the opportunity to implement their own solutions. In a broader context,
comments such as this were also indicative of the weakness of the Major Government;
a Labour-generated mood of Tory collapse was apparent.
In many ways, of more interest in this chapter are the views of those who
differed from the status quo in their attitude towards sanctions. Aside from the fact
that all of these figures are on the Labour back bench, what is immediately apparent is
that there was no consensus within these responses. Those criticising the
implementation of sanctions were not necessarily speaking against an economic
embargo per se, but found fault with elements of the proposed policy. Hence, some of
the figures featured here were not specifically against sanctions but argued against
their role at this particular point of the break-up of Yugoslavia. The first figure to
mention is the back bench Labour politician Dennis Skinner. During the break-up of
Yugoslavia, Skinner, as we saw in the previous chapter, had a propensity to contribute
108
to debates in ways that considerably departed from the mainstream; indeed, possibly
in common with his other regular appearances in the House of Commons. Early on, he
offered his opinion regarding the possible introduction of sanctions to the region:
"The Prime Minister referred to a possible economic blockade of Yugoslavia. Is not
that interference in another nation state; and how would he respond if other countries
in Europe or elsewhere told him how to organise Northern Ireland?,,34 Whilst this
stance could be dismissed as the views of a well-known maverick figure, here there
are resonances of the earlier definitions of 'humanitarian intervention', with Skinner
making a point of noting the issue of the sanctity of the sovereignty of the state.
Further examples of opposition - or caution - to the policy of sanctions exist, with
contributions from other back bench Labour figures. Following the implementation of
economic sanctions in May 1992, a Parliamentary debate was devoted to this topic.
Calum MacDonald was one figure who gave a wary response to the latest
development of events:
Is it not a case of adopting a policy of too little, too late, making the
situation much worse and more difficult to deal with? Will the right hon.
Gentleman give details of the time scale within which he hopes the
sanctions will work? Will he make it clear that there must be a cessation
of hostilities by the Serbians within days rather than' weeks, failing which,
other options will have to be considered?35
Thus MacDonald's scepticism towards the policy was two-fold. Firstly, he criticised
the fact that they had been implemented at too late a date, and secondly, it is clear that
he believed that they would only be effective if presented within a broader, more
cohesive policy for the region. Thus, for Macdonald, sanctions should not be an
erratic "sticking plaster" approach to dealing with a serious conflict. This example
shows that contrary to the mainly homogenous picture described by Simms herein
34 Dennis Skinner (Bolsover), NATO Summit (Official Report, Hansard: 12 November 1991) Vol: 198,
Columns 912 - 913.
35 Calum MacDonald (Western Isles), Yugoslavia (sanctions) (Official Report, Hansard: 2 June 1992)
Vol: 208, Column 721.
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regarding ineffectual Labour Party reaction to the break-up of Yugoslavia, there is
evidence to demonstrate that some figures did speak out in favour of a more
organised, cohesive policy of intervention. The situation is not as straightforward as
suggested by Simms.
The final figure to consider here is the Labour politician Robert Wareing. As
will be shown throughout this thesis, Wareing's views on the warring parties in the
Balkans differed significantly from the majority of his Parliamentary colleagues.
Depending on one's perspective, his position on sanctions was either based on what
he saw as the moral equivalence of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, or on a
fairly consistent attempt to show support for the Serbs. Simms has noted how
Wareing was known by the nickname 'Slob-a-Bob', which clearly identifies his
position in the attributing of blame in the region.l? His comments reflected a desire on
his part to treat all of the participants in the conflicts in the same way, irrespective of
how the rest of the world saw them. For Wareing, it was not correct to attribute blame
solely to one nationality; in his eyes, no side was innocent. This extract clearly
illustrates Wareing's position:
With regard to Yugoslavia, is the European Community sure that,
although the sanctions against Milosevic are justified and may bring about
a change in Serbia, they will lead to peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do not
Presidents Izetbegovic and Tudjman have some responsibility for what is
happening in that part of the world? What pressure is the Community
placing on them - or is the even-handed approach by the British
Government before 19 January being thrown away in order to achieve
concessions on Maastricht?37
Wareing's opposition then was clear. A sanctions policy should be applied universally
across the region; singling out Serbia would not lead to peace in the region. Wareing's
36 Brendan Simms, Op cit., p276. The nickname 'Slob-a-Bob' is a reference to Slobodan Milosevic, the
then President of Serbia.
37 Robert N. Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby), European Council (Lisbon) (Official Report, Hansard:
29 June 1992) Vol: 210, Columns 582 - 583.
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stance regarding the nationalities involved in the Balkan wars, together with any
possible motive for such a position, will be examined in more depth in chapter six.
Thus, Labour Party criticism on the implementation of sanctions offers some
important interim conclusions. Opposition, or perhaps more fairly caution, towards
the policy of sanctions was not based on one specific reason. There was no single
principle shaping this side of the debate. Instead, what was apparent was that the
contributors to the discussion were motivated by their very own particular, private
principles and agendas. Thus, Dennis Skinner's views fit with the comments espoused
by him in the previous chapter, and thus do more to portray him as a maverick
outsider operating within the confines of the Labour Party. Calum MacDonald's
opinion on sanctions appears to be linked to his more general views on the conflict,
including a support for and belief in a wider, and more extensive use of intervention.
Finally, Robert Wareing's comments on intervention are plainly linked to his views
on the attribution of 'blame' for the break-up of Yugoslavia. As will be shown in this
thesis, Wareing's contributions to debate very often demonstrated a tendency to offer
an unfashionable, even unpopular, view of the behaviour of the three warring
nationalities, that is Serb, Croat, and Bosnian Muslim, with the M.P. repeatedly taking
the position that the actions of all sides had moral equivalence.
THE ARMS EMBARGO - ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
Closely linked to the issue of economic sanctions was the arms embargo that was
imposed on the whole of the former Yugoslavia when the federal state began to
dissolve in June 1991.38 The arms embargo was applied to the entire region at the very
start of the break-up of Yugoslavia. Thus, the entire country was subject to a ban on
38 U.N. Security Council Resolution 713 (1991) 25 September 1991, embargo on all weapons and
military equipment to Yugoslavia.
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the delivery of all military equipment and hardware. This was strengthened by a
subsequent resolution which re-stated that the arms embargo applied to all of the
countries that had been part of Yugoslavia/" It was this aspect of the resolution that,
as we shall see, became increasingly more controversial and problematic to enforce.
Certainly, as the war in Bosnia continued, many felt that the way in which arms had
been distributed at the start of the conflict, which had been a legacy from the days of
the old J.N.A. (Yugoslav People's Army), meant that Bosnian Government troops
were at a severe disadvantage. This issue, along with other related topics, will be
examined next.
In common with the introduction of sanctions, this was a policy that could be
implemented with no risk to external countries. Put starkly, it would not be a domestic
political issue in the same way as introducing international ground troops to the
region. Thus, the international community could feel that it was acting proactively in
the region whilst maintaining a safe distance. In common with other issues that were
discussed as a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the arms embargo was yet another
topic to provoke serious debate. Again, as well as the views of those on the front
bench, the opinions of the back bench Labour Party did much to add to the complexity
of the whole debate.
Shadow Foreign Secretary John Cunningham outlined his frustration with the
way in which he perceived the arms embargo to be failing, in a debate in November
1992. He said:
.... Why is it that mandatory arms embargoes are not being effectively
enforced many months after they were first voted on by the Security
Council? Why is it that even now we cannot effectively blockade the
principal if not sole aggressor, Serbia, and bring the Serbians to their
senses and stop the appalling slaughter in Bosnia? ....
39 U.N. Security Council Resolution 727 (1992) 8 January 1992.
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We must impose more effectively and rigorously the will of the United
Nations, and I urge the Foreign Secretary to do even more than he has
attempted, to secure a peaceful settlement of those conflicts.4o
The views expressed here by Cunningham were observations that he continued to
make during the break-up of Yugoslavia. A further such example came from him five
months later:
I agree with what the Foreign Secretary said in support of the mandatory
arms embargo. The Labour party is committed in its constitution to the
United Nations. My colleagues and I support the decisions of the Security
Council, and especially the arms embargo. It seems ridiculous that the
people who are arguing for an end to the end to the embargo are, in the
next sentence, advocating military intervention on the ground in
Bosnia ....
We should emphatically endorse the embargo against all the protagonists.
We would not support any unilateral abrogation of it, whether by the
United States of America or by any other country."
Thus, for Cunningham, support for the arms embargo was unequivocal. Similar
comments also came from the Shadow Defence spokesman David Clark. In an
intervention in April 1993, Clark responded to those back benchers, discussed later in
this chapter, who argued for the lifting of the arms embargo. Their motives were
based on a desire to help the Bosnian Government. The arms embargo was applied
universally across the whole region. However, with what many saw as the
disproportionate balance in arms between the Serbs and Croats on the one hand and
the Bosnian Government on the other, calls were made for the embargo to be lifted for
the Bosnians. Clark responded thus:
The Secretary of State is right when he says that we cannot lift the arms
embargo to the Muslims. It has always seemed to us rather crazy to try to
douse a fire with petrol. It never works. Will he confirm that much
weaponry is already in the hands of the 190,000 fighters from the three
sides of the bloody conflict?42
40 Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), European Communities (Official Report, Hansard: 24 November
1992) Vol: 214, Columns 777 -778.
41 Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 23 - 24.
42 Dr David Clark (South Shields), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 14 April 1993) Vol: 222,
Columns 832 - 833.
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Clark's position showed a pragmatic reluctance to offer support for the lifting of the
embargo. Politically, it would be extremely difficult to endorse the arming of one
party in what was popularly viewed as a civil war.
Shortly we shall see that, as the war in Bosnia continued, calls for the lifting of
the arms embargo increased amongst Labour back bench M.P.s. However, even
relatively late on in the war, on the front bench Robin Cook still argued for the
embargo to be enforced. He explained:
I am at one with the Secretary of State for Defence on the question of
lifting the arms embargo. I see no way of lifting the embargo without
immediately pulling out the United Nations presence, with all the
consequences that I have just paraded before the House. As the hon.
Gentleman has raised the issue, let me take this opportunity to issue a plea
to the United States Congress not to make such a decision, and in
particular not to make it unilaterally. Unilateral action by the United
States to lift the arms embargo would have profound consequences not
only for Bosnia and the United Nations presence there, but for the
legitimacy of United Nations resolutions on any conflict around the world
that the United States had chosen to set aside.43
What is of particular significance about this comment is that it came just one week
after the infamous massacre at Srebrenica.44 Cook's opposition to the lifting of the
embargo is argued in the wider context of the harm that this would do to the
reputation of the United Nations. Thus, he placed greater 'moral' weight on that
institution than reacting in an outspoken, spontaneous way to the genocidal events in
Bosnia. As the previous chapter has shown, Labour politicians of all persuasions held
that particular international institution, for all its failings during this period in
international relations, in high esteem. Any action that would lead to the further
weakening of its reputation and damage to its future authority was perceived as being
important to avoid. Hence, in this extract, Cook's concern at the impact that ending
43 Robin Cook (Livingston), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 July 1995) Vol: 263, Columns 1749
- 1750.
44 The Bosnian Serbs began the siege of Srebrenica on 6 July 1995. First reports of a massacre emerged
on 16 July 1995.
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the arms embargo would have on the United Nations is clear to see. At this belated
stage of the conflict then, both Conservative and Labour front bench politicians were
taking the same stance on the issue of the arms embargo. Additionally, the Labour
Shadow Cabinet has been shown to have taken the same consensual stance as the
Conservatives on this policy for the duration of the various Balkan wars. This would
not necessarily have been for the same reasons. For the Labour front bench, support
for the embargo was based on trying to ensure the continued importance of the United
Nations, whilst the Conservative policy would have been based on a desire to
maintain an isolationist position during the conflict.45 Brendan Simms has offered this
appraisal of the position taken by the Conservative Government on this very issue:
"Indeed, thanks to her determined advocacy of the international arms embargo,
Britain would not even allow the Sarajevo government to defend itself.,,46 He has
attributed this to a number of factors, including a view that all of the combatant
groups were equally as bad.47
Of interest then is the homogeneous stance taken by the Labour front bench on
this issue. Lifting the arms embargo would jeopardise the future authority of an
organisation, namely the United Nations, held in great esteem by the Labour Party.
Related to this was the added impact of the tremendous harm to those suffering on the
ground in the region through any subsequent termination of the relief programme.
Also noteworthy was that the views of the Shadow Cabinet presented a type of
pragmatism more likely to be associated with those closer to power. The dogmatism
45 In his work, The Search/or Peace - A Century a/Peace Diplomacy (London, Little, Brown and
Company, 1997), Douglas Hurd examines the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. He explains that based
on national interest, Bosnia would not have been a high priority for Britain. However, he does add that
if military force had seemed a viable "rapid" option, then he would have agreed to it. pp98-99. John
Major explain the policy decisions taken by his Government in John Major - the Autobiography
(London: Harper Collins, 1999. Paperback 2000) pp535-536. The policy focussed on troops protecting
humanitarian relief convoys. The policy was based on two factors: "to save as many lives as we could
while the slaughter continued, and to do all in our power to limit the conflict." p535.
46 Brendan Simms, Op cit., p337.
47 Ibid, p338.
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of politicians further removed from influence and responsibility had no place on the
Labour front bench on this issue. What is clear then is that on the Opposition front
bench there was firm support for the stance that the British Government was taking on
the arms embargo. According to these Labour politicians, the arms embargo should
remain, and if anything, should be enforced much more rigorously than had
previously been the case. The opinions of Government and Opposition on this issue
were thus the same. Simms is particularly critical of the stance that the Labour Party
took on this topic. He asserts:
For the most part, however, Labour policy and rhetoric was
indistinguishable from that of the Major administration. The notion that
all sides to the conflict were more or less equally guilty found widespread
acceptance.... For this reason, the Labour Party opposed military
intervention during most of the war. It was particularly supportive of the
. . I b 48internationa arms em argo.
For Simms then, on the issue of the arms embargo and much else beside, Labour did
not take the opportunity presented to it as the party of opposition; namely, it did not
try to press the British Government into either taking a more proactive stance in the
Balkans or assist the Bosnians. Thus, regarding the Labour Party front bench stance
on the issue of the arms embargo, Simms's outspoken condemnation can, in this
instance, be empirically verified.
The opposing argument for the lifting of the arms embargo is a complex area
of the broader discussion. Back bench calls for the lifting of the arms embargo did
occur. Many Labour back bench politicians saw the Bosnian Government as the
victims of the policy, and argued that as the ban on weapons had been implemented
on a Yugoslav-wide basis since the beginning of the war; this had given the Serbs and
Croats a military advantage. This was the key principle guiding their objections to the
policy. This very point was exemplified in an extract from a Foreign Affairs question
48 Ibid, p298.
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asked by Labour M.P. Jim Marshall. It shows how one particular politician was more
in tune with a leading, albeit outspoken, figure of the Conservative party than with his
very own front bench:
Does the Minister accept that Lady Thatcher is not alone in believing that
the present arms embargo plays into the hands of the Croats and the Serbs,
and places the Bosnia Muslims at a great disadvantage? Does he further
accept that there is an increasing feeling that the arms embargo should be
partially lifted so that the Bosnian Muslims will at least be able to defend
themselves against the atrocities being committed against their nation?49
Marshall repeated similar sentiments in a debate later in the same month.
Does the Foreign Secretary accept that the apparently even-handed
approach to the arms embargo is, in effect, playing to the territorial
ambitions of the Serbs and, to a lesser degree, the Croats? In the absence
of resolve by the west to intervene, or as the west has been unable or
unwilling to intervene, will the Bosnian Government be able to defend
their own citizens and territory only through the availability of arms? The
Serbs and the Croats will still get the arms, but the Bosnian Government
do not have the arms. In the interests of the sovereignty of Bosnia and of
preserving the lives of the citizens of Bosnia, it is essential that the total
arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia should be lifted.5o
The extract shows Marshall to be totally out of step with the policies being promoted
by his very own front bench Shadow Ministers. Ten days later, he repeated demands
for the arms embargo against Bosnia to be lifted. His argument was based on what he
saw to be a lack of action by the international community. In Marshall's view, if the
world did not intend to act to help the Bosnians, then they should at least be given the
means to do so for themselves. He argued:
I am driven to the view that the west intends to take no action, but I
believe that we should at least admit that the Bosnian Government and
nation have the right of self-defence, the right to defend the lives of their
people and to try to defend the integrity of their territory. The only way of
doing that and the only positive policy that can offer the Bosnian
Government is a partial lifting of the arms embargo so that the Bosnian
49 Jim Marshall (Leicester, South), Foreign Office Oral Answers (Official Report, Hansard: 14 April
1993) Vol: 222, Column 822.
50 Jim Marshall (Leicester, South), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 April 1993) Vol: 223. Column
32.
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Government can acquire the elementary means of self-defence which the
west has been denying them."
Aside from Marshall continuing to take a stance that was different from that of his
more senior colleagues, what is also of interest, and has been shown here, is that he
consistently took this position regarding the lifting of the arms embargo. One
explanation for this could be that Marshall represented a constituency with a higher
than average Muslim population. This could lead him to take a more proactive stance
on this issue than politicians from other areas. Such a point is extremely difficult to
verify in that the 1991 Census which would provide the necessary data did not include
a question about religion. However, it is widely noted that Leicester is a multicultural
and a multi-faith city. This feature is acknowledged on the city council's website:
"The city's thriving ethnic minority community accounts for more than a third of
Leicester's population and continues to enrich city life.,,52This is substantiated by data
presented on the website. The most recent figures, from the 2001 Census, show that
Leicester has a Muslim population of 30,885, representing 11.03% of the local
population, whereas, nationally, Muslims account for 2.97% of the population."
Although the period under examination in this thesis covers the previous decade, it is
worth noting that in the Survey of Leicester of 1983, 4.3% of the city's population
were Muslim, thus presenting it as consistently having a larger than average Islamic
population. 54 These statistics would suggest that Marshall was responding, even in
part, to concerns raised within his constituency, and reflected issues brought to him in
his local surgeries.
51 Jim Marshall (Leicester, South), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 1228 - 1229.
52 http://www.leicester.gov .uk/index.asp?pgid=204
53 http://www.leicester.gov.uk/index.asp?pgid=1009
54 Ibid.
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Constituency related motives for participation in debates on this issue are more
clearly exemplified by the remarks of David Young. He argued that the failure of the
sanctions policy to be implemented and policed effectively meant that there was a
great imbalance in weaponry between the Serbs and Muslims, and that steps should be
taken to give the Bosnian Government side the chance to defend itself. Reinforcing
the way in which domestic issues can help influence policy towards an international
crisis, he provided an example based on his own political experience. Young made the
following comments:
There are many Bosnian Muslims in my constituency. One Muslim said to
me, "We appreciate your food and we appreciate the bravery and
dedication of your soldiers in getting it to us, but are we just going to be
kept alive so that eventually we can be raped and butchered?" That is the
challenge that we in this House face.55
Of interest here is that the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina had by no means been
homogeneously Muslim. This means that Young, although mentioning the Bosnian
Muslims within his constituency, was speaking in favour of the Bosnian Government
which originally represented the range of groups within the area. Although
combatants from the Middle East and Asia had gone to Bosnia to fight for the
Government troops, the majority of the population remained more secularly Muslim.56
It was only as the war progressed that the concept of a Bosnian state became more
strongly associated with Islam. However, what Young's contribution to the debate
illustrates, is that the very issue of religion and ethnicity was an extremely complex
one during the break-up of Yugoslavia. Indeed, these remarks also highlight the way
55 David Young (Bolton, South East), Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 26 July 1993) Vol: 229,
Columns 854 - 856.
56 There is a wealth of literature that explores the history and impact ofIslam in the Balkans. One such
example is Noel Malcolm's Bosnia - A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1994. Papermac edition
1996). For a literary depiction of the impact that religion has had in Bosnia see Ivo Andric's Nobel
Prize winning novel, The Bridge Over the Drina (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1959. Harvill
Press edition 1995.)
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in which particular Labour M.P.s did relay the views and concerns of their local
constituents to the House of Commons.
What these examples demonstrate is that almost a decade before the 'War on
Terror' began, with the deployment of US and British forces to both Afghanistan and
Iraq and the ensuing domestic issues regarding Islam and multiculturalism in Britain,
a foreign policy episode, namely the break-up of Yugoslavia, had already led to
Labour Party M.P.s raising concerns in the House of Commons based on the ethnic or
religious background of some of their constituents. The wars in the Balkans,
specifically the conflict in Bosnia, were a series of violent disputes which led some
Muslim members of the public to demand more action from their politicians, and in
tum the Conservative Government. The lack of commitment by the British
Government, and other countries of the international community was to be a long
standing source of tension and resentment within this area of British society.
From the spring of 1994, when the war in Bosnia had been raging for two years,
calls for the lifting of the arms embargo increased amongst Labour politicians. It is
from this point that more of the same names tended to make ongoing contributions to
this particular debate. Tony Banks argued in April 1994 that if the international
community was prepared to allow the Bosnian Serbs to flout international resolutions,
then it should agree to the lifting of the embargo for the Bosnian Muslims.57 In the
same debate, Kate Hoey took the same stance. Using powerful reason, she asserted:
Does the Minister realise that many of us - on both sides of the House -
have been saying for more than two years that the Serbs were not
interested in diplomacy, discussions or talking, and that they were
interested in a Greater Serbia? Does he now agree that, as the international
community has failed so dismally, we cannot sit in the House of
Commons and say that we will prevent the people of Bosnia, including the
57 Tony Banks (West Ham), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 18 Apri11994) Vol: 241, Column 650.
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Government and the Muslims, from being armed and able to defend
themselves if we are not prepared to do it?58
In an example that illustrates both the duration of the conflict, and the ongomg
inability of the international community to deal with the crisis, over one year later
Hoey made a virtually identical speech. 59 Another politician to adopt the same theme
was Max Madden. In just one week, Madden made two requests for the arms embargo
to be lifted for the Bosnian Muslims. On 12 July 1995 he asked the following
question: "(W)hat excuse can be left for denying arms to Bosnian Government forces
to defend their people and territory from external Serbian aggressionv'f" The next
week, Madden repeated his argument, this time making clear the strength of feeling
that he felt towards the situation. He argued:
Since the United Nations, NATO and the international community have
vividly demonstrated their unwillingness and inability to intervene
militarily in a way which would bring this war to an end, and as the
Bosnian Government naturally resist a political settlement resting on
genocide and territorial gains made by external military aggression, will
the Secretary of State, who does not come to this issue with any political
baggage, make it clear that it is now time for the arms embargo to be lifted
and the Bosnian Government to be given the means to defend their people
and their territory against external Serbian aggressionr'"
A final example to illustrate the powerful views held by Labour politicians
speaking in favour of lifting the arms embargo is the following extract, taken from a
detailed speech by Clare Short. Noteworthy here is that Short was on the Labour front
bench, albeit with a minor portfolio, thus making her the exception in those speaking
against the arms embargo.f She stated:
58 Kate Hoey (Vauxhall), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 18 Apri11994) Vol: 241, Column 653.
59 Kate Hoey (Vauxhall), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 12 July 1995) Vol: 263, Columns 955-956.
60 Max Madden (Bradford, West), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 12 July 1995) Vol: 263, Column
965.
61 Max Madden (Bradford, West), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 July 1995) Vol: 263, Column
1741.
62 Shadow Cabinet positions held by Clare Short were Shadow Minister for Women (1993 - 1995),
Shadow Transport Secretary (1995 - 1996), and Shadow Minister for Overseas Development (1996-
1997).
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But we must allow the Bosnian people to fight for themselves. We will
not protect them, and it is absolutely wrong to allow them to be
slaughtered.
The brave Bosnian army has absolutely no equipment, and a people who
have been wronged as much as this people have must be entitled to fight
for their own honour and future. It is unbearable and intolerable that we
neither protect them nor allow them to fight. It is shameful, and I agree
wholeheartedly, although with regret, with the right hon. Member for
Guildford, that we must now move on and plan for the future, so that the
Bosnian people can fight for themselves.r'
Her view on the arms embargo, specifically the injustice of it for the Bosnian
Government, is clear. Yet again, a British politician had spoken passionately on the
subject, and shown the frustration felt by those who thought that more should be done
to try to relieve the situation in the Balkans. Similarly of interest, is the reference to
the Member of Parliament for Guildford, David Howell. That Short found herself in
agreement with a Conservative politician does more to show the confusion apparent in
the responses to the break-up of Yugoslavia. As has been shown on the issue of the
arms embargo, there was a tendency for Shadow Cabinet Ministers to support the
Conservative Government. Here though, Short was distancing herself from her front
bench colleagues who were supporting the Conservative Government. Instead she was
aligning herself with a Tory back bencher who was clearly at odds with his own
Government. What became apparent was that a multitude of responses existed, and
that they were impossible to always classify along party lines: The example of Short,
showing her agreement with David Howell, illustrates this potnt" Also of interest, is
the way in which someone who could be categorised as being on the left of the
Labour Party was taking a position that one would not necessarily associate with that
part of the organisation; advocating some form of armed assistance is surprising
63 Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 July 1995) Vol: 263,
Columns 1764-1766.
64 David Howell was Chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Throughout the
wars of secession in Yugoslavia he was critical of the Conservative Government and its policies.
Simms, however, describes his interventions as lacking "force and coherence." Brendan Simms, Op
cit., p293.
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considering the importance that pacifism and internationalism have within the British
left wing. This has been mentioned earlier here with reference to Michael R. Gordon's
work Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1914 - 1965. He outlined
what he described as the four typical principles of socialist foreign policy, namely
internationalism, the importance of international working-class solidarity, anti-
capitalism, and anti-militarism, an antipathy to power politics. 65 Thus, Clare Short's
support for the lifting of the arms embargo goes somewhat against what one would
expect to see from within her wing of the Labour Party. In other words, there were
politicians speaking out against this particular policy, vocalising some form of
opposition. These people were thus in favour of introducing a more assertive form of
intervention than had previously be employed in the region. This was then, a clear
departure from the previously held consensual position of placing total faith in the
United Nations, with the means to find peace through negotiation and diplomacy.
Opposition to the arms embargo was focussed on one key issue, that is, the
perceived lack of fairness of this policy towards the Bosnian Muslims. Those
speaking against the embargo argued that this part of the population should have the
right - and the means - to defend itself. By extension, this meant tacit support for a
more prolonged conflict: putting arms into the region would obviously lead to more
fighting. These comments raise some interesting points about the views of the back
bench Labour politicians. For them, the right to self-defence was of more importance
than fears relating to the spread of increased fighting in the region. This is at odds
with a traditional Labour stance on pacifism and anti-militarism. Historical parallels
of this stance can be seen with the position taken by elements of the Labour Party
regarding the Spanish Civil War, and the Second World War. In both cases here,
65 Michael R. Gordon, Op cit. ppI3-43.
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participation in, or support of, a particular cause was of more importance than the
implications of non-intervention. Also of importance here is the part played by
constituency factors. As has been shown, some of the politicians who spoke in favour
of a lifting of the arms embargo were from constituencies that might have viewed this
as a particular issue of concern and interest. Thus, the line between both domestic and
international politics was blurred.
What becomes apparent then in this analysis of Labour Party responses either
in favour or against the arms embargo, is that, in common elsewhere in the thesis, the
differing sentiments were all strongly argued by the various participants of the
debates. The break-up of Yugoslavia and perhaps more specifically, the way in which
the international community responded to the situation, was one that garnered plenty
of passion and commitment especially by those on the backbenches. This was a
situation about which people held strong views and that they cared about. As is the
case in these examples, this was the situation whether examining the views of the
Shadow Cabinet who looked to avoid escalation of the conflict and were opposed to
the lifting of the arms embargo, or those on the back benches who used strident,
vociferous language to state their demands regarding. the lifting of the ban on the
shipment of arms to the Bosnian Muslims. However, their support for the lifting of the
arms embargo to one group involved in the conflict was not mono-causal, which
could perhaps be seen to weaken their argument. It is too simplistic to state that the
Labour Party offered little alternative to the policy of the incumbent Major
Government. Instead what is apparent is that these politicians held a number of
perspectives, some showing agreement with the Government, and some stridently
opposed. Consequently, one could argue that the vast array of views exemplified by
the politicians of the Opposition meant that there was an absence of one consistent,
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homogenous voice that could effectively campaign against the stance taken by the
Conservative Party.
CONCLUSION
This study of intervention at its most basic level in the former Yugoslavia shows that
even supposedly non-controversial policies such as sanctions and arms embargos
raised plenty of debate within the Labour Party. Even here there were discernible
differences in approach between front and back bench politicians. In common with
other debates, what occurred was a split between those in the Shadow Cabinet who, in
the main, tended to take a more bi-partisan stance on the issues under discussion in
contrast with politicians on the back benches. Those politicians presented a multitude
of views in the debates.
The fundamental findings of this chapter are that despite the range of views
and opinions examined, some key elements do exist. Thus, politicians from across the
party showed unified support for the notion of humanitarian intervention. Indeed,
around this particular term, there was a strong sentiment of bi-partisanship within
Parliament as a whole. However, cracks in unity started to emerge when policies
became more specifically defined. Therefore, a clear divide began to appear between
front benches of either party on the issue of sanctions, with the Shadow Cabinet
criticising the Government for its slow, ineffectual approach. Thus, John
CUnningham, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, regularly called on the Government to
do more regarding the enforcement of this policy. Conversely, the Labour Party front
bench, which included Cunningham, showed support for the arms embargo which was
fairly consistent with the position held by the Tories. As one prominent example
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then, Cunningham was strongly opposed to one Government stance, whilst being in
support of it in another policy area.
The position amongst politicians on the Labour Party back benches continued
to demonstrate a wide degree of stances and opinions. Whilst sanctions received the
support of some back benchers, other M.P.s were critical of such a policy. As has
been stated herein, this was not for a sole reason; a ranch of arguments was used,
including the idea that a country's sovereignty was being threatened, it was the wrong
time to introduce such a policy, and that sanctions should be applied with equanimity
across the region. Opposition against the arms embargo was voiced by a number of
Labour back bench politicians. Typically, those who spoke out against this policy
demonstrated a range of motivations, and presented views that were unlikely to be
voiced by those on the front bench; the importance of portraying a consensual Shadow
Cabinet stance would have negated any such comments. Therefore, concerns
regarding the fears of local constituents, and the notion that as the Bosnian
Government had seemingly been abandoned by the international community they
should at least have the chance to defend themselves were all features of back bench
dissent on the arms embargo. There was then, a greater complexity and depth of views
in the Commons debates than is sometimes assumed. For instance, Brendan Simms's
critical assessment of the situation has been well documented here. However, James
Gow has offered a similar view. His work, Triumph of Lack of Will - International
Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War, offers a study centred around international
relations approaches to the conflict in the Balkans.66 Although he concentrates more
on international responses than the British domestic political scene, he still offers
comments that resonate with the position taken by Simms. Gow argues that "(t)he
66 James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will- International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (London:
Hurst & Co., 1997)
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major fault with British policy, therefore, was its pusillanimous realism.,,67 However,
what has been shown within this chapter, is that some politicians were prepared to
speak out, and argue against a policy that they felt was unfair and unjust. I have then
shown that the criticisms vocalised by some within the historiography do not reflect
the entire situation. British political responses, specifically here within the Labour
Party, were not that straightforward, at least among some selected M.P.s. There was
then no homogeneity in how the Labour Party responded to the start of the debate on
intervention in the Balkans. This trend, namely a division between both Labour front
and back bench, and also, within the back benches themselves, is consistent with what
has already been seen in this thesis, and continues into the next chapter on the issue of
more proactive forms of intervention.
67 Ibid, P 182.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ACCEPT ABLE MILITARY OPTIONS?
NO-FLY ZONES AND AIR STRIKES
The last chapter outlined the nature of the 'sliding scale' of policies that could be
introduced and the ones that will be discussed here, that is, the issue of a no-fly zone,
and the introduction of air strikes, are more proactive than those examined previously.
However, the policies were still unlikely to cause much controversy in the external
states involved. It was doubtful that mass demonstrations campaigning against the
imposition of a no-fly zone in the former Yugoslavia would be held on the streets of
European capital cities. However, there was a chance that any future, more extreme
measures would have been met with greater anxiety. What this chapter examines then
is the development of an interventionist policy in the Balkans, albeit one which fell
short of full-scale military action by the international community. Specifically, the
focus of study will be on the imposition of the no-fly zone, and the more proactive
call for air strikes.
It is important to clarify the difference between these two policies. Put simply,
a no-fly zone is an area where the use of aircraft is forbidden. Aside from the impact
on civilian flights, this obviously has implications for either the transportation of
troops and military hardware, or the employment of air strikes in the theatre of war.
Controlling the no-fly zone depends on the will and the resolve of external states,
usually under the auspices of the United Nations, to enforce such a policy. As will be
examined herein, introducing a no-fly zone, and successfully implementing it were
two separate issues entirely. Air strikes in this situation are obviously when forces
acting for an international institution, use strategic attacks on targets which are
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deemed to have maximum impact for the enemy forces, whilst endeavouring to keep
civilian casualties to a minimum. As one would expect, this policy carries a
considerable degree of risk, in that so-called collateral damage can occur, and if this
leads to a high number of casualties, there can be serious repercussions for the
external states prosecuting such a policy; in such situations there could well be a
backlash amongst the domestic population campaigning against such a strategy.
Finally, it is important to note that neither of these strategies is without risk for the
countries involved in such action. Pilots, who are either enforcing the no-fly zone or
implementing air strikes, are obviously in danger of being shot down. Thus, although
either type of operation appears at first glance to present a relatively safe option for
the international community, neither strategy is completely risk-free.
SUPPORTING THE NO-FLY ZONE
The implementation of a no-fly zone was yet another form of intervention discussed
in Parliament, during the search for a resolution to the Balkan wars. Introducing such
a policy over Bosnia-Herzegovina, similar to that imposed on Iraq in 1991, would
have been mainly aimed at restricting the movement of Serbian aircraft.l U.N.
Security Council Resolution 781 (October 1992) established the no-fly zone over
Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the enforcement of such a policy was only determined
by U.N. Security Council Resolution 816 in March 1993. Inevitably, the delay
between the introduction of, and the policing of the no-fly zone led to considerable
debate amongst politicians.
A wide range of figures from across the Labour Party spoke in favour of this
policy. In Prime Minister's Questions on 15 December 1992, the Labour leader, John
1
Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour - Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Allen Lane, The
Penguin Press, 200 I) ppS, 61 - 62.
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Smith, called for the immediate implementation of guaranteeing the no-fly zone over
Bosnia:
In view of the appalling suffering being endured by the inhabitants of
Sarajevo and other besieged towns and cities in Bosnia, will the Prime
Minister join the French and United States Governments in urging the
speedy adoption of the United Nations Security Council resolution to
enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia? ...
While appreciating the concern that the Prime Minister expresses for the
humanitarian efforts, and for the safety of our own troops on the ground,
does the right hon. Gentleman not appreciate that there is a growing
feeling in this country, as there is in the international community, that
there is no point in a no-fly zone which can be defied with such impunity?
The time has come for effective international action. I hope that the Prime
Minister will take the message from the House that he would be widely
supported if Britain supported the other countries in making the resolution
effective.2
There are a number of noteworthy points in this extract. Firstly, the no-fly zone had
already been adopted by the United Nations; what was lacking was an international
will to enforce the policy. Secondly, the role of British troops in a humanitarian
capacity in the region, that is, protecting the delivery of relief convoys, meant that
enforcing the no-fly zone became a very real problem. Any action that would
jeopardise the safety of British troops on the ground in Bosnia would surely be
avoided by the Government. The proper enforcement of the no-fly zone could
obviously lead to casualties amongst forces from the"United Kingdom. This would
clearly be unacceptable at this point for those involved in the political and military
decision-making process as well as for the public at large, and would possibly have
had implications for future policies in the region. Thus in his speech, Smith's call for
the proper policing of this United Nations resolution bore clear differences with the
policy of the Government: at that stage, the Conservative front bench did not take the
same view as its Opposition counterparts. A debate held in the following year
2 John Smith (Monklands, East), Oral Answers - Prime Minister, Engagements (Official Report,
Hansard: 15 December 1992) Vol: 216, Columns 290 - 291.
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regarding the full enforcement of the no-fly zone showed that the Labour front bench
was again in full support of the policy, with the Shadow Defence Secretary outlining
his party's stance on the issue. He said:
I assure the Minister that he has the support of Labour Members in the
enforcement of the no-fly zone as a symbol of the world's belief in the
need to enforce United Nations resolutions and, at the same time, sending
a message to the warring factions of the necessity for them to sign a peace
accord .
. . . .Does he agree that the enforcement must be completely even-handed
with the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslim supporting planes being treated
in exactly the same manner?'
Thus, the Conservative Government had, albeit belatedly, committed itself to a policy
that the Labour leader had given his support to some four months previously.
Significantly, Clark was clear in his view that the no-fly zone had to be applied evenly
across the region, that is, there was to be no partiality in how the resolution was
implemented. One year into the war in Bosnia, where, as we saw in the previous
chapter, there were frequent back bench comments in support of the Bosnian
Government, the Labour front bench spokesman for defence called for the no-fly zone
to be applied with equanimity. Of further significance in Clark's speech is that - for
him - we can see that enforcing the no-fly zone was as important as enforcing the will
of the United Nations per se. The viability of that institution had to be protected. This
resonates with what we have already seen regarding the Labour Party's attitude to the
U.N. and its role in international relations.
SUPPORT FOR AIR STRIKES
There was considerable Labour Party support for the use of air strikes during the
Bosnian conflict. Demand for such action came from both front and back benches. As
3 Dr David Clark (South Shields), No-Fly Zone (Bosnia) (Official Report, Hansard: 1 April 1993) Vol:
222. Column 499.
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has been shown, the Labour Shadow Cabinet supported the implementation of a no-
fly zone long before the Conservative Government. This was also the case with the
issue of air strikes. However, what is noteworthy is that this party support for air
strikes was not part of a coherent general plan towards the Balkans. There was little
elaboration given on how such an intervention could be prosecuted, and how it would
fit into a wider strategy. The suggestion thus tended to fall within the "do something"
camp, that is well-meaning, but suffering from a lack of detail which would obviously
have an impact on a tactical, broader perspective. Likewise, the views of those behind
the Labour front bench did not form a cohesive viewpoint, so back benchers held
opinions on the issue from across the spectrum, either making calls for such
intervention even before their Shadow Cabinet raised the issue, or even strongly
opposing the policy. Thus, the range of responses did not suggest one specific
argument, but rather a variety of opinions. A United Nations resolution authorising air
strikes occurred in June 1993.4 The issue was debated before then, but, as one would
expect, discussion on the issue increased after that point especially once the first
action had been taken in April 1994. The debate continued until the end of the war in
late 1995.
Calls for air strikes first emanated from the Opposition front bench in April
1993. In a debate on Bosnia, John Cunningham gave cautious support to the use of air
strikes due to the further deterioration on the ground in Bosnia. He argued that
"(t)here should be a permanent ceasefire and the Serbs should agree to sign the Owen-
Vance peace plan. Unless they are prepared to do that, the Security Council should
consider authorising a punitive air strike against the Serbs' supply lines in Bosnia."
As will be seen later in this chapter, Cunningham was in agreement with a policy
4 U.N. Security Council Resolution 836 (1993) 4 June 1993.
5
Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 23 - 24.
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proposed by back bench M.P.s Dale Campbell-Savours and Tony Banks just one
week earlier. However, for Cunningham, air strikes formed part of a United Nations
policy towards Bosnia. This more measured tone and vocabulary contrasted heavily
with the views of his back bench colleagues. As will be shown later in this chapter,
Labour politicians away from the front bench were able to demonstrate more forceful
opinions when discussing the issue. This emphasises the difference in tone and
register often employed by those from the front and back bench of the Labour Party.
The next day in Prime Minister's Questions, the Leader of the Opposition added
his support for the introduction of air strikes into the Bosnian war:
While it is essential that the sanctions against Serbia be intensified and
properly enforced, as indeed they should have been months ago, is it not
now necessary for a clear ultimatum to be issued to the Serbs that they
will not be allowed to continue their aggression unchecked and that, if
they continue that aggression, their lines of supply within Bosnia will be
subject to air attack?6
John Smith was to be a strong advocate of firm air-power intervention in Bosnia and,
on the above occasion, used his weekly platform in Prime Minister's Questions to
raise the issue. A further example of this is from the following week when he repeated
his calls for air strikes against the Serbs:
As the horrendous situation in Bosnia worsens even further and as no
clear policy has yet emerged from the international community which
would effectively deter continued Serb advance, is it not the case that the
acknowledged risks of limited air strikes are increasingly outweighed by
the very real dangers of continued inaction? Is there not a serious danger
that if another policy is not adopted, moves will be made to lift the arms
embargo, which would merely intensify the conflict?"
In many ways this extract provides us with yet more evidence of the complexities of
the general debate that surrounded the issue of intervention in the Balkans. What is of
6 John Smith (Monklands, East), Prime Minister, Engagements (Official Report, Hansard: 20 April
1993) Vol: 223, Column 179.
7 John Smith (Monklands, East), Prime Minister, Engagements (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April
1993) Vol: 223, Columns 1148 - 1149. Two months later, Smith again spoke out in support of air
strikes, European Council (Copenhagen) (Official Report, Hansard: 23 June 1993) Vol: 227, Columns
310-312.
133
interest is the way in which, although Smith was in favour of air strikes, he was
opposed to the lifting of the arms embargo. For him, the judicious use of air strikes
had considerable advantage over the dangers that would be incurred through the
freeing of military hardware to the region. So, whilst Smith was in favour of one type
of military action, he was not giving carte blanche to all types of intervention under
discussion. In this one example, we can see how a number of apparent anomalies
existed in attitudes to the Balkan wars. It could be presumed that someone supporting
air strikes would also support the ending of the arms embargo as both policies would
presumably help the Bosnian Government. Smith, however, took a contrasting stance
on either issue. In his view, whilst air strikes would strategically assist the Bosnian
forces, arming them further would lead to an escalation of the conflict.
In a debate on Bosnia, held on the same day, the Shadow Foreign Secretary,
John Cunningham, agreed with his leader and gave his support for the same policy.
He said:
Air strikes have some advantages as well as some disadvantages. They
can be far more readily controlled, politically as well as militarily, than
involvement by ground troops in a combat role. They could be brought to
an end and the situation reassessed after air strikes had taken place if the
Serbians did not accept the ultimatum. However, none of my colleagues
has ever suggested that there are any risk-free options in any of the
propositions that we are discussing in connection with this war.8
Also from the Labour front bench, Dr David Clark the Defence Spokesman added his
support for Cunningham's position.' Thus far the Labour front bench was unified in
its approach to the issue of implementing air strikes. However, in the same debate, the
most interesting comments on the issue of air strikes came from Clare Short, another
Shadow Minister. She took a different stance from the comments that have so far been
8 Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 1183 - 1184,
9 Dr David Clark (South Shields), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223, Column
1243 - 1246.
134
examined. Her opening remarks place her firmly in favour of the idea of air strikes.
However, where she differs from the earlier comments of her front bench
Parliamentary colleagues is that she argued that that type of intervention should have
been used much earlier in the conflict. The failure to do so, according to Short, had
major ramifications for the possible introduction of such a policy at the current stage
of the conflict:
The failure to consider limited air strikes earlier was disastrous. It was led
by those who said that no troops could be risked on the ground. A
generation, thinking of the Serbians as the good guys, roughly speaking,
in the last war, could not see the reality of what was going on on this
occasion. They were scared stiff by any possibility of troops on the
ground and therefore ruled out even the use of air strikes.
When the artillery and the mortars were raining down on Sarajevo -
remember, on the hospital, on the buses full of orphans trying to get away
- if there had been limited use of air strikes then, it might have turned
back the Serbian aggression. However, errors were made and we must
deal with the situation that we face now.l"
Of increased interest in the same debate is that Short argued that air strikes were no
longer the answer:
The second option, the fashionable recent option, is air strikes. That is the
"We have got to do something" option; the "We do not have a strategy,
but it is dreadful just to let it go on. We do not want any troops on the
ground, so let's bomb a few supposed supply lines and pretend that that
will bring the conflict to an end" option. That is not a serious option.
When military spokesmen spoke recently at press conferences about the
need for a serious strategy, they were objecting to air strikes without an
d . . IIun erpmnmg strategy.
Thus, she provides us with a clear example of yet further complexities that surrounded
the entire issue of intervention in the Balkans. Whilst, in principle Short supported air
strikes in the former Yugoslavia, one year into the war in Bosnia she felt that if events
on the ground were taken into consideration, it was too late to use this type of military
option. As has been mentioned then, Short is an interesting example of a politician
10 Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 1237 - 1240.
IIClare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 1237 - 1240.
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from the left wing of the Labour Party. She acted in a way that would not seem
immediately obvious as belonging to someone with her particular ideology; that is, air
strikes seem an unlikely policy for a left-wing pacifist politician to support. However,
one could argue that her actual stance on the prosecution of air strikes is impossible to
verify in that she only spoke in favour of them retrospectively. This means that we
have no way of knowing whether she would have actually supported this policy.
With regard to left-wing support for military action, there are obviously
precedents in the history of the Labour Party. As Rhiannon Vickers has underlined,
probably the best example from the historical record to consider is the way in which
the party responded to the appeasement crisis of 1938. Although the Labour Party was
by no means in favour of provoking a conflict with Hitler over the cause of the
Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, it was, in the main, dismayed by the agreement
secured by Neville Chamberlain at Munich. Clement Attlee viewed the situation thus:
"Munich, he said, left him with the same emotions he had at the evacuation of
Gallipoli, a mixture of humiliation, relief, and foreboding.Y'f The Labour Party, at this
juncture, was relying on the League of Nations to resolve the crisis. Perhaps in
parallel with the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s, at the time of appeasement, they did
not present a clear, alternative plan in the event of their preferred strategy failing.l '
Further calls for air strikes also came from Dale Campbell-Savours and Tony
Banks, who both spoke in favour of this policy in the same debate in April 1993.14
The view of Campbell-Savours was thus:
12 Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Party and the World- Volume 1: The Evolution of Labour's Foreign
Policy 1900-51 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) pl35.
13 Ibid, Chapter 6.
14 There were general mentions of air strikes before this point, but normally as part of broader pleas for
'something to be done'. For example, see Andrew Faulds (Warley, East), European Council
(Edinburgh) (Official Report, Hansard: 14 December 1992) Vol: 216, Column 38. It is from April 1993
that calls for air strikes consistently appear in House of Commons debates.
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Since last August, a number of Opposition Members have positively
supported the use of military intervention, in the form of air strikes,
against Serbian positions because we believe that it is impossible to
negotiate with fascism. We believe that fascism sets its objectives and
ignores its victims. Fascism is what we have in Serbia. Is not it about time
that this country, the European Community, the United Nations and
NATO realised that this cancer growing at the very heart of Europe has
got to be stopped now before it spreads even further?I5
Using the spectre of fascism within his speech was a powerful tool with which to get
support for such action. Evoking memories of the totalitarian regimes of the first half
of the twentieth century was an effective device on which to base his argument. This
was an approach which was regularly used in the House of Commons: the final
chapter of the thesis will examine the ways in which the Second World War cast its
shadow over the Parliamentary debates which took place regarding the Balkan
conflicts. For Campbell-Savours it was imperative that air strikes were implemented
as soon as possible. The language used is a striking contrast to that used by the front
bench politicians. It highlights the difference in approach taken by those in the
Shadow Cabinet, and those further removed from power. What is clear from the
earlier examples taken from those on the front bench is that those politicians adopted
a more measured tone, whereas figures on the back bench could speak with little
restraint. This again illustrates the pragmatism of power which has manifested itself
throughout this thesis: politicians closer to the decision-making process, albeit even
on the Opposition front bench, demonstrate an approach to policy formulation that is
very much rooted in realism, and some bi-partisanship. Thus Labour front bench
politicians might employ rather more non-committal language to express the views as
presented here by those on the back benches. This more reasoned approach is often at
15 D.N. Campbell-Savours (Workington), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 14 April 1993) Vol: 222,
Column 837.
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odds with the views of those expressed outside of this immediate circle of power,
even when demonstrating support for the exact same policy.
The opinion expressed by Campbell-Savours was echoed by Tony Banks who
spoke on the same issue. In his speech, Banks went even further than his colleague,
and gave specific details of how he believed the situation in the region should
develop. He suggested:
Before the United Nations has to go into the ranks of the Conservative
party to keep the warring sides apart, will the Secretary of State agree that
Margaret Thatcher at least articulated the deep anger and frustration that
many people in this country feel about the inability of European
Community powers to do anything about the situation in Bosnia? Is it not
time to consider giving an ultimatum to the Serbian Government that,
unless they are able to bring the Bosnian Serbs to account, there will be
strikes against military targets inside Serbia in order to cut off the supply
of arms from Serbia to the Bosnian Serbs.16
Banks's speech shows us the complex divisions that existed within the British
political world on the issue of intervention in the Balkans. Here, Banks shows both
ironic support for the views of the former Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, and
frustration at the existing Conservative leadership's position on the very same issue.
This raises both Banks's support for the stance of a politician far removed from his
own political ideology, contrasting with his contempt for her colleagues within the
Conservative Party, albeit those in Government. Of paramount importance though is
the clear, unequivocal way that he called for armed action in the conflict.
Speaking in the same month, another figure to contribute to the debate on air
strikes was Peter Hain, a then back bench Labour politician. He argued:
No one would deny that any solution is risk-free or without danger. Why
is the Foreign Secretary not pressing the United Nations to use its air
resources in the area to target Serbian supply lines, artillery, mortar and
tank positions? The policy pursued by his Government and the whole of
the west has failed abysmally. The genocide, rape and ethnic cleansing
16 Tony Banks (West Ham), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 14 April 1993) Vol: 222, Column 838.
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continue and, increasingly, the Government are speaking with the voice of
Joseph (sic) Chamberlain on this crisis.l '
Aside from his confusion regarding two former prominent politicians who shared the
same surname, Hain's intervention showed him to be strongly critical of the
Conservative Government, and thus in complete agreement with his front bench
colleagues.l" Another figure from the back bench to show support for the policy was
Andrew Faulds, who gave specific examples of how he believed air power could be
deployed in the Balkans. His argument was based on a successful destruction of parts
of the Serbian infrastructure, for example, bridges, which would serve to inhibit and
hamper their military activities in the region. Additionally, Faulds argued that air
power could be used to destroy Serbian artillery positions, as well as arms factories
within the former Yugoslavia. Unless this was achieved, he argued that the use of air
power against the Serbs was relatively futile.19 Faulds went on to argue that although
there would be civilian casualties, the eventual outcome, that is peace in the region,
would justify the means. Again, this back bench support for air strikes mirrored the
views of the Labour Shadow Cabinet.
There is a range of literature that examines how bombing or aerial attacks have
changed the nature of war. In his work, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth
Century, Jonathan Glover explores how the essence of warfare has adapted over the
last one hundred years to accommodate developments in weaponry.i" He argues:
"Technology has created forms of cold violence which should disturb us far more than
the beast of rage in man. The great military atrocities now use bombs or missiles. The
17 Peter Hain (Neath), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 April 1993) Vol: 223, Column 33.
18 After the speech in which Hain referred to Joseph Chamberlain, the Labour politician was greeted
with the following response from the Foreign Secretary: "I think that the hon. Gentleman has got his
Chamberlains mixed up." Douglas Hurd (Witney), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 April 1993)
Vol:223, Column 33.
19 Andrew Faulds (Warley, East), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223, Columns
1211 - 1212.
20 Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century (London: Jonathan Cape,
1999. Pimlico edition, 2001).
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decisions are taken coldly, far away.,,21 By extension, it is perhaps simpler for a
politician to take a decision on air strikes than on a ground based intervention, as they,
both the politician and the aircraft, are so far removed from the local situation. In
exploring the nuclear strike on Hiroshima, Glover makes the following observations
regarding the moral impact felt by those involved in this particular military operation.
The analysis presented here can perhaps also help to explain politicians support for air
strikes, seen as de-personalised, during the break-up of Yugoslavia.
Participation in a massacre is less threatening to the picture of yourself as
a kindly and human person if the horrors seem to have little to do with
you. To diminish the sense of personal responsibility is to weaken the
restraining effects of moral identity. The sense of personal responsibility
for the atomic bomb was weakened by distance and evasion, but, above
all, was weakened by the way contributions to the use of the bomb were
shared by so many people.22
References to the atomic bomb aside, this extract can maybe explain why air strikes
were perceived as an 'acceptable' type of military action. Theoretically prosecuted in
a clean, clinical fashion, the almost unreal 'computer game' nature of such operations
make them more palatable for a politician to accept in a way that a ground invasion
would never achieve.r'
As should be apparent from the thesis so far, actual implementation of any
policy in the Balkans very often occurred years after debate on the very same issue
had started, either inside or outside of Parliament. Steps were finally taken to
authorise air strikes by the United Nations and NATO in February 1994. Politicians
from both Labour front and back bench gave their support to this policy. As one
would expect, given what we have seen of their increased calls for this type of action,
21 Ibid. p64.
22 Ibid, p99.
23 Other authors who have written on the modem nature of warfare from a more theoretical perspective
are: Sven Lindqvist, A History of Bombing (London: Granta Books, 200 I. Reprinted 2002. Translated
by Linda Haverty Rugg); Paul Virilio, War and Cinema - The Logistics of Perception (London: Verso,
1989. Reprinted 1992. Translated by Patrick Camiller.); and Paul Virilio, The Vision Machine (London
and Indiana: British Film Institute and the Indiana University Press, 1995. Translated by Julie Rose.)
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the Shadow Cabinet spoke in complete agreement with what had been decided over
Bosnia. All of the key politicians with responsibility for this area of policy made
speeches in the respective debates. John Cunningham, who was Shadow Foreign
Secretary at the time of the first aerial attacks, gave his support to any such future
action in a debate in February 1994. He gave unequivocal backing to NATO, stating
that he viewed the latest development as an essential step in ending the violence in the
Balkans. Such a stance also gave strength to the integrity of international institutions
such as the United Nations and European Union, as well as NATO. The new position
showed that these organisations were no longer prepared to wait on the sidelines,
waiting for the situation to be resolved. As well as comments encouraging this
toughened new stance, Cunningham criticised the British Government for the amount
of time that it had taken for them to reach this position. He concluded his remarks by
stating his desire that the situation in Bosnia would be resolved without recourse to air
power." Cunningham's speech emphasised the ongoing pleas for air strikes arising
from the Labour front bench. Explicit in his words is a criticism that the Conservative
Government had taken so long to come to support the. same policy as had been
proposed by other governments, and by the Labour Shadow Cabinet. The Shadow
Defence Spokesman, David Clark, gave his support to air strikes in a debate on
Bosnia that took place in the November of the same year. He commented:
I thank the Secretary of State for coming to the House to inform is that
British airmen have been involved in an air attack in the former
Yugoslavia. I speak for the whole House when I say that we are relieved
that they have come back safely. Opposition Members recognise that the
action is justified, in accordance with United Nations resolution 958 .....
The action was necessary on two main counts: first, to stop the killing of
innocent civilians in the United Nations safe area of Bihac. If safe areas
mean anything, that is the least that could happen, especially in response
to napalm bombing. Secondly, we believe that it was necessary to
24 Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), Air Strikes (Bosnia) (Official Report, Hansard: 10 February 1994)
Vol: 237, Columns 448 - 449.
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maintain the reputation of the United Nations and NATO, for the lesson is
that threats should not be made unless they will be carried OUt.25
Clark's robust support of the air strikes was noteworthy for several reasons. Once
again it demonstrated the strong resolve of the Labour front bench in supporting a
military action against a third party. Secondly, of equal, if not more, importance, and
clearly linked to the first point, is that the air strikes were intrinsically tied in to the
United Nations and appropriate resolutions. The air strikes in the former Yugoslavia
were not ad hoc attacks but part of an approach organised under the auspices of the
United Nations. As we have seen in previous chapters, the United Nations was held in
great esteem by Labour, and Clark's comments about the air strikes reinforce the
widely held view within the party on the importance of protecting the reputation of
that institution.
The final front bench spokesman to consider is Robin Cook, who succeeded
John Cunningham as Shadow Foreign Secretary and took on the role in Government
after Labour had been elected in 1997. Interestingly, Cook's comments on air strikes
offer a broader analysis of their effectiveness. Whilst making slight reservations and
acknowledging the weaknesses of such an approach, he still showed support for the
policy. Cook presented the view that an earlier, firmer approach would have had
considerable benefit for the situation in the former Yugoslavia:
I also agree with the Foreign Secretary that there are severe limitations on
air power. It is a low-intensity ground war that cannot be won from the air
alone. It is difficult terrain with successive mountain ranges which give
only short spans over which a target is visible. It is not, as some
Americans sometimes appear to imagine, the easy desert terrain in which
Operation Desert Storm was waged from the air.
Nevertheless, I still take the view that the UN could have been more
robust in the use oflimited air power in response to local violations."
25 Dr David Clark (South Shields), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 21 November 1994) Vol: 250,
Column 342.
26 Robin Cook (Livingston), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol: 259,
Columns 5899 - 592.
142
For Cook then, air strikes, for all their failings, were still an appropriate measure to
introduce in the war in Bosnia. Support for the policy was similarly widespread on the
back benches of the Labour Party, even once the action had started, as will now be
shown.
Support for the enhanced policy of air strikes on the Labour back benches
came from a range of politicians. Once the international community had finally been
forced to intensify the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs with a firmer resolve regarding
the issue of air strikes, Kate Hoey queried the lack of commitment that had been
shown by the British Government vis-a-vis that particular policy: "Does the Minister
recognise that millions of people in this country do not understand why the concerted
action that has been taken in the past couple of weeks could not have been taken with
Britain taking the lead over the past two years?,,27 Similar sentiments were made by
Chris Mullin in a debate on Gorazde just over one month later. His question clearly
illustrates the full support that some Labour M.P.s had towards this type of armed
intervention: "Is the Foreign Secretary aware that some of us have been advocating
such action from the outset? If it has been proved as successful as he said it has been,
would not a great many lives have been saved had the policy been employed 18
months ago?,,28 The views held by both of these politicians both reiterate, and
highlight the stance taken by many in the Shadow Cabinet, that is, that air strikes were
an appropriate action to take in Bosnia, and that they should have been implemented
at a much earlier date.
What is important here is that Labour politicians were attempting to make a
distinction between the more proactive stance that they were taking, in comparison
27 Kate Hoey (Vauxhall), Oral Answers, Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 2 March 1994) Vol: 238,
Column 932 - 933.
28 Chris Mullin (Sunderland, South), Gorazde (Official Report, Hansard: 12 April 1994) Vol: 241,
Column 24.
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with the lack of resolve that was demonstrated by the Major Government. Taken in a
wider context, this could be seen as an attempt by the Opposition to take an
honourable position, one that showed them to be mature and prepared for office, in
direct contrast to the Conservatives. By this stage of their long tenure in power the
Tories were seen to be beset with sleaze, and somewhat morally bankrupt. Thus, the
comments presented here are an opportunity to highlight a powerful ethical divide
between the two main political parties.
The introduction of safe areas into Bosnia, that is United Nations designated
zones where the safety of the population was supposed to be guaranteed, was a
catalyst for more comment on the validity of air strikes as an appropriate form of
intervention." In a wide ranging debate on the former Yugoslavia, one Labour
politician, Malcolm Wicks, was scathing in his criticism of the stance that the British
Government had taken with the use of this type of military action over Bosnia. His
speech was an indictment of what he felt was a failure by the West, heavily influenced
by Britain, to resolve the conflict in an effective manner:
That brings me to the reluctance to use air strikes. I believe that the British
Government in particular, have placed the brake on"the use of air strikes.
At different times when the United States Government clearly wished to
take a firmer approach to the conflict in Bosnia and to stand up to the
aggression by the Serbian regime of Dr Karadzic, British Ministers said
no, and urged caution.
The history books will show that the west's overall response has been
poor, but the role of the British Government will stand to be especially
condemned. In recent years the Serbs have tested, prodded and then
understood the feebleness of the west's response. Sadly, every time
Ministers from the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office have stood up in the House to comment on the
situation, when the speeches have been analysed they have served as a
green light for further aggression."
29 U.N. Security Council Resolutions 819 (1993), 824 (1993), and 836 (1993) on the introduction and
Erotection of safe areas.
o Malcolm Wicks (Croydon, North), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol:
259, Column 634 - 637.
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What is striking about the speech, aside from the outspoken language used, is that
these comments were made by a Labour Member of Parliament. Traditionally we
would imagine the Conservative Party to be the party of defence and foreign affairs.
However, what is apparent here is a total condemnation of the way in which John
Major's Government had dealt with this particular issue. Explicit in Wicks's speech is
that more should have been done from a much earlier stage in the conflict. It is
important to note that even as recently as the 1980s and the era of unilateral
disarmament, Labour had been portrayed as being weak on defence, and by extension
foreign affairs.31 These were very real areas in which many voters felt that the Labour
Party was lacking. This period of Labour history obviously coincided with that of
Margaret Thatcher as leader of the Conservative Party, and thus it is difficult to
imagine a more striking contrast with regard to the international affairs arena. She was
a dominant figure in global politics. To summarise then, Wicks demonstrated a pro-
interventionist stance that one would perhaps be surprised to find in a politician from
the Labour Party. His position could be seen as being representative of a growing
determination within Labour to show itself as worthy of office, and capable of dealing
with the responsibilities that came with being a potential party of governance. This
also ties into the point which was made earlier in this thesis, about the role of the
Liberal Democrats, and their leader Paddy Ashdown, in Parliamentary debates
regarding the break-up of Yugoslavia. By offering itself as a responsible party,
capable of debating foreign affairs, the Labour Party was able to present itself as a
viable alternative to the Conservatives, whilst neutralising any nascent threat that
3( There are a range of works which deal with this troubled and turbulent period of Labour Party
history. For example: AJ. Davies, To Build a New Jerusalem (London: Michael Joseph, 1992. Revised
edition published by Abacus, 1996); Kevin Jefferys, The Labour Party since 1945 (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1993); and Andrew Thorpe, A History of the British Labour Party (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1997).
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could be attributed to the third party, due to the prominent role that Ashdown played
in debates on the Balkans.
The Labour Party was then moving away from the perception of liability
within foreign policy and defence affairs which the wider public had previously
identified it; a notable legacy of the dark days of the 1980s and unilateral
disarmament. This new, assertive stance within international relations was one that
would emerge ever more strongly within the party after Labour won the 1997 and
subsequent General Elections, with Tony Blair taking an extremely proactive
approach to foreign intervention.Y In a more general sense, the notion of Labour
presenting itself as a very viable alternative to the Conservative Government was a
sentiment that had grown ever since Blair's election to the party leadership, and the
subsequent familiar re-branding of Labour into the party which we recognise today.33
In foreign affairs then, and also more generally, there was a very real sense that the
Labour Party was leaving behind the 'wilderness years' of the 1980s.
A final back bench M.P. to consider on the issue of air strikes is David
Winnick. At the end of May 1995, as air strikes were increased in order to protect the
safe areas, another debate took place in Parliament. He made the following remarks:
I say straight away that I believe that the air strikes were justified. Like
others, I have argued that military action was necessary to stop designated
areas being shelled by Serbian commanders, I took the opportunity on a
number of occasions in recent weeks to question the Secretary of State for
Defence and the Foreign Secretary about action to safeguard designated
areas. Having urged air strikes where appropriate, I am hardly in a
position now to say that they were wrong. They were right in all the
circumstancesr'"
32 See Iraq (l998);Kosovo (1999); Sierra Leone (2000); Afghanistan (200 I); Iraq (2003).
33 Anthony Seldon gives a comprehensive account of the modernisation of the Labour Party in: Blair
(London: The Free Press, 2004. Paperback edition published 2005)
34 David Winnick (Walsall, North), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260,
Columns 1037 - 1040.
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Winnick's support for this type of military action fits within the model that we have
seen thus far, that is, Shadow Cabinet consent for military action matched by similar
comments from those on the back benches. Crucially then, approval for air strikes
came from a significant bloc within the Labour Party; it was not confined to a handful
of renegade, maverick figures. Analysis of these comments made by Opposition M.P.s
shows a constant level of criticism about the Conservative approach. As we have seen,
the particular topic of air strikes led the Labour Shadow Cabinet to portray a more
interventionist role than that of its Conservative front bench counterparts. Similarly, a
substantial group of Labour politicians from the back benches were fulsome in their
support for the same type of intervention. The comments from these Labour
politicians who spoke in favour of air strikes again belie the stance taken by Brendan
Simms in his assessment of the party's response. Simms's view that Labour had been
ineffectual in opposing the Government's stance is countered by the comments
examined herein. Despite acknowledging that on the issue of air strikes the Labour
Party did briefly diverge from the Conservative's position, in the main Simms
maintained his critical assessment of the role taken by the Opposition during this stage
of the war in Bosnia. Thus wrongly, he likened Cunningham's stance as being a
"classic piece of Hurdite rhetoric (which) was interchangeable with that of the Major
administration.t''" Even Cook and Blair who receive slightly more favourable
comments are described as lacking "the clarity and steely resolve which became the
hallmark of their Balkan stance in the late 1990s.,,36 What is clear here though is that
Labour politicians were prepared to speak in favour of the air campaign, however
belatedly that particular policy might have been implemented. The comments
examined herein, those demanding and supporting air strikes, are very much in tune
35 Brendan Simms, Op cit., p299.
36 Ibid, p299.
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with British foreign policy in the years which followed the 1997 general election.
Those speaking in favour of air strikes then can be identified as providing the
antecedents of the muscular approach to international relations that we associate with
the successive Blair Governments of 1997, 200 Iand 2005.
AGAINST AIR STRIKES
It would be wrong however to believe that there was unanimous support for air strikes
either as a theoretical policy or as an actually implemented military action. It is now
time to consider the views of those who opposed the use of air strikes, either when
discussed as an abstract concept, or when introduced as a real strategy. As one would
expect, considering the unanimous support for air strikes emanating from the Labour
front bench, dissent for this policy was confined to the back benches. In contrast with
the heterogeneous nature of those in favour of air strikes, that is, figures supporting
that stance came from across the entire political spectrum that is embraced by Labour,
those opposing air strikes fell entirely within what could best be described as the old,
traditional left wing of the party. Also, as will now be shown, the majority of this
opposition to air strikes was due to a wide variety of reasons. Thus, backbench
opposition to such action was not based on any such notions of homogeneity.
In 1993, Gwyneth Dunwoody expressed concern about the use of air strikes in
Bosnia. Her unease was due to the fact that British soldiers were based in the region,
such as the Cheshire Regiment, and these forces included members of her own
constituency. They would be at considerable and obvious risk if not withdrawn before
the start of any such bombing campaign.V Opposing air strikes for different reasons,
and speaking in the same debate, was Jim Marshall. Marshall's opposition was
37 Gwyneth Dunwoody (Crewe and Nantwich), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol:
223, Column 1182.
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founded on strategic concerns, namely, the role that air strikes would play in the
region in the long term. He claimed:
Air strikes are becoming increasingly popular among armchair generals.
When they were used in Iraq and elsewhere, many people were critical of
them, but now they seem to be becoming the day's best treat. Air strikes
are nothing but a figleaf for military inaction. Unless they are the
precursor of further military action, they will make no difference. And to
pretend that air strikes will make any significant difference to the position
of the Bosnian Government flies in the face of the evidencer"
For Marshall, then, air strikes were not the answer if they did not form part of a more
cohesive long-term military plan. In the same speech, Marshall had also spoken in
favour of the arms embargo being lifted, at least on the side of the Bosnian Muslims.
For this reason then, Marshall's wariness about the use of air strikes did not contain
the same type of criticism as that demonstrated by the other opponents of this
potential policy. That is, he was advocating certain military based methods of
intervening whilst discounting others.
One of the most vociferous politicians who spoke out against air strikes was
veteran left-winger Tony Benn. Examples from Benn's speeches perfectly exemplify
a traditional left-wing reliance on an internationalist, peaceful approach to conflict
resolution. Speaking in a debate on Bosnia in February 1994, he outlined his
opposition to this particular type of armed intervention. The extract that follows is
considerably lengthy, however, it is well worth including in its entirety as it raises
many points that illustrate Benn's stance on Yugoslavia. He commented:
Is the Minister aware that the caution that has been shown up to now is
much wiser than may be thought to be the case from some of the
comments made across the Floor of the House? If air strikes were
undertaken, not only would all humanitarian aid come to an end, which
could lead to far, far greater loss of life, but British and other United
Nations troops could be endangered and the peacekeeping attempts made
by Lord Owen and others could terminate. That could lead to the long-
38 Jim Marshall (Leicester, South), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 1228 - 1229.
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term involvement by Britain and other countries in a Balkan war, the
outcome of which could not be foreseen. Those possibilities raise political
and not just military questions.
Is the right hon. Gentleman also aware that the point made by the right
hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Mr Jopling) about the
uncertainty of so-called surgical strikes, as a means of bringing to an end a
war that has a deep history and is the source of great bitterness, raises
grounds for considerable caution? Were the Government to be cautious on
the matter, they would receive far greater support than might be apparent
from some of the comments made in the House today. 39
Berm's speech is interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, as well as outlining the
threat to British troops serving in the region, he highlights the threat to the
humanitarian relief effort that would be incurred if air strikes took place. In the longer
term this would lead to an increase in the number of casualties of those local people
who, at that time, were being helped by the United Nations recovery programme.
Secondly, his implicit support for the cautious approach that had been taken by the
Government up to that point meant that his stance was at odds with those on his very
own front bench, as well as many of his back bench colleagues. Further to this, he
shows himself to be in agreement with comments made by the Conservative politician
Michael Jopling, again emphasising the unusual alliances and rifts that have been
demonstrated within this study.l" Finally, his reference to the turbulent history of the
region highlighted the intrinsically problematic nature of the break-up of Yugoslavia.
It was too complex an issue to be dealt with in a straightforward manner, and in many
ways this was what hampered the response of the international community.
Berm's opposition to air strikes continued after they had actually been
implemented. It is in these further speeches that we get a more extensive glimpse of
the position that he took regarding the way in which the international community
responded to the crisis in the Balkans. The day after air strikes over Bosnia had been
39 Tony Benn (Chesterfield), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 7 February 1994) Vol: 237, Column 24.
40 Michael Jopling served as Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food in the 1983-1987
Conservative Government.
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authorised, and a protocol for their implementation agreed, Benn made the following
comments:
Is the Secretary of State aware that the responsibility for global peace rests
with the United Nations and not with NATO, which is not the policeman
of the world? The danger of the Secretary-General organising air strikes
against the opposition of Russia, a permanent member of the Security
Council, poses far greater threats for the future of the United Nations.
Is the right hon. Gentleman also aware that any action of this kind must
necessarily involve the commitment of far greater numbers of British
forces? Is he aware that the question will arise, if the Royal Air Force
bombs Serbia, whether we are at war with Serbia in law? Have any
contingency plans been made to consider the political implications that
may follow if the intervention in the Balkan war escalates, as clearly it
could do, with ve? grave consequences for peace in Europe and in the
world as a whole?4
Thus, Benn's opposition to the use of air strikes in the Balkans was manifold. In his
view, the United Nations was the appropriate institution that should deal with the
conflict. He was outspoken in his criticism of the role of NATO. This would tie-in
with traditional left-wing suspicions - a legacy from the Cold War - of the defensive
alliance and its motives. There was also concern at the way that Russia was sidelined
from the whole process, which again resonates with Cold War sentiments regarding
the old Soviet Union.42 The exact nature of the intervention was also raised when he
queried the legal status of any such action. An escalation of the conflict would, Benn
argued, have serious effects on the wider peace in the region, and broader issues
regarding the area's stability. His concern regarding both the role of NATO in the
conflict, and attitudes towards Russia, was also apparent in a speech given a couple of
weeks later. Coming after NATO had shot down aggressor planes in the no-fly zone,
he reaffirmed his position regarding the alliance's actions in the region:
41 Tony Benn (Chesterfield), Air Strikes (Bosnia) (Official Report, Hansard: 10 February 1994) Vol:
237, Column 453.
42 Eugene Meehan's work, The British Left Wing and Foreign Policy: A Study of the Influence of
Ideology (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1960) provides a good examination
of the beginning of the Cold War, and looks at Britain's relationship with the Soviet Union. He
examines how the Labour Government dealt with this particular foreign policy issue.
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·.. .Is he (the Foreign Secretary) aware that NATO is not the world's
policeman and that for a British Foreign Secretary to speak of Russia
being "kept on board" - when the responsibility rests with the United
Nations of which Russia is a permanent member, and when Russia has a
much closer interest in the Balkans than the President of the United States
whose aircraft were engaged - is clearly not a matter that can be brushed
aside as if this were a western action to maintain peace on behalf of the
United Nations, whose Security Council was never consulted specifically
on the military action?43
Clearly apparent again in this speech was Benn's commitment to the role of the
United Nations. For him, there was no support for what he saw as a unilateral NATO
action. This ties in with the traditional left-wing view of foreign policy that has been
explored previously in this thesis. Benn's unease at the manner in which he perceived
the USA to be dominating events in Bosnia is clear. Brendan Simms has offered the
following appraisal of the position taken by Tony Benn on the issue of American
involvement in the Balkans:
Nor does it come as any surprise to find the veteran anti-American Tony
Benn calling upon the Foreign Secretary to 'make clear to the Americans'
British opposition to 'lift and strike'. To Benn, US policy was the more
sinister in the light of American global arms sales, which - he told the
House - amounted to more than two thirds of the global trade and which
fuelled the vast majority of contemporary conflicts: 'I have always
thought the arms trade the most criminal in the world. ,44
For Benn then, suspicions of the United States of America, its hegemony, and
standing in the post Cold War world were issues of real concern. Thus, in this
example, left-wing unease of American motives, grounded in the history of the Cold
War, had not evaporated. Benn substantiated this view in his diary, "NATO has
entered the civil war as a belligerent; the United Nations has been totally edged aside
by NATO.,,45
43 Tony Benn (Chesterfield), Air Attack (Bosnia) (Official Report, Hansard: 1 March 1994) Vol: 238,
Columns 790 - 791.
44 Brendan Simms, Op cit., p279.
45 Tony Benn, Free at Last -Diaries 1991- 200 1, Selected and Edited by Ruth Winstone, (London:
Hutchinson, 2002) p331.
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Berm's concern regarding the situation in Bosnia was echoed by his back
bench colleague Tam Dalyell. Speaking in the same debate, Dalyell exhibited concern
that the air attack had taken place without universal support, citing Russian and Greek
concerns over the action.l" What was clear from the examples of both politicians was
that there was a real concern in the way that the action had been prosecuted. Both
men, either implicitly or explicitly, showed a commitment to the role of the United
Nations as a competent, viable institution in the international arena. Of concern to
both Benn and Dalyell was the way in which NATO had acted with Russia seemingly
sidelined by the whole process. This provides us with yet a further example of more
traditional left-wing thinking with regard to foreign policy; that is, the importance of
the United Nations thus promoting an internationalist approach to global relations,
and secondly, an awareness that Russia, as a major power, should be considered,
holding as it did, a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. These
views bear considerable similarities with the sentiments expressed earlier, in the
chapter that examined the role of the various international institutions and the search
for a resolution to the crisis. As was shown then, there were definite splits regarding
the preferred organisation to be used in resolving the wars. Whilst all politicians
expressed support for the United Nations, there was a definite split between those who
supported NATO involvement, and those who opposed any such action. As we have
seen here, this view was again apparent when discussing the implementation of air
strikes during the war in Bosnia.
Tam Dalyell's criticism of air strikes continued the following year. Here, his
speeches against the policy were founded on concerns for the United Nations troops
46 Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow), Air Attack (Bosnia) (Official Report, Hansard: 1 March 1994) Vol: 238,
Column 792.
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servmg m the former Yugoslavia. In a speech in July 1995, Dalyell voiced his
concerns about any possible escalation of action in the region:
Can the Foreign Secretary conceive of any circumstances in which air
power could be used without creating a real threat to United Nations
forces on the ground? Can the House of Commons have the assurance that
Her Majesty's Government are advising all others, particularly the
Americans, not to use further air strikes?47
This view was repeated in a Parliamentary debate just one week later. Dalyell
expressed concerns regarding the safety of British troops who were working as part of
the United Nations Protection Force. If an air campaign began, these forces would be
at risk from retaliation from local troops. Dalyell urged Parliament to view the
broader picture, and consider the implications and long term impact that air strikes
could have on British forces."
What both of these extracts show is Dalyell's commitment to the United
Nations troops - the blue berets - serving on the ground in Bosnia. This links to the
views of Tony Benn explained previously. Both politicians showed a belief in the role
of the U.N. as the preferred institution to deal with the conflict in Bosnia. Their
caution towards air strikes thus illustrated unease about any extension of the role of
NATO in the region. As has been shown, this was also tied to a suspicion, or at best
unease, about the role played by the United States, and the power that it exercised
through the defensive alliance. This was in total contrast to the stance taken by the
Labour front bench, and many other back benchers as well.
The final opponent of air strikes to consider here is the back bench politician
Robert Wareing. He was questioning their use for a very different reason. Wareing's
concern radiated from what he took to be a bias on the part of the international
community to how they dealt with the various warring parties. He considered:
47 Tam DalyelJ (Linlithgow), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 12 July 1995) Vol: 263, Column 964.
48 Tam DalyelJ (Linlithgow), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 July 1995) Vol: 263, Columns 1776
-1777.
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My right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition made a very important
point, which I hope will be answered, when he suggested that the safe
havens should be demilitarised because many of the attacks which have
been made, as general after general has said, were launched from inside
the safe havens by Muslim forces. Even if the retaliation of the Serbs has
sometimes been inordinate, Tuzla and Sarajevo have certainly been used
as bases by Muslim forces to break ceasefire after ceasefire. Do we talk
about air strikes against the Muslims? Of course we do not.
I am not suggesting that air strikes are justified in any event, but I am
pointing out that if we talk about being even-handed, as the Prime
Minister still does, we must remember that what is sauce for the goose is
sauce for the gander. To act in any other way while putting an extra 6,000
of our troops into Bosnia-Herzegovina is to ensure the inevitability of
their being sucked into a civil war on one side against the other. I do not
believe that I could support that approach. It is a purely military strategy
and there is a complete lack of political strategy."
For Wareing then, air strikes raised questions about international policy to the Balkans
in general. Safe havens had been created to protect Bosnian Muslim communities
from Bosnian Serb forces. However, in Wareing's view, (and, as we see from his
speech, this particular point was one that he shared with the Labour leader) those
particular areas should be demilitarised so that they did not act as a platform for
Bosnian Muslims to launch fresh offensives against the Bosnian Serbs. Inextricably
linked to this issue was Wareing's unease about air strikes; namely, this action was
being carried out against the same forces that the Bosniari Government troops had the
chance to retaliate against from within their own safe havens. His view then was one
based on the notion that all parties in the conflict should be dealt with on an equal
footing by the international community. This view of Wareing's is one that has
already been underlined in this study, and one that will reappear later in this thesis. In
his opinion, assisting one side more than either of the others meant that the world was
being drawn into a civil war. Thus, rather than giving the Bosnian Government troops
49 Robert Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260,
Columns 1088 - 1089.
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his out and out support, Wareing's view of the broader situation affected and
influenced his stance on air strikes.
Back bench opposition to air strikes can be seen as being rooted in a number
of motives. Whilst it is simplistic to view the motivations of those on this side of the
debate as being mono-causal, there was a definite trend showing this particular group
of politicians as demonstrating a certain loyalty towards the United Nations. Their
belief in this organisation strongly tempered their arguments against air strikes.
However, their motives varied enormously. For example, Dunwoody expressed
concern about the U.N. troops serving in Bosnia as part of the humanitarian relief
mission, and the danger that could be posed to them by air strikes. This stance was
also informed by the fact that her 'local' armed forces, the Cheshire Regiment, were
serving in the region. Thus, here was another example where constituency concerns
helped to inform the policy stance of a particular politician. Alternately, Tony Benn
brought traditional left-wing suspicions of the United States of America into his
comments arguing against the imposition of air strikes. For him, the United Nations
was the organisation that should attempt to resolve the situation; NATO air strikes
were not the answer. This was a view also shared by Tam Dalyell. Another dimension
to those arguing against air strikes was provided by Robert Wareing, who felt that
international involvement on the side of the Bosnian Muslims, would lead to the
world becoming embroiled in what he saw as a civil war. These debates also show a
split between politicians who are typically described as being 'old Labour'. Thus, the
figures mentioned here were on the opposing side of an argument to their traditional
colleagues, namely Tony Banks and Chris Mullin. This then shows that the left wing
of the Labour Party had fragmented over the issue of air strikes in the former
Yugoslavia. The debates against the use of air strikes thus mirrored the controversies
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and discussions that surrounded all of the interventionist measures that were
implemented in the former Yugoslavia; that is, vociferous opinion against a particular
policy articulated and argued for a multitude of reasons.
CONCLUSION
The chapter has shown that these particular interventionist policies implemented in
the former Yugoslavia were subject to intense criticism and debate within the Labour
Party. A set of trends can be identified regarding the use of each interventionist
measure. Broadly speaking, the Labour Shadow Cabinet was either in agreement with,
or slightly in advance of the Conservative Government regarding its views on
intervention. Specifically, air strikes were an area that the Labour front bench
supported before that of its Tory counterparts. There was also consensus shown
amongst these particular Labour politicians; they all tended to share the same view on
each issue. Figures considered here include John Cunningham, David Clark, John
Smith and Robin Cook. They all demonstrated support for air strikes, but argued that
they should be prosecuted as part of a United Nations mandate. The front bench then
all presented very similar positions on this issue, which appeared to be, in general,
informed by the same reason, that is the importance of working with the U.N. That is
one, straightforward conclusion to be drawn from this chapter. However, matters
become more complex when considering how the Labour Party back benches
responded to the issue of air strikes. The policy enjoyed varying degrees of Labour
back bench support. This does seem to counter the criticisms raised by Brendan
Simms that have been mentioned within this chapter. There was then consistent
support in favour of a more proactive military policy. However, what become of
interest are the reasons given by these politicians in support of such a policy. As with
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other examples presented within this thesis, there was not one overriding factor
driving through Labour back bench demands for a particular policy, in this case, air
strikes. A variety of motivating reasons were used in arguments. References to
appeasement and fascism, which will be explored in more depth in the final chapter of
this thesis, were one such justification for air strikes. Secondly, another argument was
based on the point that the attacks were justified and should have taken place earlier in
the conflict. This sentiment is interesting if considered in the broader context of a
Blairite style of interventionist foreign policy. What this group of politicians were
demanding then, was a type of foreign policy which was to be very much the hallmark
of the next Labour Prime Minister. Thus, the foreign policy ideas which one
associates with the direction taken by the government under Tony Blair, were in
evidence during a conflict which predated the 1997 general election. Of further
interest is the way in which for the majority of this period of study, Tony Blair was
not the leader of the Labour Party. It is not possible then to suggest that he was
asserting his own style and preference regarding foreign policy, and acting as an
influence on his back bench colleagues. This suggests then that a so-called 'Blairite'
foreign policy is not necessarily just attributable to that politician. Additionally,
historically, politicians from the Labour Party have held a wide variety of foreign
policy opinions. The break-up of Yugoslavia could therefore be viewed as just another
example in this wider, general trend. This point is further illustrated by the variety of
motivating factors which influenced opinion.
Although there were a range of clearly identifiable strands of agreement within
the various debates, there was not one sole coherent argument. The party was divided
in its response to a variety of different policies; these divisions manifested themselves
both within, and between the different strands of the party. This is perhaps best
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illustrated by considering those politicians who spoke from the Labour Party back
benches. If we take the one example, again, that of air strikes, whilst there was plenty
of back bench opposition to the policy; it was for a variety of reasons. Thus, Benn
voiced concern at the supremacy of NATO over the United Nations, Dalyell and
Dunwoody had fears for the safety of the United Nations troops on the ground,
Wareing spoke of the importance of taking a morally equivalent stand within the
region, whereas Marshall argued that air strikes had come too late to be of any real
benefit. This multi-faceted approach to one specific issue was mirrored within debates
on the other types of intervention, as illustrated in the previous chapter. Of importance
was the way in which these debates were not necessarily conducted along fixed
ideological lines; so two figures from the left wing of the party, Chris Mullin and
Tony Benn, each took a very different position on the implementation of air strikes.
This shows that there was a split within the left wing of the party towards this aspect
of intervention. Thus, discussions on implemented interventions fit within the model
seen so far within this thesis, that is, ideological background did not prove to be the
primary concern in determining the stance that Labour politicians took in debates
about the break-up of Yugoslavia. In fact, the defining characteristics were much
more complex than that. What has been shown here, is that a wide number of
motivating factors were at work, with each politician employing various reasons to
substantiate his or her position and argument. There is seemingly little consistency
with how the different M.P.s presented themselves in the arguments regarding
intervention. Of longer term, more general interest is that this chapter has shown that
the Labour Party was extremely fractured in its response to the break-up of
Yugoslavia, specifically regarding the issue of limited military intervention. This
shows that the way in which the party has divided recently on foreign policy is not a
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recent development. Divisions in international relations since the 1997 election, most
notably over Kosovo (1999), 9111 (2001), and Iraq (2003-present), are not a new
phenomena. For the Labour Party, disagreements over foreign policy are not restricted
to the years post-1997.
Of further interest in this chapter, is the way in which certain 'stereotypical'
attitudes manifested themselves in debates about airstrikes. Chapter one of this thesis
demonstrated the way in which 'the Balkans' has traditionally been viewed, and how
the term has become a form of 'shorthand' to denote a place somewhat different and
removed from the west. As will be shown in more detail in the final chapter of this
thesis, during the Yugoslav wars of secession, such stereotypical attitudes were not
confined to the description of countries of that region. Even here in this analysis of air
strikes, politicians used certain phrases, and held particular opinions which
demonstrated a convenient labelling of other institutions and countries. Of particular
relevance here is the way in which NATO was frequently described as 'the world's
policeman'. During Parliamentary debates then on the break -up of Yugoslavia, the use
of stereotype was not confined to descriptions of the Balkans.
What this chapter has continued to demonstrate then is that a myriad of views
and stances existed amongst those Labour Party M.P.s who contributed to
Parliamentary debates on subjects and issues surrounding the wars in the Balkans
during the early 1990s.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DO MORE! DEMANDS FOR FURTHER INTERVENTION
As the conflicts in the Balkans escalated, especially the war in Bosnia, debates
surrounding the issue of intervention extended far beyond the parameters outlined in
the previous two chapters. Discussions began to move towards the unpalatable idea of
a more sophisticated type of military intervention. Comments were forthcoming on a
range of topics, from the more abstract and vague notion of 'military intervention' to
more specific issues such as the introduction of ground troops and the likely
escalation of the conflict on the ground: further rifts, divisions and alliances within the
Labour Party were apparent when discussing these more proactive forms of action.
This chapter will examine the discussions that arose regarding these more aggressive
policies, and seek to portray the differing opinions that developed. There will be a
general analysis of debates surrounding the term 'military intervention', and the
chapter will analyse the response of different politicians to this policy, and assess the
extent to which these people can be identified as being part of a specific group.
It is worth noting here that the use of the term 'military intervention' did not
suggest a policy in specific detail. Therefore, those politicians in favour of such action
were using a particularly vague term in their arguments. It is one thing to argue for
'military intervention' but another thing entirely to demand the use of British troops in
some sort of ground invasion. Although some politicians are shown here to make
mention of an enhanced role for ground forces in the region, in the main, the phrase
itself became an almost convenient way in which to demand action whilst avoiding
giving more specific details.
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LABOUR WARRIORS? CALLS FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION
Calls for military intervention in the Balkans began at the very start of the break-up of
Yugoslavia. The controversial nature of the topic, that is the notion of intervening
with ground troops in an already established conflict, meant that comments in favour
of such an action were few and far between from those in the Shadow Cabinet. Hence,
this examination of the politicians who spoke out in favour of military intervention
will begin by looking at the views of those on the back benches who supported a more
comprehensive action. The opinions of those on the front bench who only spoke in
favour of this policy relatively late on in the conflict, and in addition to which were
few and far between, will be examined at the end of this section.
In a debate in November 1991, the Labour back bench M.P. Tony Banks
outlined his stance on the very issue of military intervention. Regarding the situation
in Croatia and Serbia, he made the following observation:
The two sides simply cannot trust each other with ceasefires arranged
from The Hague that do not hold on the ground. Is it not time that the
Government went to the Security Council seeking sanction for a military
intervention force so that a political settlement can be found? If they do
not, we shall have to witness these people slaughtering each other, and
that is disgraceful in a European country. .
Of interest here, is that Banks was referring to the conflict between Serbs and Croats,
and made no mention whatsoever of the situation in Bosnia. This emphasises the fact
that he was making the point at a very early stage in the break-up of Yugoslavia. At
this point, the war in Bosnia was five months away; hence Banks's forecast regarding
slaughter in the region was particularly prescient. His support for military intervention
was even stronger in the following summer, by which time, the war in Bosnia had
begun. He argued:
I Tony Banks (West Ham), NATO Summit (Official Report, Hansard: 12 November 1991) Vol: 198,
Columns 913 - 914.
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Surely, if the Serbian irregulars in the hills around Sarajevo start lobbing
bombs and mortars into that city, we should give those irregulars an
ultimatum: if they do not cease their action, Western European Union
military forces under United Nations jurisdiction should be used to
destroy the batteries in the hills around Sarajevo.i
Banks's unequivocal support for military action was repeated at the end of the very
same year. In a debate regarding the role of the United Nations, he gave a long speech
in favour of some form of armed intervention in the Balkans. Although a fairly
substantial extract is shown here, Banks's speech raises a number of interesting
points. It is worth quoting at length:
... .It is now time for the United Nations to intervene militarily in the
former Yugoslavia if only to stop that conflict stretching into Kosovo and
Macedonia and then involving Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and even Italy.
There are dangers; but the greater danger is that of doing nothing at all.
Although I will not adopt the "action man" mode of the leader of the
Liberal Democrats and want to send large numbers of troops in without
thinking about it, the right hon. Member for Yeovil (Mr Ashdown) has a
point. However, it is very easy for politicians within the comforts of the
Palace of Westminster to decide to send troops abroad to intervene in
trouble spots because we do not run the risks. In those circumstances,
troops should be volunteers. I do not know how that fits in with the fact
that ours is a professional army, but we should send troops on a voluntary
basis rather than on the basis of, "Pick up your pack and off you go,
laddie." Itwould be wrong for politicians to adopt that attitude.
Military intervention rarely provides a long-term solution. We must look
to the United Nations political role to solve those problems. We must
make people sit around tables and ensure that they stay there until they
find solutions to their problems. Naturally, economic sanctions must be
imposed, and perhaps with greater enthusiasm than they have been
imposed. As has been said, arms control is also essential. We must cut off
the causes of regional conflicts rather than deal with the symptoms.
I am clear in my mind. I have not changed my position with regard to the
United Nations. I have always believed in the role and function of the
United Nations. It holds the key to the very future of world peace, and it
deserves our unstinting support.'
The extract provides us with a variety of interesting issues that are each worth
examining. Firstly, Banks clearly stated that it was time for the United Nations to take
2 Tony Banks (West Ham), European Council (United Kingdom Presidency) (Official Report, Hansard:
2 July 1992) Vol: 210, Column 977.
3 Tony Banks (West Ham), United Nations (Official Report, Hansard: 4 December 1992) Vol: 215,
Columns 533 - 534.
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military action in the former Yugoslavia. For Tony Banks, a key danger was that the
conflict could develop into an extensive regional war. Of importance here is that
although he was advocating some type of military action, he was pressing for the
United Nations to take on this responsibility within the region. This offers the
dichotomy of a left-wing politician suggesting military action albeit under the
jurisdiction of the United Nations. As we have seen from the previous chapters,
Banks's stance offers us somewhat of a dilemma. From Michael Gordon's work on
the nature of left-wing foreign policy, the Labour M.P. appears to demonstrate two
conflicting positions: that is, taking a stance that is against the traditional pacifist and
anti-militarist position as outlined by Gordon, but showing his strong support, belief
in and reliance on the United Nations as the appropriate institution for conflict
I . 4reso ution.
However, there are further points to note from just this one speech by Tony
Banks. Of considerable interest, is his suggestion that politicians should not have the
power to send troops to a conflict, rather that the army should plan its operational
activities on an optional basis, thus inviting soldiers to "volunteer" for conflict. This
raises an interesting point in that this position would remove part of the responsibility
away from politicians who, if such a policy existed, could argue that they had not
compelled any British troops to go to war. The practicalities of enforcing such a
scheme are obviously not explored by Banks. However, this somewhat tentative
attitude to decision-making was also apparent later on in the speech. After opening
with a clear show of support for military action, he then argued that it was rarely a
panacea for resolving such situations, and ended with a complete show of confidence
in the role of the United Nations, and its conflict resolution abilities. Again, in
4 See Michael R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour's Foreign Policy 1914-1965 (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1969).
164
common with the earlier analysis of his speech, what Banks demonstrated was the
complexity of the very issue of military intervention. In many ways, it is relatively
simple to call for military action; difficulties arise when more specific suggestions are
required. As will quickly become apparent, this is a consistent theme when looking at
the various calls that came in favour of 'military' intervention.
The difficulties presented by this very issue were apparent in a speech made
by David Winnick during a debate on Bosnia, one year after the start of that conflict.
He interjected:
Does the Secretary of State recognise that there has been a shift of
opinion, certainly across the country and in the House in recent months? I
was among those who argued six or eight months ago against any form of
military intervention. However, in view of the continued slaughter of
innocent Bosnian civilians, is it not clear that far greater pressure must be
placed on the Serbian leadership and military commanders? To a certain
extent, one can draw an analogy with the ruler of Baghdad.
Is it not the case that the Serbs continue their aggression, war crimes and
atrocities because they know that no force will be used to stop them?
Whether Lady Thatcher is right or wrong, are we to be appeasers in the
face of some of the worst crimes in Europe since the end of the Second
World War?5
Of note in this speech, is that Winnick acknowledged that he had changed stance on
the issue of military intervention, showing that the developing situation had led to a
re-examination of his earlier position. Also, the reference to Lady Thatcher being in
favour of military action shows that what with Winnick also taking this view, there
was no clear-cut ideological split between political parties on this particular issue.
Again, this shows the complexity of the debates that took place regarding the break-
up of Yugoslavia: there was no straightforward grouping of politicians identifiable as
being either for or against military action. Thus, David Winnick, a back bench Labour
politician normally identified with the traditional beliefs of the party, was in favour of
5 David Winnick (WalsalI, North), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 14 April 1993) Vol: 222, Column
841.
165
the same policy as Margaret Thatcher, a figure seen to be traditionally at odds with
views held by those on the Labour back benches.
Of further interest in his speech is the analogy of appeasement, which he used
to try and gamer further support for a more interventionist policy. In making this, and
other references to the Second World War, Winnick provided a direct link to the last
time that Europe entered the dark days of conflict. The powerful images that resonate
from the mention of that major war would perhaps be perceived as helpful in
orchestrating support for military action in the current hostilities. The impact of the
past on the debates surrounding likely intervention in this particular war was intended
to be extremely persuasive. This is an issue which will be examined in more depth in
the next chapter of this thesis.
A more direct call for military intervention was made by back bench Labour
politician Andrew Faulds. Accepting that full-scale military action, that is, that which
involved ground troops, was unlikely to come to fruition, he made a plea for a more
concerted air campaign, acknowledging the very real practical difficulties that could
occur with such action, that is, possible fatalities and the suspension of the United
Nations humanitarian relief programme:
I do not believe that any of the leaders in western Europe will agree to the
early involvement of ground troops made up of their forces. They are too
frightened of the effect that the body bags will have on their electoral
chances in future years. But if the military were instructed to mount
specific actions against certain objectives, of course it could be done. It is
outrageous to suggest that that could not be achieved. Remember the skills
and precision displayed in the Gulf war, a somewhat less justified
intervention than would-be intervention in Bosnia .....
Serbian aggression has to be stopped and to achieve that we must go in
and mean to win. Of course, there will be civilian as well as military
casualties, but civilian casualties are continuing all the time, compounded
by cold-blooded murder, torture and rape as a policy objective.
The humanitarian operations will have to be withdrawn while the attacks
on Serbian objectives continue. Itwould be foolish in the extreme to keep
our and other forces in Bosnia as sitting targets for revenge operations,
and the Serbians are not very nice fighters. The protection that those
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forces provide and the provisions that they distribute would have to cease,
hopefully only temporarily, while Serbia's military machine is crippled.
On the achievement of that goal, and it can certainly be done if the west
means to do it, humanitarian operations must be resumed.6
Noteworthy of Faulds's position, is the acceptance of the very real effects that
would be wrought by a military campaign. The range of responses outlined in
this part of the chapter do not show a general trend for this type of recognition
of the very real difficulties that would occur in an armed intervention. Indeed,
Faulds's speech was unusual in that it painted an extremely clear, graphic view
of the likely consequences of military action against the Serbs. What was also
distinctive was that he was not afraid to outline detailed points, in a cause and
effect manner, whereas very often his Parliamentary colleagues made less exact,
more abstract pronouncements on the implementation of armed intervention in
the region. Of additional interest is Faulds's mention of the Gulf War (1991).
His comment is significant in that he compared Bosnia favourably to the earlier
conflict. Thus, in his opinion, intervention was more justified in the Balkans
than it had been in Iraq. Missing from his speech, rather frustratingly, was his
explanation and reasoning behind such a comment.
Another Labour politician in favour of military intervention was Max
Madden. Participating in the same debate, he used a similar level of detail to
that employed by Faulds in his speech. Citing the objections to military
intervention used repeatedly in Parliamentary debates, for example the risk to
United Nations personnel, the threat of civilian casualties, Madden stated that in
spite of these factors, the local situation demanded some form of enhanced
action. He spoke out in a debate in the House of Commons in 1993:
6 Andrew Faulds (Warley, East), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223, Column
1211-1212.
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However, not only in the debate but previously, far less emphasis has been
placed on the risks of doing nothing about what is happening in Bosnia.
There is a formidable risk in inaction and failure to take effective military
action. From day one, and certainly since British troops were first
involved in the United Nations contingent, there has been uncertainty and
confusion about not only Her Majesty's Government's political objectives
but the whole exercise .....
... .1 cannot see how those objectives can be achieved without military
intervention mobilised by and through NATO under the overall command
of the United Nations. That inevitably calls for a major ground force. Like
other hon. Members, I came to that conclusion reluctantly. But
nevertheless I accept the consequences of that and I say clearly and
unequivocally that those forces need to be deployed in numbers that
military commanders judge to be necessary. They should remain there
until, in the view of military commanders and their political leaders, their
job is complete.i
What Madden demonstrated then was a resolve to implement a comprehensive
military intervention in the former Yugoslavia. This is at odds with the typical view
of left-wing foreign policy as epitomised In works on Labour and international
relations by Gordon and Meehan'
Further calls for military action were apparent in a debate on Yugoslavia at the
end of July 1993. Calum Macdonald and David Young both commented on the need
for a more coherent military approach to resolving the conflict. Although offering
suggestions on how to improve the situation, Macdonald took issue with what he
perceived to be the lack of support by the international community given to the United
Nations as it tried to operate in the Balkans. He said:
That is not to criticise the United Nations, or those involved in trying to
implement UN peacekeeping missions. It is not their fault that the member
Governments of the United Nations have not supplied the resources and
the wherewithal to allow the UN to carry out these missions effectively
and properly."
7 Max Madden (Bradford, West), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223, Columns
1224 - 1226.
8 Michael R. Gordon, Op cit., and Eugene J. Meehan, The British Left Wing and Foreign Policy: A
Study of the Influence of Ideology (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1960.)
9 Calum Macdonald (Western Isles), Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 26 July 1993) Vol: 229
Columns 838 - 841.
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Young's comments in support of military intervention were also borne from a
frustration towards the international community at its inability to act effectively in the
former Yugoslavia. His assessment of the situation drew parallels with an earlier
conflict:
When we hear all the reasons why we cannot act, I sometimes wonder
whether it is time to consider some reasons why we should act. Perhaps
action would have occurred long ago if Bosnia had oil. We find that action
occurs quickly from surrounding countries in respect of oil-bearing
states. IO
The "intervening for oil" argument was one frequently used by those who advocated a
more proactive approach to the war in Bosnia. This ties in with those who held
sceptical views regarding the concept of a New World Order, as discussed in chapter
two of this thesis. Essentially, foreign affairs was viewed as an arena in which states
operated solely for their self interest; this is based on the realist paradigm of
international relations. The end of the certainties of the bipolar, Cold War world had
initially led to heightened optimism about a more cooperative global community who
would united to fight various ills that were befalling different states. However, what
became apparent with the break-up of Yugoslavia is that cooperation only manifested
itself when national interest was at stake.
Two years after the war in Bosnia started another Labour back bench M.P.
voiced the views of many with regard to the lack of action taken by either the British
Government, or the wider international community. Dale Campbell-Savours used a
comparison between two Conservative Prime Ministers to emphasise his position:
May I say to the Secretary of State what I really do believe? If Margaret
Thatcher had been Prime Minister today, she would have sorted out this
bloody - I use the word advisedly - nonsense one and a half years ago. At
least she demanded that fascism should be stopped in its tracks in the
10 David Young (Bolton, South East), Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 26 July 1993) Vol: 229,
Columns 854 - 856.
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heart of Europe, whereas this Conservative Government have ducked the
. IIIssue.
This extract is noteworthy in that it demonstrates the complexities that were manifold
during the Balkan wars. Here, as seen before with David Winnick, a Labour back
bench politician was clearly critical of the Conservative Government. This might be
of little significance for a number of reasons. Firstly, the adversarial nature of British
politics means that very often there is disagreement between the major parties. Also,
in this example, the issue of intervention in the Balkans was extremely contentious for
many politicians. However, of crucial relevance here, and if not unique to the debates
that took place regarding the former Yugoslavia it is certainly indicative of the
confusion of the Parliamentary contributions, is the fact that Campbell-Savours
showed open support for former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and the tough
stance that she advocated vis-a-vis Bosnia. Thus, the wide variety of views apparent at
this time enabled the Labour politician to be critical of the current Government, whilst
showing support for the position taken by the previous incumbent of Downing Street.
Another reason for deploying the former Prime Minister into a debate as a means to
attack the current government was to further weaken. the position held by John Major
at that time. As has been demonstrated throughout this thesis, aside from displaying
an interest in events in the former Yugoslavia, Labour Party politicians very often
used debates on the region as a means of 'political point scoring' against the
embattled Prime Minister. This was a means to bring British domestic political issues
into debates on events in the Balkans.
A further point to consider is that, as with previous contributors, the mention
of 'fascism' was a device to remind people of the horrors of the Second World War,
11 D.N. Campbell-Savours (Workington), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 18 April 1994) Vol: 241,
Column 649.
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and thus employed to encourage them to support enhanced intervention III the
Balkans.
Further back bench support taking a firm stance on the issue of military
intervention was apparent in the last year of the war in Bosnia. John Home Robertson
made comparisons with three earlier events from twentieth century history. Firstly, he
mentioned the way in which the situation was affected by an attitude of appeasement.
The implication of this point has been mentioned when examining previous speakers.
However, of significance is the way in which 'appeasement' was an easily
understandable way to make a criticism about the existing type of policy. The obvious
weaknesses of that particular example were intended to show how the world had
failed Bosnia in the 1990s. The second and third examples that he used regarded much
more recent conflicts, the Falklands War, and the Gulf War. Home Robertson used
those episodes to illustrate his point regarding Britain's national interest. Thus:
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a great deal closer than the Falkland Islands, and
closer even than Kuwait. It is only a very short flight away, or three days'
drive in a truck. I suggest that protecting the people of Bosnia is a vital
humanitarian interest, that the collective security and stability of Europe is
a vital national interest for all of us in Europe, that respect for the United
Nations is a vital international interest, ... I2
Explicit in this extract was the point that Britain had intervened in these earlier
conflicts, which were geographically much more distant than Bosnia: the implication
being, if forces could be deployed there, why not in the Balkans now?
Other politicians speaking in the same debate who were in favour of a more
enhanced type of intervention included Andrew Faulds. As will become apparent, the
nature of the break-up of Yugoslavia, that is the seemingly endless fighting and lack
of success on the part of the international community in bringing peace to the region
12 John Home Robertson (East Lothian), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260,
Columns 1027 - 1030.
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was such that many people spoke frequently on the various issues in a large number of
debates; this particular Labour back bencher was just one such politician. In a
passionate speech Faulds outlined the stance that he had taken on the Bosnian war
from the start of the conflict some thirty six months previously. He clearly stated the
action that should be taken against the Serbian forces, this included the destruction of
their armaments factories and military infrastructure.l ' Addressing the concerns of
those opposed to such action, namely that many Serbs would lose their lives, and
there would be large numbers of casualties, he argued that:
... there would have been and there will be heavy, heavy casualties among
the Serbs and among the civilians of all faiths if the necessary action is
taken. But there have been, over these years, in any case, hundreds of
thousands of civilian casualties and there will be many hundreds of
thousands more if the international community withdraws and allows the
belligerence of all sides to fight it out to the bloody end. That, I believe, is
the likely outcome of European procrastination - the Minister of State for
the Armed Forces had better listen - and timidity.l"
Thus, Faulds's stance seems an almost Benthamite - albeit in a rather brutal way -
approach to the resolution of the conflict. The military action that he prescribed would
be bloody and cause casualties. However, the argument used by Faulds was that if
nothing was done, the situation would become even worse. Whilst not quite a
manifestation of the 'greatest good for the greatest number' principle, his stance was
one that demonstrated the need to consider the long term benefits to the majority
however, bloody and desperate the intervening period. This approach would have
been very difficult politically for many politicians to accept: any government
sanctioned bombing would have certainly caused so-called collateral damage and
would have been extremely controversial.
13 Andrew Faulds (Warley, East), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns
1060 - 1062.
14 Andrew Faulds (Warley, East), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns
1060 - 1062.
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Speaking in the same debate, another Labour back bench politician to take a
tough stance on the issue of military action was Calum MacDonald. Again, as with
the previous speaker, this shows how some figures were regular participants in
debates on the same topic. The importance of supporting the armed forces in their role
in the Balkans was the key tenet of his speech. Critical of those who had mentioned
the issue of withdrawal, MacDonald stressed the need to give the military unequivocal
backing. Anything less, he argued, would be incredibly demoralising for those troops
involved. IS They should know that they had the full backing of both the politicians
and public at home.
The name Srebrenica has become synonymous as the site of the biggest
massacre in Europe since the end of the Second World War. Television footage
showed the now notorious deportation of all Bosnian Muslim men of military age. As
one would expect, these events led to debate in the House of Commons regarding the
developments that were taking place in the Balkans. Frustration amongst politicians
was evident in a debate that took place in July 1995. Again, two familiar figures
featured in the deliberations, espousing the tough view that they had taken since the
start of the conflict. Andrew Faulds asked:
If our forces in Bosnia are to have any meaning or significance, they have
to be used. Would it not be perhaps some strength to him to rid the
western view of its pusillanimity so far - to ask our chaps in Gorazde
whether they want to take action against the criminal activities of the
Serbs? If the Government have not got it, those chaps have certainly got
the guts and the balls to do it. 16
Strong, outspoken language such as this clearly illustrates the anger that was felt by
some of these politicians, along with many people outside of Parliament. Faulds's
sentiments were mirrored by Tony Banks who, as we have seen earlier in this chapter,
15 Calum MacDonald (Western Isles), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260,
Columns 1065 - 1067.
16 Andrew Faulds (Warley, East), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 12 July 1995) Vol: 263, Column
956.
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consistently supported a more committed, robust type of military intervention, albeit
one without a clearly defined strategy. Speaking in the same debate as his back bench
colleague, he argued that by overrunning the safe haven of Srebrenica, the Bosnian
Serb army had, in effect, declared war on the United Nations. I7 This was due to the
fact that the 'safe haven' policy was administered by that organisation. In the same
intervention, Banks asked for clarification regarding how the situation on the ground
could be improved.
As mentioned at the start of this chapter which examines the debates that took
place on the issue of military intervention, the majority of those who spoke out in
favour of a more assertive policy were from the Labour back bench. However, here it
is well worth highlighting those in the Shadow Cabinet who spoke in favour of
military action. Interestingly, due to the potential for controversy for any politician
speaking out in favour of such a policy, both of the speakers in question were at
different times the leader of the Labour Party. Thus, the only two figures to call for
more assertive military intervention were the successive leaders of the Opposition. At
the start of 1994, nearly two years after the start of the war in Bosnia, the Labour
leader John Smith called for increased numbers of troops 'on the ground' in Bosnia.ls
His demands were linked to increasing the numbers of forces in the UNPROFOR
units serving in Bosnia. Although this would be seen as part of the humanitarian
mission, Smith's commitment to sending troops to the region showed a desire to
intervene in a more assertive manner than had been demonstrated up to that point. As
we have seen in the earlier chapters of this thesis, John Smith's contribution to the
various debates on the war in Bosnia were considerably proactive. His premature
death in the spring of 1994 means that we obviously have no way of knowing how his
17 Tony Banks (West Ham), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 12 July 1995) Vol: 263, Column 964.
18 John Smith (Monklands, East), NATO Summit (Official Report, Hansard: 12 January 1994) Vol: 235,
Column 179 - 180.
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position regarding the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the chaos which ensued, would
develop or change. In many ways, considering the way in which the foreign policy of
the Labour Party in the years since 1997 has become increasingly interventionist, this
is one of the great unanswerable questions of recent British political history: namely,
would a Labour Government under John Smith have been as proactive in the
international field as the Government led by Tony Blair. It is obviously impossible to
answer such a question. In his official biography of John Smith, Mark Stuart outlines
the politician's position on Bosnia and the break-up of Yugoslavia in only very
general terms, which makes it difficult for us to get any further detailed impression of
his stance. Stuart states that Smith did issue a statement calling for an ultimatum to be
issued to the Serbs, but this could have been in response to an open letter written by
some back bench Labour M.P.s to The Guardian.19 After this brief comment, Stuart
continues to study how Cunningham handled the crisis. It is thus difficult to get
further insight into Smith's position on the situation in the Balkans.
It is one point to speculate over the direction that a late politician would have
taken the party; however, the last year of the Bosnian war saw vocal demands for
military intervention from the new leader of the Labour Party, Tony Blair. No such
speculation is necessary regarding the nature of foreign policy that he was to pursue
on election to office. Chapter three of the thesis has already outlined his firm support
both for the sanctions that were in place in the region, and for their effective
enforcement. The following extract provides further information about the policy
changes that he demanded for the Balkans. Although Blair was cautious of
committing troops to a ground campaign, the sentiments that he demonstrated in this
particular debate show particular resonance with the stance that he took on the
19 Mark Stuart, John Smith - A Life (London: Politico's, 2005) pp274-276. The letter was published on
17 April 1993.
175
international stage following his arrival in government in 1997; that is, the more
muscular approach to intervention with which we are now familiar:
... .Inevitably, this debate allows us to take stock of the medium and
longer-term strategy in Bosnia. I think that the beginning of understanding
in this matter - indeed, of humility - is to recognise that all options are
fraught with difficulty and that there is no difficulty that is not vast in its
character and complexity ....
I do not believe that that is a compelling case for withdrawal from Bosnia
and I shall tell the hon. Gentleman why. It is always possible to say that
we should have intervened in other conflicts and there can be debates
about that. However, the Bosnian conflict is in Europe and the
consequences could spread to neighbouring European states. We have to
make a judgement about where our national interest lies and take
humanitarian concerns into account. I believe that that judgement is
overwhelmingly in favour of involvement/"
For Blair then, there was no question over Britain's commitment to intervention in
Bosnia. In this speech, he acknowledged the complexities of any type of intervention,
and outlined the basis of his argument in favour of such a policy; namely the guiding
principle being one of national interest underscored with a concern over the
humanitarian situation within the region. Within the same speech, he described
exactly how he saw intervention taking place in the Balkans. In a robust defence of
the use of a more effective policy, he called for the U.N.' s position to be clarified,
with careful effort being taken to ensure that there was no ambivalence regarding the
role of that organisation's troops in the region, and for the existing mandates to be
strongly enforced. In parallel with that point, Blair also asked for the U.N. troop
deployment to be strengthened, outlining how the existing force was not operating at
its intended strength. In addition to these points, he called for both the demilitarisation
of the safe areas, in order for the United Nations to be seen to maintain its
20 Tony Blair (Sedgefield), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns 1007 -
1009.
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impartiality; and asked for a more stringent application of the sanctions policy vis-a-
vis the rump Yugoslav state.21
The extracts from Tony Blair's speech examined here are interesting in that
they show him, as the leader of the main Opposition party, to be interested in a key
foreign policy issue. Within the context of the early years of the twenty first century,
and various events that have occurred in the international arena, the comments also
signpost the proactive stance pursued by the Labour leader since his arrival in
Downing Street. These remarks offer a clear insight into the type of foreign policy
that has been initiated by the various Labour Governments in the years since 1997. In
short, Blair's comments here are a precursor to the type of muscular intervention,
carried out for humanitarian reasons, that have featured regularly on the political
landscape since his election as Prime Minister. Indeed, John Kampfner has examined
Blair and his attitude towards committing British troops to battle in his study Blair's
Wars.22As Kampfner wrote in the preface: "(t)his is the story of a man who came to
office in 1997 knowing precious little about foreign affairs, who within a year had
defined a new mission for Britain overseas.',23 However, despite the absence of a
background within the field of international relations, Blair's position in office has
been focussed on the creation of a foreign policy that has been rigorously prosecuted
even when opposed by many people or controversial in its implementation. Thus,
what was shown in the extract from the Parliamentary speech referring to the earlier
conflict was a desire to make a difference in the region and change the situation on the
ground for the better, even when this meant positioning himself away from other front
21 Tony Blair (Sedgefield), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns 1011 -
1012.
22 John Kampfner, Blair's Wars (London: The Free Press, 2003)
23 Ibid, pix.
177
bench figures - of either side of the Parliamentary divide - on this one particular
Issue.
OPPOSING MILITARY ACTION
As one would expect, there were many within the Parliamentary Labour Party that
opposed any type of more muscular intervention. Unlike the group that argued in
favour of more enhanced action, politicians that argued against the military option
included a broader representation from both front and back benches. The views of
those from the Shadow Cabinet will be considered first, followed by an examination
of those contributing to the debate from the back benches. Significantly, all of the
politicians who served as Shadow Foreign Secretary during the time of the wars in
Yugoslavia spoke out against military intervention. Thus, Gerald Kaufman, John
Cunningham and Robin Cook all argued against the pursuit of such a policy. These
high profile figures were joined by David Clark, the Shadow Defence Secretary. It is
significant then, that there was no high profile campaign led by senior figures within
the Labour Party to promote the notion of military intervention. As we have seen, the
only figures to show support for such an approach were the leaders John Smith and
Tony Blair. However, it should be stated that due to the nature of Parliamentary
business at Westminster, the Shadow Foreign Secretary and Shadow Defence
Secretary would speak much more regularly on debates pertaining to the break-up of
Yugoslavia. It is these figures that would present detailed arguments showing the type
of policy which they felt should be pursued in the Balkans. So, whilst the leaders
made more overt, general statements regarding military intervention, one should
recognise that although their speeches promoted the notion of a more muscular
foreign policy, they did not give more specific detail on how this could be achieved.
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The first of the Shadow Foreign Secretaries to consider is that of Gerald
Kaufman. Just two months after the war in Bosnia started, Kaufman clearly outlined
his opposition to any military intervention in the region. Two months into the war in
Bosnia, the Shadow Foreign Secretary showed his opposition to any international
intervention reliant on force. He stated:
The situation is far too confused for forcible intervention from outside to
do any positive good. It is certain that force would lead to further
unnecessary bloodshed and increase the number of people at risk. I hope
that the Government will stand out inflexibly against any suggestions of
forcible intervention by the European Community.. . The European
Community should have no military role in this conflict or indeed in any
other. The need is not to extend the conflict but to maintain it. .... The
Foreign Secretary is equally right to make it clear that the Serbs are not
the only guilty party - that others share that guilt. No solution will be
acceptable unless it is based on the restoration of stability, coupled with
the safeguarding of all minorities, and that includes Serbian minorities.
We hope that the United Nations actions will provide a possibility for
such a solution, and it is on that basis that we give the United Nations our
24full support.
This extract provides us with a range of points regarding both Kaufman's stance as
well as that taken by the wider community towards the war in Bosnia. Of foremost
importance was Kaufman's insistence on the importance of European Community
troops remaining outside of the conflict. There was .no suggestion whatsoever on the
part of the Shadow Foreign Secretary that European troops should become involved in
the region. Of further interest was his use of the moral equivalence argument
regarding the apportionment of blame regarding the events in the Balkans. A key
feature of the debates that took place regarding intervention in the various wars of
secession was that each of the three ethnic groups was responsible for the horrific
events on the ground. This argument was used against those who called for
intervention; after all, if each group was responsible then why should an external
24 Gerald Kaufman (Manchester Gorton), Yugoslavia (Sanctions) (Official Report, Hansard: 2 June
1992) Vol: 208, Column 715.
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force be deployed to assist one particular victim? Kaufman's comments are important
to consider here, as they provide an explanation regarding his position on
intervention; or rather they show why he did not approve of military intervention in
the region.
John Cunningham succeeded Kaufman to the role of Shadow Foreign
Secretary in 1992. He maintained the stance on military intervention that had been
outlined by his predecessor. Just five months into the Bosnian War, during a debate
on United Nations Operations, Cunningham made his position clear regarding any
potential escalation of external involvement in the region:
The Foreign Secretary rightly ruled out military solutions to these
complex problems, at least for the moment, but he and his European
colleagues have got us into the worst of all possible worlds. The only
realistic alternative to military intervention is effective implementation of
the United Nations mandatory sanctions, particularly against Serbia and,
perhaps, in the developing circumstances, against Croatia.f
Cunningham's speech showed his opposition to the use of military action.
Interestingly, considering our knowledge of the importance of the role of the United
Nations to the Labour Party, he showed his support for that organisation and stressed
that the only way in which the situation was going to improve in the region was if the
sanctions that have been implemented were properly supported by the outside world.
Just two months later, Cunningham continued to stress these two points; that is the
need to avoid military action coupled with the importance of enforcing the United
Nations sanctions in the region. Crucially, he stated the inevitable link between failing
sanctions and the rise in demands for action. He asserted:
If that is not done, those voices calling for armed intervention - which I
do not support - will grow louder and stronger as they see that the peace
process is not working, because of a failure of will on the part of countries
25 Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), United Nations Operations (Official Report, Hansard: 25
September 1992) Vol: 212, Columns 131 - 134.
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- some of them our partners, and all of them signatories to United Nations
decisions - in quietly but persistently flouting those decisions.i"
For Cunningham then, it was crucially important to ensure that the sanctions policy
was properly enforced. If that policy were to succeed it would mean the cessation of
the calls for armed intervention. His determination to avoid the use of more localised
military action was apparent even after the introduction of air strikes which he did
Support_27 In a speech made one year into the war in Bosnia, John Cunningham
stressed the importance of basing policy on the practicalities of the situation on the
ground rather than emotion:
Who does not share the anger and the anguish of people in Britain and
elsewhere about the agonies of the Bosnian people? We all share the anger
and anguish, but we should not allow anger to dictate the difficult political
decision that we must make in trying to deal with the circumstances.f
Linked to the large amount of publicity that surrounded the war in Bosnia, and tied in
with the previous issue regarding the use of sentiment in determining foreign policy,
in the same debate the Shadow Foreign Secretary attempted to demolish the argument
that had been constructed regarding the need for action in the Balkans:
Nor do I accept the argument put to me by Dr Silajdzic and others that we
have a moral duty to intervene in Bosnia. Noone talks about our moral
duty to intervene in Angola, where nearly three times as many people
have been killed in a bloody civil war. No one says that we have a moral
imperative to intervene in Nagomo-Karabakh.j"
Cunningham's dismissal of the 'moral' dimension of the argument IS an
interesting contrast to the principles that the Labour Party has followed in
foreign policy more recently. Although there is currently no suggestion of
26 Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), European Communities (Official Report, Hansard: 24 November
1992) Vol: 214, Column 778.
27 For Cunningham's view on air strikes, please see the previous chapters. Also, see Dr John
Cunningham, Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 April 1993) Vol: 223, Columns 23 - 24 for his
contribution to a debate that covered this particular policy.
28 Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 1178 - 1180.
29 Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Column 1182.
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intervention globally in an endless number of conflicts, what is interesting to see
is the Shadow Foreign Secretary's honesty or cynicism, depending on one's
viewpoint, regarding the restrictions that exist with regard to such an approach.
Indeed, critics of the now infamous 'ethical foreign policy' have made a point of
highlighting how when in government it is either naive or implausible to expect
to prosecute a foreign policy that is based on a moral dimension.i" In this extract
then, Cunningham provided a contrast with the later rhetoric of a more
traditionally 'New Labour' foreign policy.
The final Shadow Foreign Secretary to consider from the period of this
study is Robin Cook, the politician that went on to hold that position when
Labour achieved office in 1997. In a debate that took place in the May of the
final year of the war (1995), he expressed reservations about military
intervention in the former Yugoslavia. The long term commitment required by
such a policy was a key feature of his argument:
I fully agree with what the Foreign Secretary said about our inability to
impose a solution by military intervention. The big problem with
imposing a solution by military intervention is not whether we could
successfully carry it out but how long we would have to stay to make the
political settlement stick and how we would get out after imposing a
political settlement that nobody wanted until the military arrived.3!
Cook's position provides us with an interesting contrast to the opinion of Tony Blair,
who was by that stage the leader of the Labour Party. Cook's caution was a marked
difference to the notion of 'moral' obligation displayed by the Leader of the
Opposition. In a later House of Commons debate on the topic of Bosnia Cook
outlined his views on military intervention in more detail. Taking place in the
30 Mark Wickham-Jones, 'Labour's trajectory in foreign affairs: the moral crusade ofa pivotal power?'
in Richard Little and Mark Wickham-Jones (eds.), New Labour'sforeign policy- a new moral
crusade? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000) pp3-32.
31 Robin Cook (Livingston), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol: 259,
Columns 589 - 592.
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aftermath of the Srebrenica massacre it is little surprise to note that Cook's stance had
slightly adjusted from previous speeches. The following extract is based around what
he identified as four key points regarding action in Bosnia. Although the speech is
lengthy, it is worth looking at in detail as it illustrates how Cook's position on military
intervention evolved very slightly in favour of action, albeit with a range of caveats:
First, we should clarify what are the feasible military objectives, and
ensure that we provide the military assets to achieve those objectives.
Equally, we must ensure that we do not make commitments to objectives
that we do not regard as militarily feasible. Secondly, we must show
resolve in securing the objectives that we define as achievable. It would
therefore be helpful if those who speculate about what those objectives
might be did not in the same breath speculate about the possibility of
withdrawal.
Thirdly, we must back every possible diplomatic and economic sanction
to oblige the parties to the dispute to reach a political settlement. In view
of clear evidence over the past two months of the support that President
Milosevic has given the Karadzic Serbs, there must be no more talk in the
immediate future of relaxing sanctions on Serbia. That does not mean that
we should not be prepared to lay on the table now a programme of
economic reconstruction for the post-war period, which might help to
concentrate the minds of those in the Balkans on the enormous destruction
and lost opportunities that the conflict has cost the economy.
That brings me to my final guideline. As well as containing the military
expression of ethnic hostility, the international community should engage
more actively in the propaganda war that manipulates that bostility.r'
What Cook's speech showed was a measured approach to the expansion of the
military capacity of British troops in the region. Absent from his comments was the
more assertive, even gung-ho attitude of some of his back bench colleagues examined
earlier in this chapter. For Cook, of paramount importance was that enhanced military
intervention had to be properly prepared for, with clearly identifiable aims and
methods. Proper provision had to be made in order to achieve such targets.
Interestingly, in his third and fourth point, Cook stressed the importance of two non-
combative policies; firstly by emphasising the importance of the continuation of the
32 Robin Cook (Livingston), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 July 1995) Vol: 263, Columns 1751
-1752.
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diplomatic efforts, and secondly by showing how a propaganda battle could be
prosecuted more effectively. Cook's speech then appeared to provide a more cohesive
plan for the region compared to those of his colleagues who were merely calling for
action. As has been stated in the first chapter of this thesis, for Brendan Simms, the
arrival of Robin Cook as Shadow Foreign Secretary, under the leadership of Tony
Blair, was grounds for slightly more optimism regarding the position that the Labour
front bench was taking on the war in Bosnia; however, its approach was still not as
forceful as Simms would have liked, and only developed into a policy of which he
approved by the time of the NATO action against Serbia in 1999.33
The final figure from the Labour front bench that spoke out against military
intervention was the Shadow Defence Secretary, David Clark. In a debate on United
Nations Operations held in September 1992, he was vociferous in his opposition to
any type of military action involving British troops:
In no way can we give the Government a blank cheque for further
escalation. To extend military participation further would be extremely
dangerous, if not foolhardy. The terrain is ideal for hit-and-run attacks.
The old Yugoslavian army, many of whose remnants are now fighting in
Bosnia, were trained specifically for that task and we simply must not get
drawn into a conflict on one of the various sides. British military
involvement must not be allowed to escalate into such a quagmire, and we
do not believe that escalation is inevitable .
... The truth is that the mission can be justified only on humanitarian
grounds. In a sense, that is the essence of our involvement and that makes
our responsibility as politicians doubly onerous. We must ensure that our
ground troops out there have a clear guide to their role and a clear list of
instructions of what they can and cannot do.34
This was a comprehensively detailed speech outlining Clark's stance on the escalation
of British involvement in the Bosnian war. As should by now be apparent, an ongoing
theme of this thesis is the way in which unusual alliances and groupings emerged in
33 Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour - Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Allen Lane, The
Penguin Press, 2001) p299.
34 Dr David Clark (South Shields), United Nations Operations (Official Report, Hansard: 25 September
1992) Vol: 212, Column
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the search for resolution and peace in the former Yugoslavia: this speech provides us
with yet another example. Clark's stance is a mirror of that of the Conservative
Government. Thus, he was prepared to countenance humanitarian intervention but
was resolutely opposed to any extension of the existing remit. His speech called for
clear 'terms of engagement' for British troops stationed in the former Yugoslavia.
Clark, in common with the British Government, was determined not to see British
involvement extend to a more offensive role in Bosnia. Thus, his entreaty for a well
defined mission for the troops puts his views as parallel to the Conservative front
bench.
Brendan Simms has described how the break-up of Yugoslavia caused a front
bench consensus in British politics. In his work Unjinest Hour - Britain and the
Destruction of Bosnia, he stated that "Labour prided itself on not turning Bosnia into a
party-political issue" and described the Opposition as being complicit in government
policy." The extract from Clark's speech examined here shows how closely the
Labour Party front bench mirrored the views of the Conservative Government at this
point during the break-up of Yugoslavia. Although the language of Simms's attack is
highly critical, the analysis of both Clark and his front bench colleagues goes some
way to substantiating his (Simms's) opinion.
Clark's caution or complicity - depending on one's point of view - was
apparent at the start of the following year. In this particular speech, one could argue
that Clark showed even more reserve than his Government counterpart:
In the middle of his statement the Secretary of State indicated that an
advance group of specialist troops is to be sent to "make
arrangements .... for a larger force". That suggests a change in the role of
British troops. Is that contingency or strategy?
If we are to deploy extra troops, will other countries do likewise? Has the
United States said that it will supply troops? Will any of the conscript
35 Brendan Simms, Op cit., p300.
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armies of our neighbours be sent to Bosnia? There is a strong feeling that
the British cannot ourselves provide sufficient soldiers to do the job. It
would be helpful if the right hon. and learned Gentleman would give more
. f . h . 36m ormation on t ose pomts.
Whilst it is possible to argue that Clark was merely seeking clarification on elements
of the Government's Parliamentary statement, what was apparent from his tone was
that he was in no way whatsoever an enthusiastic supporter of extending the remit of
British troops in the region. This point is substantiated by further contributions made
by Clark in a debate three months later. As well as supporting the way in which the
government had ruled out the use of ground troops in the conflict, the Shadow
Defence Secretary illustrated in one simple sentence his stance on further British
armed involvement: "Does the Secretary of State accept that this civil war cannot be
solved by external military intervention?,,37 He supported his argument by calling for
the government to make improved efforts in the diplomatic arena in order to bring the
conflict to an end.
Clark's caution regarding the issue of military intervention manifested itself in a
further debate on Bosnia, just two weeks after his previous comments. Whilst
acknowledging that there was a need to expand military operations in order to protect
the humanitarian effort already underway in the region, the Shadow Defence
Secretary stressed his concern for the British forces in the region:
The Government have shown that they do not have a closed mind about
military action. If the Government pursue that line, they must take the
necessary precautions. They must either deploy additional personnel to
protect the soldiers delivering humanitarian aid or they must withdraw
those soldiers. Clearly, it would be highly irresponsible to carry out air
strikes without taking those precautions. "
36 Dr David Clark (South Shields), Bosnia (Further Deployment) (Official Report, Hansard: 14 January
1993) Vol: 216, Columns 1058 - 1059.
37 Dr David Clark (South Shields), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 14 April 1993) Vol: 222,
Columns 832 - 833.
38 Dr David Clark (South Shields), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223,
Columns 1243 - 1246.
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Explicit in Clark's response was a genuine concern to prevent British involvement in
the region escalating to a degree that would cause harm to the troops already serving
there in a peacekeeping capacity. Even in the final months of the conflict, the Shadow
Defence Secretary's comments displayed his cautious, reluctant approach to British
involvement in the region. In May 1995, David Clark highlighted anxieties regarding
the potential for confusion during any military build-up in the region. His concerns
mirrored the views held by some back bench politicians, whose views will be
considered later in this chapter. For Clark there was a fear that the humanitarian,
peacekeeping role of British troops in the region would be compromised by a more
assertive military presence in the Balkans. This was an issue that he demanded need
close attention and resolution.l" This factor will be considered in more depth now, in
examining the positions held by back bench Labour Party politicians.
Comments made by David Winnick in support of military intervention have
been documented previously in this chapter.i'' However, in the early days of the
break-up of Yugoslavia, he was unequivocal in his opposition to any involvement of
British troops in the region. His statement "that British troops should under no
circumstances get involved in such a vicious Balkan civil war,,41 was indicative of
much of the wider mood within Westminster, not just on the Labour back benches.
His concern was again apparent in the following month when he took part in a debate
on the European Council. He asked:
(I)s the Foreign Secretary aware that there is bound to be considerable
support for the humanitarian measures that he mentioned, such as the
airlift and monitoring, but there is no support in the House or in the
country for military intervention on a large scale, or in the country for
military intervention on a large scale, or of any kind, with the possible
39 Dr David Clark (South Shields), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns
1090 - 1093.
40 See footnote 5.
41 David Winnick (WalsaU, North), Yugoslavia (Sanctions) (Official Report, Hansard: 2 June 1992)
Vol: 208, Column 720.
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repercussions of getting bogged down in a civil war? Can the Foreign
Secretary assure the House that, if there is any question of such
intervention during the long summer recess, the House will be recalled?
The Government would need the authority of the House to follow that
course, and I hope that they will not embark on it.42
Winnick's concern regarding military intervention was such that he demanded that
Parliament should be recalled should there be any need to discuss Britain's
developing policy within the Balkans. Clearly, he was against any such expansion of
Britain's role in the region. Opposition to a more developed policy of intervention
was not restricted to David Winnick. Speaking in the same debate, Mike O'Brien also
expressed his concern regarding the potential for any military situation to escalate,
and he clearly outlined the parameters of what he felt was an acceptable level of
involvement:
Intervention must be for humanitarian and not political purposes; it must
be restricted to the protection of life, rather than the imposing or deposing
of any regime; any military intervention must be at the minimum level
necessary to secure a limited humanitarian objective; and intervention
should take place only after the failure of all other diplomatic methods.Y
For O'Brien then, military intervention was limited to that which enabled the
humanitarian relief effort to succeed: anything more was not acceptable. Intervention
purely for political gain and military success was not something that he agreed as
being a suitable policy for Britain in the Balkans.
David Winnick's concern regarding the absence of Parliamentary input on the
issue of military intervention manifested itself less than two weeks after his initial
comments on the very same issue. Speaking on 13 July 1992, he again made clear his
desire for Parliament to be consulted on all potential changes of policy in the region."
42 David Winnick (WalsaJl, North), European Council (United Kingdom Presidency) (Official Report,
Hansard: 2 July 1992) Vol: 210, Column 978.
43 Mike O'Brien (Warwickshire, North), European Council (United Kingdom Presidency) Official
Report, Hansard: 2 July 1992) Vol: 210, Columns 1019 - 1020.
44 David Winnick (Walsall, North), Economic Summit and CSCE (Official Report, Hansard: 13 July
1992) Vol: 211, Column 825.
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At the same time a further Labour back bench figure appeared and added his weight to
the debate against military intervention. Tony Benn is a politician who consistently
took a 'traditional old left' approach to the break-up of Yugoslavia, as indeed he did
with a number of other issues, both foreign affairs and domestic. His traditionally left-
wing approach has been seen throughout the thesis. Speaking in the same debate as
David Winnick, Benn too added his concerns to the issue of Britain extending its
remit in the former Yugoslavia. As well as sharing Winnick's desire for Parliament to
properly debate any change of British policy in the region, Benn also outlined the
likely difficulties that British troops could face in the area. Thus:
Will he [the Prime Minister] assure the House that there will be no
military involvement in Yugoslavia - by land, sea or air forces, or bases
under our control - without the consent of the House of Commons? A
long history shows that it is easy to get into conflict but difficult to get out
of it, and memories of similar conflicts go back a long way. Will he give
the House a specific assurance that British troops and bases will not be
involved until the House has heard the case for it from the responsible
Minister and has had an opportunity to register its feelings?"
For Benn then, the summer recess was not a valid excuse for British policy in the
former Yugoslavia to escalate into a more assertive military outing. Interestingly, as
will be shown throughout the rest of this chapter, Berm's stance on military
intervention, unlike that of Winnick, did not change at all, despite the worsening
impact of the war on the local population. Thus, Berm's position on military
intervention in 1995, that is towards the end of the war in Bosnia, showed no
discernable difference to his views as illustrated here.
Two months later, in September 1992, a debate on United Nations Operations
gave politicians further chance to offer opinion on the issue of the escalation of events
in the former Yugoslavia. The complexity of the arguments regarding intervention
45 Tony Benn (Chesterfield), Economic Summit and CSCE (Official Report, Hansard: 13 July 1992)
Vol: 211, Column 816.
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was clouded due to the nature of the existing United Nations involvement on the
ground there. U.N. forces, including British troops, were working in a peacekeeping
capacity. There were concerns that any extension of an international military force
would compromise the safety of the existing troops serving in the area. The blurring
of the two different types of role, that is humanitarian and military, was an issue
discussed by Labour back bench politicians in this debate. Peter Hardy and Andrew
Miller both spoke on this issue. Peter Hardy made clear his unease regarding the
extension of Britain's role in the region:
Weare now preparing for military intervention in Bosnia. For two years I
have listened to people in Europe calling for military intervention and
some of those calls have been very jingoistic. But Britain which was
prudently, the most cautious of all is now sending the largest contingent.
Some Conservative Members are making a considerable mistake by
saying only that our troops must shoot back if someone shoots or prepares
to shoot at them. Can soldiers shoot at a sniper who is firing from 1,000
yards or more or at those who are lobbing mortars from wooded terrain at
an armoured convoy?
The Government must be careful. I am not suggesting that we should not
put our forces behind the United Nations but if we are not careful, a
situation of inextricable complexity and embarrassment will develop and
that will place an unfair responsibility on our platoon commanders in the
Cheshire and other regiments."
For Hardy then, enhanced intervention in the Balkans would lead to endless problems
for British troops serving in the region. Of interest here is that this particular debate
was focussing on the expansion of the humanitarian effort within Bosnia. Defining
rules of engagement was a crucial part of United Nations involvement there.
However, from Hardy's speech, there was a clear reluctance for any role for British
troops that might put them at more likely risk of attack, even if the job in question was
a humanitarian one with the right of self-defence. This shows that Peter Hardy was
firmly entrenched against intervention by British troops within Bosnia.
46 Peter Hardy (Wentworth), United Nations Operations (Official Report, Hansard: 25 September
1992) Vol: 212, Columns 172 - 175.
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Showing similar concerns regarding the rules of engagement was his fellow
back bench M.P. Andrew Miller. Approving the use of British troops for the
humanitarian effort, Miller was careful to offer a caveat of concern regarding any
extension of their role in the former Yugoslavia. His concern focussed on the
parameters by which the military could retaliate in self-defence. For Miller, of great
concern was that soldiers in the peace-keeping force should not become involved in
any extension of their role by stealth. He illustrated this point by outlining his views
on the soldiers' right to self-defence:
On the ground, command may have to be given to people with a degree of
control to deal with these difficult circumstances. We cannot possibly
recall the House to decide each time a soldier needs to defend himself. He
clearly needs the right to defend himself and must be properly equipped so
to do, but that does not mean that the House should authorise the regiment
to embark on anything beyond protecting its own personnel and helping
the people whom it has gone to assist by means of the convoys.V
Of crucial importance to him then, was that the British troops had a clear idea
regarding their role in the region: it was important that they did not overstep their
responsibilities in the Balkans. Miller was emphatic in his comments that
unambiguous rules had to be introduced. In his view, the armed forces needed to
know their status in the field as it was impractical 'to expect the recall of Parliament
each time an incident ensued there.
As one would expect, in view of his stance taken on issues discussed earlier in
this thesis, Tony Benn was a regular and vociferous speaker in debates covering
military intervention. In a debate on troop deployment to Bosnia, almost one year
after the start of war there, he again expressed his concern regarding the direction
taken by events in the region. "[T]he commitment to further forces with an uncertain
objective of either protecting or withdrawing leaves the House in some doubt as the
47 Andrew Miller (Ellesmere Port and Neston), United Nations Operations (Official Report, Hansard:
25 September 1992) Vol: 212, Columns 176 - 177.
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Government's objectives.v'" A key worry for the veteran politician was that Britain's
role in the region was going to be extended by stealth, and that before long, the
country would find itself committed to military action in Bosnia.
Benn's unease about events in the region was repeated just three months later
when the House of Commons held a debate on Bosnia. As well as his opposition to
military action, his contribution to the discussions highlighted his concern of the way
in which Britain might stumble into participating in what he argued was a civil war. A
key factor for Benn was that the situation in the Balkans was being treated as unique
when worldwide there were other conflicts that could equally demand action, in this
example he cited the Palestinian situation:
Is the Foreign Secretary aware that the media coverage of the atrocities
has aroused much of the pressure for further action which has been
expressed today? Of course all wars, especially civil wars, include
atrocities on a massive scale, not all of which are equally covered. Is he
also aware that the world community, the United Nations and the western
nations must decide quite clearly at the beginning whether they can hope
to lift the arms embargo, to supply arms or to become combatants
themselves by air strikes or ground strikes and to maintain their role as
peace-makers and agents of humanitarian relief? If the principles
advocated today in the House by some hon. Members were applied to the
Palestinian question, for example, the logic of what was proposed would
become clearer.t"
The issue of equivalence with other situations is interesting in that due to his left-
wing position, it is highly likely that the Labour back bencher would oppose any
action if proposed for other such conflicts. This point is obviously difficult to verify
with certainty. However, as has been shown consistently throughout this thesis, Benn
was a firm advocate of the United Nations, and argued in favour of action by that
institution rather than anything more militaristic. This point is substantiated by
comments that he made in a debate on Bosnia one year later:
48 Tony Benn (Chesterfield), Bosnia (Further Deployment) (Official Report, Hansard: 14 January 1993)
Vol: 216, Columns 1062 - 1063.
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Is the Secretary of State aware that the warnings given that the situation
could lead NATO to stumble into a civil war in Bosnia are turning out to
be frighteningly true? NATO is not the United Nations, although the
humanitarian and peacekeeping roles may be successful. ...
Will the Secretary of State resist the siren voices from the White House
and from this House encouraging further military action? Will he take the
matter back to the United Nations Security Council, where all the
permanent members can contribute their opinion, and restore it to a UN
function, in which any military operations are under the command of the
Military Staffs Committee and not under the command ofNATO?5o
For Benn then, the United Nations was of crucial importance in attempting to bring
peace to the former Yugoslavia. Explicit in this extract was his belief that the U.N.
had supremacy over NATO. Although Benn makes reference to military operations
being run under the auspices of the U.N., throughout the break-up of Yugoslavia he
consistently argued against armed intervention. For him, as the preceding chapters
have demonstrated, of most importance was the desire to rectify the situation through
peaceful, diplomatic means. A recurring theme of the thesis is the way in which a
traditional left-wing foreign policy centred on a pacifist and internationalist approach
to international relations: this is certainly the case with regard to Benn's stance on the
break-up of Yugoslavia.
In the final months of the Bosnian war, Benn again outlined his views on
resolving the break-up of Yugoslavia. The following extract from his speech provides
a succinct summary of his suggested course of action:
My view is straightforward: it is that we should now build policy around
the only things that can be done in a civil war - and it is time we got it
straight - which are to provide humanitarian aid, mediation, arbitration
and negotiation and an arms embargo to ensure that more arms do not get
into the area. That is all that we can dO.51
Benn then was consistent in his stance on the issue of military intervention in Bosnia.
As has been shown herein, he regularly opposed any extension of Britain's role in the
50 Tony Benn (Chesterfield), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 18 April 1994) Vol: 241, Column 646.
51 Tony Benn (Chesterfield), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns 1019
-1020.
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region. The extract here highlights the stance that he was prepared to take regarding
this country's involvement in the war there; thus, Britain should be fully involved in
diplomatic efforts but this was not to be compromised by extending any military
remit.
It would be wrong to assume that Tony Benn was alone in his criticism of
military intervention. Even in the latter days of the Bosnian war, there were still back
bench colleagues who viewed such action with caution. Warning against any adoption
of a more 'gung-ho' military action were Labour back bench M.P.s Ann Clwyd and
Alice Mahon. In May 1995, and in the same debate where Benn spoke out against
military intervention, Clwyd's intervention was an illustration of the complexities of
the discussions that surrounded the break-up of Yugoslavia. She outlined how her
position on armed action had changed during the course of the conflict:
There is clearly not the political will in the House to enforce a peace by
military means. Large-scale force might have suppressed the conflict at an
earlier stage - and I was in favour of that - but it would probably now
incite guerrilla responses, ultimately backed by Serbia .....
Given past mistakes and political inadequacies, there are no easy answers;
but the current Bosnian Serb belligerence arises partly through
desperation, and Serbian support is already succumbing to external
pressure. Greatly strengthening such pressure, while attempting wherever
possible to suppress and contain the fighting, must surely be the best
. 52option.
What her response showed then was a concern regarding the extension of military
intervention at that particular point in time: obviously in the first part of the speech
she acknowledged how she was in favour of such action at an earlier point in the war.
However, in the second section of the extract, Clwyd's ideas for the resolution of the
conflict are quite vague, and although she talked about increasing pressure for peace,
she does not explicitly say how this should be achieved.
52 Ann Clwyd (Cynon Valley), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns
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Speaking in the same debate as both Benn and Clwyd, Alice Mahon took a
similar stance on the issue of enhanced military intervention. Her comments provide
an unambiguous insight into the stance taken by many politicians - on both sides of
the House - during the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the subsequent wars of secession.
She stated:
Experience teaches us that there are limits to external intervention in civil
wars. I also believe that we have become involved in a civil war and that
making paper threats has helped us lose credibility.
As many of our military commanders have told us, we should ignore those
groups that encourage us to take sides. That is always dangerous. One
Opposition Member referred to knowing which side to support; I am on
the side of peace in the Balkans and that must be paramount. To be sucked
into taking sides would be disastrous and would lead us into another
Vietnam. That is why the United States does not want to commit any
troops on the ground. The Americans have had their fingers burnt and
realise that such a move would be disastrous. 53
Mahon's comments regarding the nature of the war are a good illustration of the
stance that was criticised so heavily by Brendan Simms. For him, the idea that the
conflict in Bosnia was a civil war was an argument which was used to justify the lack
of appropriate intervention. Simms criticised this particular stance taken by
politicians, citing it as an excuse for inactivity. 54 Also mentioned in Mahon's speech
was a reference to the Vietnam war, which loomedlarge over any American decision
to commit troops to any military campaign. Thus, the reference to the earlier war was
justification for an absence from the current conflict.
Even until the dying days of the Bosnian war, Labour Party back bench M.P.s
continued to show caution regarding Britain's involvement. In a House of Commons
debate in July 1995, after the infamous Srebrenica massacre, politicians still showed
anxiety regarding any developments to the existing policy. Denzil Davies stated that
53 Alice Mahon (Halifax), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, columns 1080-
1082.
54 Brendan Simms, Op cit, For example: "Because most parliamentarians saw Bosnia essentially as an
intractable civil war, they were highly susceptible to governmental suggestions that there was not much
to choose between the sides." p289.
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Britain's troops in the region should be acting for appropriate military reasons rather
than to salve the consciences of international politicians and statesmen. 55 Speaking in
the same debate was veteran Labour back bencher Tam Dalyell. As has been shown in
the earlier chapters, Dalyell frequently brought historical references into his speeches.
On this particular occasion he talked about the guerrilla nature of the old Yugoslav
army, and the lessons that had arisen from the occupation of the country by Germany
during the Second World War. Dalyell raised a further point, one that has been
examined previously in this chapter when examining the views of Tony Benn,
namely, asking why the world was obliged to intervene in the region in an incredibly
complex conflict:
The option I have described [that is, exercising caution regarding
intervention] may seem not so much craven as that we are not fulfilling
our duty, but we have many duties and international obligations. I wonder
whether such wealth as we have to devote internationally should not be
devoted to the drought in Zambia, which is creating terrible problems, or
to the appalling situation that is developing in Malawi, and Mozambique.
If we are talking about saving lives, there are other places in the world
where, instead of becoming involved in a civil war, we may be more
effective in relieving great and equal hardship. 56
For Dalyell then, there were any number of international relations situations occurring
around the globe that could benefit from attention. The key question that needed to be
answered was why a civil war would benefit from intervention more than a famine or
other disaster. This particular opinion emphasises the way in which a seemingly
never-ending range of principles and perspectives affected the debates regarding
intervention in the Balkans. Dalyell' s comments tie in the points that have been
considered vis-a-vis the break-up of Yugoslavia being a civil war, as well as
demonstrating a traditionally left-wing 'internationalist' approach to foreign affairs.
55 Denzil Davies (Llanelli), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 July 1995) Vol: 263, Columns 1755 -
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Thus, just one speech gives us an indication of the ceaseless number of issues that
were discussed with regard to these wars of secession, and here, with regard to
military intervention, shows us the complexity of the different debates
CONCLUSION
The issue of military intervention garnered just as much comment as those topics that
have been covered in previous chapters. What is apparent is that as with the previous
discussions, there was no one coherent body of thought within the British Labour
Party. Differences were apparent both between front and back bench, as well as
between those who sat on the back benches, with even some difference in the way
ideas were presented between those who sat on the front bench. In short, there was no
one consistent position across the Parliamentary Labour Party. Military intervention is
obviously a fluid, rather generalised term, however, it still fostered plenty of comment
from those who spoke in the debates. Also of interest is the way in which many
people spoke on a fairly regular basis on the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the issue of
military intervention. Whilst there may not have been unanimity in the views held by
the various politicians, what is important is the way in which many of those studied
here determinedly participated in debates regarding the extension of Britain's role in
the Balkans. This may not have led to Britain actually intervening, but what this
chapter does show is that regular debates on this aspect of foreign affairs were taking
place in the House of Commons, and that, whatever their particular opinion, the issue
was important to a range ofM.P.s, both front and back bench. What is apparent is that
for a certain number of politicians, the break-up of Yugoslavia was a foreign policy
issue on which there existed a range of strongly-held views. In tum, many of the
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debates offered surprising outcomes with unlikely alliances between those holding
similar views.
The group of politicians who spoke in favour of military intervention
represented all areas of the Labour party. Motivations for demands for intervention
included fears over the Balkan wars spreading into some type of regional conflict;
concerns over a repeat of some type of disastrous appeasement policy; anger at the
lack of resolve demonstrated by the international community; and a Benthamite style
approach to international relations, i.e. following the policy that was likely to bring
the most benefit to the most people. Figures speaking out in favour of such
intervention were drawn from across the Parliamentary party. Tony Banks for
example, who has featured throughout this thesis, would be described as a politician
of the traditional left of the party, whereas Calum MacDonald would be seen as more
moderate. On the Labour Party front bench, only the successive leaders, John Smith
and Tony Blair mooted the idea of a more proactive interventionist policy. Of the two,
Smith's comments were less explicit than those of Blair. However, due to the events
that took place in the Balkans, namely the NATO intervention over Kosovo, this
should be of little surprise.
Of the politicians that spoke out against a more enhanced policy of military
intervention, there were a variety of reasons supporting their particular position. A
key concern was that the international community risked being dragged into what
some elements of the Labour Party continued to describe as a civil war. Other
politicians feared that without properly defined rules of engagement, British troops
would become embroiled in a conflict with no clear sign of an exit strategy. A further
group felt that the current policies being pursued in the region, namely economic
sanctions, and the presence of the United Nations in a humanitarian capacity should
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be properly supported. A final opinion was based on the rather stark view that any
military action had to be introduced for appropriate reasons, and not just implemented
to assuage the guilt of any western leaders due to the international community's
failure to deal with the situation in the former Yugoslavia. A further key observation
is that of the politicians who spoke against military intervention, their concerns were
not based on any Balkan-specific issues, but rather on broader geo-political
considerations. Those opposed to a broader military intervention were not confined to
the left wing of the Labour Party, and included members of the front bench as well as
back benchers from across all areas of the party. In short then, the range of responses
over the issue of military intervention in the former Yugoslavia was as varied as those
we have seen throughout this thesis, and demonstrate some quite unusual alliances
and interesting factions. These complex and varied reactions to events in the Balkans
will again be apparent as the thesis turns its focus to the way in which the shadow of
history loomed large over Parliamentary proceedings.
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CHAPTER SIX
LEGACIES OF HISTORY: THE USE OF SECOND WORLD WAR IMAGES
IN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES
A recurrent theme of the criticism regarding the British role in the break-up of
Yugoslavia is that there was a lack of commitment to intervene, and that any policy
which was implemented was not supported with enough conviction by those in a
position of power. This thesis has demonstrated that whilst it may be easy to criticise
the lack of assertive policy and the prevarication which accompanied the majority of
the conflict, it is unfair to say that events in the Balkans were ignored by the British
political community, or that they lacked commitment on the issue. Whether speaking
in favour or against a particular topic, it is clear that there was a body of Labour Party
M.P.s who were interested in what was taking place in the former Yugoslavia.
Obviously, as members of the main opposition party, these politicians were unable to
formulate policy. However, what has been shown herein, is that the complex nature of
the conflict, in the still new, uncertain post Cold War world, meant that alliances were
formed and disagreements developed between ali manner of Parliamentary Labour
Party colleagues. The break-up of Yugoslavia, and the ensuing conflicts led to a
number of topics being debated in Parliament, these included: attitudes to the United
Nations, the E.U. and NATO; issues regarding militarism and pacifism; as well as
domestic party politics. However, alongside these issues, there was another frame of
reference at work.
The amount of discussion which took place regarding the events in the
Balkans is perhaps better explained and understood when positioned in the broader
context of the previous fifty years. The last conflict to have affected Europe had been
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the Second World War, and what became apparent in the last decade of the twentieth
century was the immense influence which that war still held over politicians, and,
more importantly here, how that war influenced their position on different types of
policy. Mark Connelly has described how "(s)ince 1945 nearly every international
crisis involving Britain has been compared to, or seen through the lens of, the Second
World War."( It is perhaps of no surprise then to see that within British Parliamentary
debates on the break-up of Yugoslavia a so-called 'hand of history' was frequently
employed by politicians in order to reinforce points that they made in particular
debates. Labour Party M.P.s frequently mentioned incidents from the past in order to
reinforce their arguments regarding events in the Balkans. Evoking key episodes from
history was a device intended to add weight to the Parliamentary debates that took
place in the House of Commons. There were certain significant themes from the
Second World War which were regularly mentioned as a means of informing the
position of each particular politician. These were: appeasement; the Holocaust,
genocide and debates surrounding the issue of war crimes; specific factors relating to
Yugoslavia in the Second World War, for example, the partisans and guerrilla
warfare, and the Ustase; and the way in which the fiftieth anniversary of V.E. Day
was to be commemorated. What is of interest then, is how events from the past were
appropriated by politicians in order to reinforce and support their arguments regarding
potential developments in current international relations policy. These areas can be
divided into two themes: history as a warrant for intervention; and, using the past to
condemn the present. Indeed, these two arguments were used in parallel to the
subjects which have been discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis.
IMark Connelly, We Can Take It! - Britain and the Memory of the Second World War (Harlow:
Pearson Education Ltd., 2004) p268.
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HISTORY AS A WARRANT FOR INTERVENTION
The failed policy of appeasement in the 1930s was used by politicians as a means to
criticise current Government policy, and indeed the stance taken by much of the
international community, during the break-up of Yugoslavia. When mentioned by
politicians in a speech, the very word 'appeasement' resonates with failure and all that
has ever been wrong with British foreign policy. It is an easy form of shorthand that
instantly conveys disappointment and a lack of success in international relations. That
this word was used quite so often in debates focussing on the situation in the Balkans
does much to illustrate how some politicians viewed the success - or otherwise - of
the stance taken by the British Government. In fact, one can see in the debates to be
analysed herein, that the very use of the word appeasement was a means with which
to shame the Government, and indeed the outside world, into taking the action which,
until then, had not been forthcoming.
In the very early days of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the then leader of the
Labour Party, Neil Kinnock, was one of the first to make an allusion to the issue of
appeasement. Speaking in a debate in the summer of 1991, he made reference to
Neville Chamberlain's now infamous speech regarding Britain's likely involvement in
a conflict caused by issues of seemingly little relevance to the British public.' Neil
Kinnock stated that: "[c]learly, for our generation, there are no "small countries far
away of which we know little"." 3 His comment was in response to the first
diplomatic efforts undertaken by the European Council, including the despatch of the
E.U. troika Foreign Ministers to Yugoslavia, implemented in order to show European
2 In a speech made on 27 September 1938, Neville Chamberlain said:" 'How horrible, fantastic,
incredible it is,' .... 'that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a
quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.' "See James Joll, Europe
since J 870: An International History (London: Penguin Books, 1990. First published Weidenfeld &
Nicolson, 1973) p370.
3 Neil Kinnock (Islwyn), European Council (Luxembourg) (Official Report, Hansard: 1 July 1991) Vol:
194, Column 23.
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concern at events in the country." This followed the 'ten days war' in Slovenia, when
the local forces took on the might of the JNA.
The next politician to cover the issue of appeasement was Andrew Faulds. As
we have seen in previous chapters, he was a regular speaker on issues relating to the
break-up of Yugoslavia and played a keen part in participating in debates on the
subject. On this particular occasion, one year into the war in Bosnia, he mentioned the
role played by the Conservative Government during the 1930s at the time of the civil
war in Spain. Faulds drew a direct parallel to the contemporary situation by describing
the way in which the government of the day refused to send arms to the Spanish
Government. 5 This was a clear reference to the lack of desire on the part of the Major
Government to involve itself in any deeper way in the situation in the Balkans. Within
the same speech, Faulds stressed the way in which "the second world war ensued
because of such appeasement" Another back bench figure to contribute to the debate
was Ken Livingstone. Using the type of outspoken language that we would expect
from this politician, he used the analogy of appeasement to criticise the Tory
government for its lack of action. He said:
Ihave sat in the House sometimes and thought that it must have been the
same mood - this is what it must have sounded like as year after year
weasel-worded people got up at the Dispatch Box and said,
"Czechoslovakia is a long way away. It is a small country of no
significance to us. Hitler has legitimate aspiration but we do not
understand him." Some hon. Members said that the policies of the Nazi
regime towards the Jews were an internal matter and no concern of theirs.
That must have been the same as hearing people now say that the rape of
women as an active policy is an internal matter and cannot be a matter for
the international community."
4 The troika of European Foreign Ministers refers to the previous, future and current incumbent of the
holders of the presidency of the European Union. Thus, in July 1991, the presidency was held by the
Netherlands who had followed Luxembourg in taking the position. Italy was due to succeed the
Netherlands.
5 Andrew Faulds (Warley, East), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223, Columns
1211-1212.
6 Ibid.
7 Ken Livingstone (Brent, East), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223, Columns
1219-1220.
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Livingstone's direct vocabulary left his Parliamentary colleagues in little doubt as to
where he stood regarding the issue of intervention in the former Yugoslavia. In the
one extract he alluded to two historical events, namely the appeasement of Hitler
regarding Czechoslovakia, as well as the Holocaust, the Nazi policy of exterminating
Europe's Jewish population. Livingstone's anger at the lack of what he viewed as
appropriate action being taken by the British Government in Bosnia is clear by his
mentioning of these two aspects of twentieth century political history. The reference
to appeasement is a clear indication of how he viewed the stance being taken by the
Government. Likewise, his mentioning of the Nazi policy towards the Jews was
designed to highlight the way in which he believed the contemporary situation was
being dealt with; that is, the victims in the current conflict were being similarly
deserted. As will be shown later in this chapter, the events of the Holocaust were
frequently evoked by other Labour Party politicians with the intention of provoking
some type of firm British intervention.
Speaking in the same debate as both Faulds and Livingstone was another
Labour politician who took a strong interest in the break-up of Yugoslavia, and who,
as has been shown in previous chapters of this thesis, regularly contributed speeches
on the subject. Max Madden, in common with Ken Livingstone, used direct and
powerful language with which to make his point. He declared:
I venture to submit that the stench of appeasement hangs over the
Government - and, indeed, over every EC Government. In my view, we
do have an obligation to the people of Bosnia - Muslim, Croat and Serb -
to defend their independent country from external aggression'
Madden's use of the word 'stench' clearly illustrated the disdain with which the
policy of appeasement was viewed by politicians in the late twentieth century. As will
8 Max Madden (Bradford, West), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223, Columns
1224 - 1226.
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be clear by the end of the analysis on this particular point, no politicians stood up in
the House of Commons and spoke about the virtues of such an approach. Thus,
Madden's position regarding appeasement was indicative of the stance taken by his
Parliamentary colleagues not just during deliberations on the break-up of Yugoslavia,
but also when discussing foreign policy in general.
Just a few months later, another regular participant to debates on the former
Yugoslavia added his views to the discussions around the issue of appeasement. In a
lengthy contribution Calum MacDonald clearly outlined his opposition to the stance
that was taken by the Conservative Government. In the following extract, he referred
back to the dark days of Europe's past with mention of both appeasement and fascism.
He stated:
The message that I hope will come out of tonight's debate is that, despite
the delay and despite the pattern of appeasement, it is not too late. Europe
can still rediscover its will and its conscience. By taking action now, we
can still turn back the tide of nationalism and neo-fascism that is welling
up in the Balkans and which threatens to spread across central and eastern
Europe."
Speaking in the same debate, David Young also used the analogy of the 1930s to
substantiate his position as one that was critical of the existing policy towards the
former Yugoslavia. In his speech, Young made mention of the League of Nations and
how that organisation had failed due to a policy of appeasement.!" He argued that it
was imperative that the successor to the League, the United Nations, did not fail for
the same reasons.
Speaking almost one year after the previous debate, Malcolm Wicks raised the
issue of appeasement. "Does he [the Foreign Secretary] now accept the ancient lesson
9 Calum MacDonald (Western Isles), Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 26 July 1993) Vol: 229,
Columns 838 - 841.
10 David Young (Bolton, South East), Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 26 July 1993) Vol: 229,
Columns 854 - 856.
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of history that appeasement can never be supported and can never be successful?"!!
This comment illustrates several points. Firstly, it highlights the longevity of the
conflict within the Balkans. Almost a year after similar comments were made in
Parliament, it appears that very little had changed. Secondly, Wicks's remarks show
that, even in the last decade of the twentieth century, 'appeasement' was still very
much a 'dirty word', a shorthand for diplomatic failure. The imagery associated with
the word meant that, even in 1994, it resonated with all that had been deemed wrong
with British foreign policy.
At the end of the year, Labour back bench M.P. David Winnick used the
theme of appeasement in an ever more powerful way so as to illustrate the failure of
the British response to events in Bosnia. He argued:
Is it not obvious that the Serbian warlords - many of them outright war
criminals - are daily humiliating the United Nations and its authority,
knowing full well that member Governments do not have the political will
to resist what is happening in safe areas? Having listened to some of the
exchanges in the House today, if one were to change the word 'Bosnia' to
'Czechoslovakia', it is easy to imagine what it must have been like in the
House of Commons in 1938. The air of Munich pervades this place, which
is very unfortunate when it comes to resisting aggression in other
. !2countnes.
What this example demonstrates, is that, yet again; in utilising the term 'appeasement'
and specifically the Munich crisis, British politicians had a useful tool with which to
express their disgust and despair at the policy of the British Government - and the
wider international community - towards the break-up of Yugoslavia.
The final extract to consider that focussed on the issue of appeasement was in
a Parliamentary debate on the Former Yugoslavia that took place in May 1995.
Coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary of the ending of the Second World War, many
IIMalcolm Wicks (Croydon, North), Air Attack (Bosnia) (Official Report, Hansard: 1 March 1994)
Vol: 238, Column 796.
12 David Winnick (Walsall, North), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 7 December 1994) Vol: 251,
Column 321.
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M.P.s took the opportunity to mention that conflict and suggest parallels with the
more contemporary situation. As has been the case in the previous chapters of this
thesis, politicians very often spoke frequently on the events in the Balkans. Thus, a
pattern has already been identified where certain back bench figures showed a keen
interest in how the British Government was reacting to the break-up of Yugoslavia.
Here, with the issue of appeasement, was no exception. Malcolm Wicks, who has
featured previously within both this chapter and throughout the thesis, made a further
contribution regarding the topic of appeasement. He argued:
In the face of genocide more than 50 years after the holocaust, our Foreign
Office policy has never dared speak its name. British foreign policy has
once again been one of appeasement. Once, 55 years ago, appeasement
was thrown out by our nation and our House of Commons in favour of
action, and hand wringing was eventually rejected to make room for
resolution. All these years later, that may be the most valuable lesson to
learn from our history - the lesson that appeasement never pays and that
firm action must be supported.l '
Here, as with the previous examples that have focussed on the issue of appeasement,
Wicks presented a clear critique of the existing government policy in the region.
Again, in mentioning events of nearly sixty years earlier, the back bench politician
suggested that the current approach suffered from 'guilt by association' with the
events of the 1930s. Thus, these examples have shown how Opposition politicians
successfully appropriated the term 'appeasement' in debates surrounding the collapse
of the former Yugoslavia; even decades after the events with which that policy is most
famously - or infamously - associated. That one word resonated with such power in
these Parliamentary discussions says much about how the earlier conflict still hangs
heavily in foreign policy deliberations, and also, shows the gravity with which the
contemporary event was regarded by those Labour Party politicians who spoke
13 Malcolm Wicks (Croydon, North), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol:
259, Columns 634-637.
207
frequently on the subject. It is important to highlight that the M.P.s who used the term
in their speeches represented the whole spectrum of the Labour Party, so from the left
of the party one can identify Ken Livingstone, right through to figures who would be
identified as taking a more traditionally centre left position, such as Calum
MacDonald and Malcolm Wicks.!"
The issue of appeasement has long hung over British foreign policy. Mark
Connelly has described how: "Britons born long after Chamberlain returned from
Munich with his piece of paper still react to that word, determined that never again
should a British leader be caught talking peace with a deceitful opponent.r''" The
notion of being weak in the face of adversity, albeit, in a situation that was of no
direct impact on Britain, is a theme which has run throughout the comments seen thus
far in this chapter. The legacy of appeasement continued to have ramifications for
foreign policy in the Balkans at the end of the twentieth century. After the election of
the Labour Party in 1997, Tony Blair employed a robust approach to foreign affairs.
For our purposes here, his full support for the NATO action against Serbia in Kosovo,
which took place in 1999, is of most relevance. According to Mark Phythian: "For
Blair, the siege of Srebrenica would become a reference point in determining his
approach to the crisis in Kosovo, which emerged as the Dayton peace unravelled
during 1998.,,16Thus, the new Labour Prime Minister used the shame of appeasement
as a justification for his muscular approach to intervention in the Balkans in 1999.
This chapter will now examine the way in which the Holocaust, genocide and
war crimes were brought into British Parliamentary debates by Labour Party
14 Another examples of a speech that referred to appeasement and the Munich crisis is one made by
Nigel Griffiths (Edinburgh, South), Oral Answers: Foreign Affairs, Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard:
14 December 1994) Vol: 251, Column 912.
15 Mark Connelly, Op cit., p269.
16 Mark Phythian, The Labour Party, War and International Relations, 1945-2006 (London: Routledge,
2007) p118.
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politicians. It is worth clarifying here how these different phrases will be used in this
chapter. The word 'Holocaust' refers to the Nazi extermination policy towards the
Jewish population of Europe at the time of the Second World War. The orchestrated
deaths of six million people is seen as unique in history due to the way that the policy
was implemented. Use of the term 'genocide' refers to other examples of mass
extermination such as the massacre of the Armenians by the Turks in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Stalinist policies of genocide in Soviet
Russia, the 'Killing Fields' of Cambodia during the 1970s, and the deaths of
thousands of Tutsi at the hands of the Hutu in Rwanda during the 1990s. Finally, here
'war crimes' will refer to atrocities such as the expulsion of refugees, systemised rape
of women, and the torture of the local population.
The Holocaust was mentioned by many politicians during debates on the
break-up of Yugoslavia. The point was made that during the Second World War six
million people had died during a highly organised, industrialised campaign of
extermination, and no external intervention had been launched to stop that happening.
However, in the 1990s, with the prevalence of media crews covering the break-up of
Yugoslavia, there was no excuse to claim lack of knowledge, and thus avoid action
over the atrocities that were taking place in the region.!"
As will be demonstrated during this discussion on the Holocaust and
memories of that atrocity, comments citing those particular events of the Second
17 There were a wide range ofjoumalists working in the region who covered the events that took place
in the former Yugoslavia. Maggie O'Kane, Ed Vulliamy and Janine di Giovanni to name just three,
regularly filed reports from the conflict. They filed reports for, respectively, The Guardian, The
Observer, and The Times. These are just some of the writers that did much to keep events in the public
eye. Television journalists also remained a constant presence in the region. Martin Bell, working for the
BBC, is possibly the figure that is most regularly identified with his work reporting on the Balkan
Wars. As one would expect, there has been a raft ofiiterature written about the atrocities that took
place during the break-up of Yugoslavia. Just two to consider here are: Thomas Cushman and Stjepan
G. Mestrovic, This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia (New York: New York
University Press, 1996) and David Rieff, Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the failure of the west (London:
Vintage, 1995).
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World War tended to come from those who were not serving in the Shadow Cabinet.
It is difficult to suggest reasons for this, it could well be due to the fact that back
bench politicians felt that they had more freedom to raise topics that could be
considered controversial. After all, invoking the Holocaust in order to call for military
action during the Yugoslav wars of secession could be viewed as a provocative stance
to take. However, later in this chapter, during the examination of how mention of
genocide and war crimes were brought into debates, it will be apparent that politicians
from all areas of the Labour Party raised relevant points during Parliamentary debates:
thus, M.P.s from both front and back benches mentioned genocide and war crimes.
Clare Short referred to the Holocaust in Foreign Office Oral Answers in 1993.
Her question was succinct and to the point: "Does the Minister agree that there are
awful parallels between Europe's failure to protect the jews (sic) before the second
world war and our failure to protect the Bosnians from the systematic use of rape and
ethnic cleansing?,,18 Further mention was made of the Holocaust in the summer of
1993, during a debate on Yugoslavia. David Young stated that: "What perturbs me is
that ethnic cleansing smacks of the holocaust. From our not too distant history, we
know the penalty that was paid by ignoring the slaughter of the Jews in Germany.
Reasons were given then for why we could not act.,,19What is apparent from both of
these extracts, is that the sentiment attributed to each speaker is the same, namely,
ignoring the situation was no defence, and at its most extreme could lead to a situation
that mirrored the action taken against the Jewish populations of Europe during the
1940s. Thus, reference to the Holocaust was used as a means to argue that some type
of effective policy should be implemented. What was not seen then was a direct
18 Clare Short (Birmingham, Ladywood), Foreign Office Oral Answers, Serbia and Montenegro
(Official Report, Hansard: 14 April 1993) Vol: 222, Column 828.
19 David Young (Bolton, South East), Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 26 July 1993) Vol: 229,
Columns 854-856.
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comparison with events in the former Yugoslavia with what took place regarding the
extermination of the Jews. The two events were not seen as the same. However, the
events of the Holocaust were used as a warning of what could happen if the situation
in the former Yugoslavia was ignored.
This idea of using the Holocaust as a portent was made in a speech given by
Frank Field during a debate on Bosnia that took place in the following year, 1994. He
raised the way in which the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia were being well
documented by the media:
Does he [the Foreign Secretary] accept that in the 1930s, when the Jews in
Germany and Poland and surrounding territories were being exterminated,
most people in Europe could claim that they knew nothing of what was
going in, but that no one has that defence today?2o
This question ties in with the earlier observation regarding the way in which the wars
of secession within the former Yugoslavia were covered by the media. There would
be no way in which any politician or policy maker could argue that they did not know
of the atrocities that were being carried out in the region. As Field suggested, that was
a common argument used in the 1930s and 1940s regarding the treatment of the Jews
by the Nazis. However, in the last decade of the twentieth century, pleading lack of
knowledge and awareness about events in the Balkans was not an appropriate defence.
The recurring theme that has been demonstrated herein, that is, that the
Holocaust should not be repeated, and that awareness of events in the countries of the
former Yugoslavia meant that politicians should act to stop such atrocities was
restated in the closing months of the Bosnian war. Labour back bench politician
Malcolm Wicks gave a wide ranging speech about the situation in the former
Yugoslavia. He drew parallels between the events of the 1940s, and those of the
contemporary situation. Although this is a lengthy extract, it is worth examining in
20 Frank Field (Birkenhead), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 25 April 1994) Vol: 242, Column 27.
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detail as it raised so many of the points that occurred on this particular topic in the
preceding years. He stated:
I was born a few years after the end of the second world war and, as I
grew up in the 1950s and early 1960s, I learnt more about the causes and
the experiences of that war. I remember when I first saw, as many other
hon. Members would have done, the flickering black and white television
pictures from the concentration camps. We not only asked how this could
have occurred, but we were struck by the conviction that we would never
again see or allow genocide on any scale in Europe. We vowed that we
would never again tolerate such naked aggression or territorial gain of that
kind by military conquest, certainly not in Europe.
Obviously the scale in the former Yugoslavia is different, but the
experience has been much the same. Therefore, we should ask very
humbly why we have again tolerated such genocide and naked aggression
on the edges of Europe. In that post-war period we created the United
Nations and we believed that, through the United Nations and by other
alliances, we would prevent that kind of genocide in the future. Many of
us who believed ultimately in the goal of peace recognised that we needed
to expend money and large percentages of our national wealth on the
military to prevent the threat of such incidents occurring again."
The first point to consider is that Wicks drew a parallel with the film footage that was
taken at the concentration camps at the end of the Second World War, with that which
was being broadcast from the former Yugoslavia during the break-up of the country.
The difference being that widespread awareness of the Holocaust only occurred after
the war, whereas the situation in the Balkans was viewed almost 'in real time'. Next,
Wicks acknowledged that the scale of events in the region was not comparable with
the Nazi crimes of the earlier war. However, the overriding point made by Wicks was
that widespread knowledge of the atrocities being committed in the former
Yugoslavia had not stopped them from taking place. How, he wanted to know, had yet
another genocide been allowed to take place in Europe under the watchful eye of the
world's media. The incredulity demonstrated by Wicks in the extract does well to
serve as a summary to the responses raised in Parliament regarding the linking of
21 Malcolm Wicks (Croydon, North), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol:
259, Columns 634-637.
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events in the Balkans with what had taken place in Europe some fifty years earlier. It
demonstrates the way in which the television images of the atrocities in the Balkans
led to the Holocaust being used as a point of reference for the contemporary debate.
Whilst the word 'Holocaust' is specific to atrocities committed by the Nazis at
the time of the Second World War, the use of the terms 'genocide' and 'war crimes'
are used in a more widespread, general way. These terms were frequently mentioned
during the break-up of Yugoslavia, in order to offer comment on what was taking
place in the region. Interestingly and as has been mentioned, in contrast with use of
the word 'Holocaust', the use of these phrases to describe events in the Balkans was
not confined to the Labour Party back benches.
The Shadow Foreign Secretary spoke out on the issue of war crimes during a
debate on international peacekeeping later in the same month in 1993. In response to a
statement made by the Foreign Secretary, John Cunningham gave a detailed speech
commenting on events in the Balkans. With particular regard to the issue of war
crimes, including the mass rape of women, he gave his support for the Government's
calls to bring the perpetrators to justice:
I share the views expressed by the Foreign Secretary on the brutal crimes
of violence against women the former Yugoslavia. The organised,
criminal rape of women, which has taken place there must be condemned
and prosecuted as a war crime with the full vigour of international law.
Her Majesty's Government and the international community will have our
wholehearted support in their pursuit of the perpetrators of such crimes
against women, I urge them to continue their wholehearted efforts to
pursue the criminals, as I know that the Foreign Secretary is doing, and to
bring the full vigour oflaw to bear upon them.22
Prime Minister's Questions on 1 April 1993 was an opportunity for the Labour
leader to raise the issue of war crimes. John Smith expressed his concern at what was
22 Dr John Cunningham (Copeland), International Peacekeeping (Official Report, Hansard: 23
February 1993) Vol: 219, Columns 788- 790.
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taking place in Bosnia, and linked his position with the issue of enforcing sanctions
against Serbia.23
As with other debates that took place regarding the break-up of Yugoslavia,
participation was not restricted to those on the Parliamentary front bench: back
benchers also spoke in debates. In February 1993, George Robertson raised the issue
of war crimes during Foreign Office Oral Answers in the House of Commons. His
question was linked to the pursuit of justice against the perpetrators of the various
atrocities that had been committed in the region. He asked:
Is the Foreign Secretary aware that the House expects him to continue to
press for the continuing pursuit of those guilty of war crimes in the former
Yugoslavia? The whole world has been revolted by verified reports of
actions which clearly fall within the description of war criminality,
especially reports of the systematic mass rape of women in that area. For
the perpetrators of such obscenities there must never be a hiding placer"
The issue of meting out some type of Nuremberg style justice on those who had
committed crimes in the region, was reiterated by David Winnick who spoke in the
same debate. Winnick raised the coverage of the atrocities as they had been reported
by The Independent's Robert Fisk making specific mention of the torture and rape of
women in the region" Like Robertson, he suggested the idea of introducing an
international tribunal in order to deal with what had occurred in the former
Yugoslavia. David Winnick is an important back bench figure to highlight here. As
has already been demonstrated throughout this thesis, certain politicians spoke
regularly on the break-up of Yugoslavia, and associated issues such as intervention.
With regard to the issue of war crimes and the pursuit of justice in the region,
23 John Smith (Monklands, East), Prime Minister Engagements (Official Report, Hansard: 1 April
1993) Vol: 222, Columns 494 - 495.
24 George Robertson (Hamilton), Foreign Office, Oral Answers, Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard:
10 February 1993) Vol: 218, Column 967.
25 David Winnick (WalsaU, North), Foreign Office, Oral Answers, Balkans (Official Report, Hansard:
10 February 1993) Vol: 218, Column 974.
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Winnick is a Labour M.P. who consistently spoke out on this topic. This will be
demonstrated throughout this part of the chapter.
Speaking just under a fortnight later, David Winnick added his support to the
calls for war criminals to be brought to justice. His contribution highlighted the way
in which the attacks were not merely random, but were well planned and
systematicall y implemented:
Has my right hon. Friend seen the newspaper reports which demonstrate
that those terrible crimes - especially the rape of Muslim women - were
not committed on the spur of the moment but were organised deliberately
beforehand by criminals and gangsters? Some of the Serbian political
leadership who were involved must bear responsibility for the actions of
soldiers and criminals against women. I agree that those responsible,
including the people who took the decisions, should be held to account
and brought to justice."
The setting up of a war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was a further
parallel with the events that had taken place during 1939-1945. This point was raised
by Norman Godman in April 1993, during Prime Minister's Questions. He asked:
This is the first time since Nuremberg and Tokyo that an international war
crimes tribunal has been set up. Unlike Nuremberg and Tokyo, however,
is it not likely that the implementation of United Nations resolution 808
will tum out to be an exercise in futility? Has not the United States State
Department already labelled those murderous leaders, Milosevic and
Karadzic, as potential war criminals? Are they to be granted immunity
from war crimes proceedings? Who will apprehend the criminals? Will
British soldiers be involved? Will British police officers and lawyers be
involved? It is surely a charade."
Mention of the earlier judicial proceedings provided a shorthand for comparing the
atrocities that had taken place during the Second World War with what was then
happening in the former Yugoslavia. The earlier conflict was an easy reference point
to use in order for the speaker to emphasise what was currently taking place.
26 David Winnick (Walsall, North), International Peacekeeping (Official Report, Hansard: 23 February
1993) Vol: 219, Columns 790-791.
27 Dr Norman Godman (Greenock and Port Glasgow), Prime Minister: War Crimes (Yugoslavia),
(Official Report, Hansard: 1 April 1993) Vol: 222, Column 496.
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There has already been mention of the ongoing contribution to debates that
was made by another Labour back bench M.P. David Winnick. In a debate on the no-
fly zone in Bosnia, he again made clear his view of what was taking place in that
country. As before, Winnick brought mention of the Second World War into his
contribution so as to reinforce the significance of what was taking place in Bosnia:
Is the Minister aware that the imposition of a no-fly zone should be but a
minimum step by the international community, under the authority of the
United Nations, to protect those most at risk from continued Serbian
aggression and crimes, which are almost at the level of the sorts of crimes
committed in Yugoslavia during the second world war? Is the Minister
further aware that if such crimes and atrocities that he has spoken about -
and rightly deplored - continue, the international community will be
expected to do more? We cannot wash our hands of the terrible things that
are happening which are crimes against humanity. This country has a
responsibility, as does the United Nations_28
Of interest here is the way in which Winnick uses the events of the Second World
War in order to almost shame British politicians into taking action. Essentially his
argument is based on the point that the government had knowledge of what was
taking place in the region, and that it would be absolving itself of its responsibilities if
it did not make a concerted effort to improve the situation within the region.
Later in the same month, another familiar· figure from the Labour back
benches contributed to a debate regarding the events that were taking place in Bosnia.
Max Madden has consistently been seen throughout this study to have played a key
role throughout the break-up of Yugoslavia, speaking regularly on a range of issues,
such as intervention. On this particular occasion he raised the topic of war crimes in
Bosnia, and linked them to the atrocities of the Second World War. He asked:
When, in God's name, are the elected representatives of the people of
Britain to be given a full and proper opportunity to discuss in the House of
Commons, the evil genocide, murder and systematic rapes which are part
of the unmitigated aggression of Serbia? When will the House be given an
28 David Winnick (Walsall, North), No-Fly Zone (Bosnia), (Official Report, Hansard: 1 April 1993)
Vol: 222, Column 504.
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opportunity to speak for the people of Britain on the biggest crisis facing
Europe since the end of the second world war?29
Of continuing interest is the way in which memories of the Second World War were
used in order to shame politicians into action. The insinuation was clear; if nothing
was done to help those in Bosnia, then Britain's politicians would have the blood of
thousands of people on their hands. The implication being that their lack of action
would mean Britain abdicating itself of any responsibility in trying to resolve the
worst humanitarian disaster to hit Europe since the end of the Second World War. The
earlier conflict was thus used as a moral framework with which to define events
taking place in the closing decade of the twentieth century.
In the summer of 1993, David Winnick made a further intervention in the
House of Commons regarding the situation in the former Yugoslavia. In Foreign
Office questions, he raised parallels between the justice that was brought at
Nuremberg, and the war crimes tribunal that had been set up in order to deal with the
situation in the former Yugoslavia:
Does the Foreign Secretary accept that if, despite what he has told the
House, those who have been responsible for the terrible crimes against
humanity in former Yugoslavia are not brought to justice, that will
encourage the continuation of such crimes and atrocities time and time
again? Does he also accept that the framework established at Nuremburg
after the second world war is a good framework within which to try
people held responsible for such crimes against bumanity'r'"
Again, as with the previous examples that have been analysed herein, mention of the
Second World War provided a particularly powerful argument with which to support
the politician's call for intervention and justice for the area's victims.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the fiftieth anniversary of the ending of the Second
World War saw further mention of the parallels between the atrocities carried out
29 Max Madden (Bradford, West), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 19 April 1993) Vol: 223, Column
36.
30 David Winnick (Walsall, North), Oral Answers, Foreign Affairs, Yugoslavia (Official Report,
Hansard: 16 June 1993) Vol: 226, Column 850.
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during that conflict and the war crimes that were being prosecuted in Bosnia. In a
debate timed to coincide with the anniversary commemorations, Malcolm Wicks
raised the issue of the earlier war. Again, as with so many back bench M.P.s that
contributed to debates during the break-up of Yugoslavia, Wicks, as we have seen
throughout this thesis, was a regular participant in discussions on the region. He
offered the following observation:
We have also seen genocide against the Bosnian people - although not, as
has already been said, on the scale practised by Nazi Germany. None the
less, we are talking about evil and that is why, with others, I want to
remind the House about the challenge that this debate brings us, when
yesterday we were celebrating, and not only celebrating but remembering
and thinking through the implications half a century after VE day .....
That brings us back to our celebration of victory in Europe 50 years ago.
There have been celebrations and acts of sad remembrance, but learning
the full lessons of 50 years ago involves more than celebration and
humming along to well-known old songs. We must relearn the lessons of
1945 in a more complex post-war period.
Bosnia is a proud and democratic cosmopolitan society, particularly
Sarajevo, which I visited for three days at the end of 1993. It is a proud
and democratic city. The fact that it is still being shelled mocks our
pretensions of celebrating VE day and challenges our post-war hopes."
Firstly, Wicks discussed the parallels between the two wars. Whilst for him, the war
crimes perpetuated within Bosnia were not of the same scale as those orchestrated by
Nazi Germany fifty years earlier, the events within the former Yugoslavia still acted
as an unpleasant reminder of the atrocities that could occur in wartime. Secondly,
Wicks implied that there was a certain irony to commemorating the earlier conflict
whilst taking little action to minimise the impact of the contemporary war. As he says
towards the end of the extract, commemoration of the Second World War was
worthless if measures were not taken to show that lessons have been learned vis-a- vis
current events in the Balkans. For Wicks then, the lack of activity regarding conflict
resolution within the former Yugoslavia in many ways made a mockery of the
31 Malcolm Wicks (Croydon, North), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol:
259, Columns 634 - 637.
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commemorative events of the earlier conflict. Essentially he asked whether lessons
had been learned.
The use of the anniversary of V.E. Day coupled with the ongoing war in
Bosnia was used by David Winnick in a debate at the end of May, just a few weeks
after Wicks's comments. In his speech, Winnick mentioned the parallels between
Nazi war crimes and the ethnic cleansing that had been employed in the former
Yugoslavia. For him, both sets of atrocities were carried out against people whom the
aggressor viewed as being "inferior".32 In common with Wicks, Winnick made clear
that the scale between the two conflicts was very different. However, what was
significant was the way in which both politicians harnessed the commemoration of the
ending of the Second World War to highlight a current conflict, one which they felt
had not been properly acknowledged by the international community.
The final example to consider with regard to war crimes is a further comment
by Malcolm Wicks in October 1995. His question carne just over three months after
the ethnic cleansing that had taken place in Srebrenica:
Does the Foreign Secretary agree that, just as 50 years ago, Nazi war
criminals were brought before a tribunal and properly judged, so today
there should be no hiding place for those who have initiated war crimes,
be it the policy of mass rapes, of murder or of frank genocide? Can he
reassure the House that the Government are giving resources and support
to the war crimes tribunal and that, however senior within their regimes
those people may be, justice will be done?33
Wicks used the inauguration of the war crimes tribunal for Yugoslavia to reinforce the
parallel between events that had taken place in the last decade of the twentieth century
with what had occurred over fifty years previously. Again, his tactic was clear.
Mentioning the atrocities that had occurred during the Second World War did much to
32 David Winnick (Walsall, North), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260,
Columns 1038 - 1040.
33 Malcolm Wicks (Croydon, North), Oral Answers, Foreign Affairs, Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard:
25 October 1995) Vol: 264, Columns 1016-1017.
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emphasise the gravity of what had happened in Europe during the break-up of
Yugoslavia. The intervention by Wicks also reinforces the ongoing theme that has
been apparent throughout this thesis. Various Labour Party back bench M.P.s invested
a considerable amount of time in keeping the break-up of Yugoslavia on the political
agenda. As has been seen so far, these figures did their best to maintain a constant
source of pressure, both subtle and outspoken, on their own front bench and, perhaps
more importantly on the Conservative Government of the day. Although the Labour
Party front bench was also regularly present in debates demanding more action in the
region, Parliamentary protocol - and political practicalities- deemed it necessary that
the more high profile figures took a more measured approach.
Although Brendan Simms has argued how, in general, the Labour Party was
not as vociferous in its criticism of the Conservative Government as it might have
been, what has been shown here, and indeed throughout the thesis, is that there were
elements within the Opposition who spoke out regularly on what was taking place in
the Balkans.34 What this examination of the discussion of war crimes emphasises, is
that participation in debate was not limited to one part of the Parliamentary Labour
Party. Figures from both front and back benches spoke out: concern regarding the
wars of secession in Yugoslavia was not confined to a particular group of politicians.
The Shadow Cabinet tended not to mention the Holocaust in order to support or
strengthen their contribution to debates: the exception to this was Clare Short, who, as
has been demonstrated in this thesis, although holding a front bench position,
frequently adopted a more outspoken, maverick role. Aside from Short, use of the
term 'Holocaust' came from the back benches. However, Shadow Cabinet politicians
34 See "Chapter 7 - 'Emulsifying the Whole Affair': Parliament and the Public Sphere" of Unfinest
Hour - Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia for Brendan Simms's examination of the role of the
Labour Party in challenging government policy during the break-up of Yugoslavia. (London: Allen
Lane, the Penguin Press, 2001).
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used the terms 'genocide' and 'war crimes' in their speeches, and in doing so,
mirrored their colleagues from the back benches whose use of these terms was
designed to highlight the gravity of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, and
intensify their demands for a more effective intervention. The back bench politicians
who did use these terms were the people who were consistently calling for more
action, whether the lifting of the arms embargo (Max Madden), or those who had
spoken out in favour of air strikes (Malcolm Wicks). What this demonstrates then, is
that events which had taken place during the Second World War, were used as an
attempt to convince the Conservative Government that a much tougher position
should be taken in the Balkans.
USING THE PAST TO CONDEMN THE PRESENT
During the Second World War, aside from its involvement in that conflict, Yugoslavia
was also riddled with a civil war. The complexity of events of over sixty years earlier
was used by British politicians when debating the more recent turmoil within the
region. Broadly speaking, the focus in these Parliamentary debates was divided into
two areas: namely, mention of Tito and the Partisans; and secondly, the Ustase, the
fascist regime led by Ante Pavelic. For the population of the former Yugoslavia, the
events of the Second World War remain an extremely contentious issue. For more
detail of this period in Balkan history there are a number of studies available: Misha
Glenny, Stevan K. Pavlowitch and Mark Mazower are just three authors who have
written about the region.35 However, this thesis will focus solely on how the events of
the earlier conflict were appropriated by British politicians in order to substantiate
their contribution to debates on this topic.
35 Misha Glenny, The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers (London: Granta
Books, 1999); Stevan K. Pavlowitch, A History a/the Balkans 1804-1945 (Harlow, Essex: Pearson
Education Ltd., 1999); and Mark Mazower, The Balkans (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000).
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Early on in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, the spectre of the Second
World War was mentioned in Foreign Affairs Oral Answers in Parliament. A warning
was given that the fighting experience of the Germans in the area during that conflict
provided a stark enough illustration as to why it was important to exercise caution in
any intervention: "The Germans should recall their experiences in the area, when the
fighting tied down seven German divisions.,,36 This point refers to two different
issues. Many politicians viewed the German government as being chief architects of
the plan to recognise Slovenia and Croatia. This was demonstrated earlier in this
thesis, in chapter two, with the analysis of politicians and their responses to the role of
different international institutions. However, of importance to us here is the implicit
reference to the wartime experience within the former Yugoslavia. The Partisans, the
guerrilla fighting force in Yugoslavia, inflicted heavy losses on the occupying
German forces. The Partisans's knowledge of the mountainous area was to prove
incredibly problematic for the Nazi invading forces. The reference in Oral Answers
thus acted as a warning against either blindly following the contemporary German
government into action in the region, whilst implicitly mentioning the acts of some
sixty years earlier in making reference to Tito' s forces.
A similar message was given in Parliament almost four years after the
previous comments. This time the speaker was Tam Dalyell. As has been shown in
previous chapters, this Labour back bench politician played an important and regular
role in debates on the situation in Yugoslavia. In a wide ranging speech during a
debate on Bosnia, Dalyell made reference to a variety of points pertaining to the
history of the region. As with the previous extract, he made particular mention to the
Yugoslav experience during the Second World War. Additionally, Dalyell spoke
36 Merlyn Rees, (Morley and Leeds, South) Oral Answers - Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 18
December 1991) Vol: 201, Column 261.
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about the Cold War relationship between Stalin and Yugoslavia. Both points referred
to the military training of the Partisan units, and their ability to fight using guerrilla
warfare techniques:
What is an overriding problem, however, is that it is part of history that
Tito's deterrent to Stalin was not atomic bombs, let alone hydrogen; it was
the most powerfully trained guerrilla army ever We are coping with
their sons if not themselves, trained in the tradition of guerrilla warfare.
It is a formidable deterrent. I understand that it was such a deterrent that
Marshals Zhukov and Timoshenko told Stalin that on no account should
the Red Army take on those people, although in the eyes of Moscow they
were guilty of a deviant variety of communism.
I conclude that, unless we are prepared to impose a solution - and it will
involve more than the 37 German Panzer divisions that the Yugoslavs tied
down during the war - we are in no position for posturing. Whether or not
we lose face, we have to talk seriously .... 37
As with the previous speech, there was particular emphasis here on the fighting skill
of the guerrillas, with Dalyell suggesting that the descendants of the Partisans would
prove equally as adept, if needed, at holding their position in the tough terrain of
Yugoslavia. By linking in Soviet-Yugoslav relations during the Cold War, the back
bench politician does much to show the extent of the reputation enjoyed by the
Partisan fighters. The implications for any policy to be introduced in the last decade of
the twentieth century were obvious: take on these- fighters at your peril, not even
Stalin decided to confront the guerrilla forces of Yugoslavia. What this speech shows,
is the way in which one particular interpretation of historical events can do much to
considerably influence the present. Any politician of a younger generation than
Dalyell, with limited knowledge of the events that he described, would, after hearing
the veteran M.P.'s contribution, surely have thought twice about extending British
involvement in the region. Whether the back bench politician's assessment of the
current situation would be viewed as accurate or based on a hyperbolic description of
37 Tam Dalyell (Linlithgow), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 31 May 1995) Vol: 260, Columns
1048-1050.
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the reputation enjoyed by a fighting force some fifty years earlier, one cannot dispute
that his words reinforced the complexity of the situation in the former Yugoslavia.
Interestingly, in 1999, during the NATO air campaign against Serbia, Tam Dalyell
returned to the topic of the Second World War. To illustrate his opposition to the air
strikes, he made reference to the 'Blitz spirit', in order to demonstrate how the
military campaign could unite the Serbian population against the NATO alliancer"
This point reinforces the comments of Mark Connelly discussed earlier in this
chapter; namely, the way in which the earlier conflict continues to inform British
foreign policy." The fighting prowess of the Partisans in the earlier conflict was thus
used as a means to warn against intervention in the region.
There has already been mention here of the civil war that beset Yugoslavia
during the Second World War; for example, the fight between Chetniks and Partisans.
However, the impact of the fascist Ustase was also noteworthy in the debates held in
Parliament regarding the break-up of Yugoslavia. The link between the Ustase and the
Nazis was regularly explored by politicians during debates examining events in the
Balkans. A discussion on Bosnia saw Ken Livingstone raise the issue of fascism in
Croatia, and how that affected people's perception of the country. He said:
I am also struck by the fact that the apologists for inaction say that the
problem with the Croats is that they are all fascists and are on Hitler's
side. It is interesting that we are told that history seems to have started in
1940, because in the 1920s and 1930s people - including Members of
Parliament at the time - signed international letters condemning the
Serbian oppression of the Croats in Yugoslavia. There were protests when
the Serbian royal family, a member of whom was to become the king of
Yugoslavia, began assassinating and eliminating the political leadership of
the Croats. I condemn the Croats who lined up with Hitler as I condemn
the resulting butchery. However, let us not forget: they have been
38 Ann Schreiner, 'Humanitarian Intervention, the Labour Party and the Press' in Paul Corthom and
Jonathan Davis (eds.) The British Labour Party and the Wider World (London: I.B.Tauris &Co Ltd.,
2008) p207.
39 Mark Connelly, Op cit.
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subjected to two decades of oppression as a minority in Yugoslavia. We
must remember that when we hear these sweeping condemnations.i''
Striking about this passage is the way in which it summarises the various tensions and
difficulties that have bedevilled the region for so long. As can be inferred from any of
the works studying the history of the Balkans, it is far too simplistic to 'pigeon hole'
any national group in that region. This point is emphasised by this speech from Ken
Livingstone.
Further mention of Croatia's wartime past was apparent in a Parliamentary
debate that coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of Victory in Europe day. The
commemorative events that were planned in London were to be attended by a variety
of world leaders. Much controversy arose regarding the part that the President of
Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, would play in proceedings. He was a contentious figure
either widely supported and admired by Croats, or seen as a divisive nationalist leader
by those from countries that bordered Croatia. These sentiments were apparent in a
speech by Labour back bench M.P., Mike Gapes:
In view of the invitation to President Tudjman to come to this country to
commemorate the victory over fascism, will the Foreign Secretary study
an article in a Croatian magazine, called Magazine, by Dinko Sakic, who
was the commander of the Jasenovac concentration camp, where 10,000
Serbs died, from 1941 to 1945? That man describes Tudjman's
Government as a flowering of Croatian freedom parallel to the Pavelic
dictatorship, which was the ally of the Nazis.41
This politician's mention of the Ustase atrocities during the Second World War, was a
powerful means of focussing his fellow Parliamentarians on the nature of one
particularly bloody aspect of Balkan history. Linking any politician to the atrocities of
the earlier conflict was an effective way of making a point.
40 Ken Livingstone (Brent, East), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 29 April 1993) Vol: 223, Columns
1219-1220.
41 Mike Gapes (Ilford, South), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 3 May 1995) Vol: 259, Column 333.
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Just a few days later, Mike Gapes raised the issue again. During a debate on
the former Yugoslavia, he talked about how Tudj man had been part of the V.E. Day
commemorations in London. This was contrasted with an overview of the stance
taken by the Croatian president regarding the atrocities that had been committed in
that country during the Second World War, with particular emphasis given to the way
in which Tudjman had written about the Jewish population of the former Yugoslavia:
My hon. Friend mentioned Jasenovac camp and the book by President
Tudjman. I hope that he will confirm that the book, as I understand it,
includes an allegation that the Jewish people in Yugoslavia were in charge
of their own extermination in that concentration camp, and that it forms
part of an anti-semitic tinge to President Tudjman, which our Government
seem to have ignored in the past few years. They were prepared to invite
Tudjman here - a man who admired the fascist Pavelic Government - but
they did not invite anyone representing the partisans of Yugoslavia who
defeated Hitler and his armies.Y
What is clear here, in the extract from the speech by Mike Gapes, is that the shadow
of the Second World War loomed heavily over events in the Balkans during the
1990s. Franjo Tudjman's interpretation of events in wartime Yugoslavia was
controversial and led this Labour politician in particular to question the position taken
by the British Government in relation to its policy with the Croatian leader.
The role played by Croatia during the Second World War was further explored
by the back bench M.P. Robert Wareing in the same debate. He appropriated
Croatia's wartime activities to support the stance that he took against that country. In
a lengthy speech during the debate on the former Yugoslavia on 9 May, Wareing
spoke in detail about the collaboration of the Croatian Ustase with the Nazis during
the period of the Second World War. He was critical of the Government decision to
invite Tudjman to the V.E. Day commemorations in London. Additionally, he raised
the question of why no one representing the Partisans had been invited to the events.
42 Mike Gapes (lIford, South), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol: 259,
Column 616.
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Wareing then gave two examples of how figures from the wartime Ustase were being
rehabilitated into contemporary Croatia:
The Ustashi leader, Mile Budak, who was executed after the war for his
quisling activities, is now recognised in Croatia. Schools are named after
him; a commune in Zagreb is called after him, as are streets, squares and
other public institutions. He was recently described as a martyr and a
Nobel prize nominee in the 1930s - but he was, in fact, the ideologue of
the Pavelic state set up by Hitler in 1941.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, South (Mr Gapes) pointed out the
other day, in a private notice question, that one Dinko Sakic - the last
commander of the Jasenovac concentration camp - had seen fit to return
from exile in Australia. This war criminal, who was never brought to trial,
has returned to Croatia, and has said - according to a Dalmatian periodical
"I am proud to have been an Ustashi."
In the Zagreb journal Magazin, to which my hon. Friend referred, he said:
"I am proud of all I did. If! were offered the same duty today, I would accept it."
Those are the people with whom, unfortunately, we found our Ministers
associating during the VE day celebrations - celebrations of the defeat in
Europe of fascism, which had caused the deaths of many millions of
people in the second world war, including our own people.Y
Although this is a lengthy extract to include here, it is well worth studying in detail.
The shadow of the Ustase state loomed large in the new Croatia. Thus, the first figure
mentioned, Mile Budak, whilst being one ofthe leading figures behind the ideology of
the wartime regime was being rehabilitated into modem society in a way which would
have caused offence to those who had suffered under the NDH.44 The second figure
mentioned by Wareing, Dinko Sakic, the Jasenovac camp commander was a similarly
controversial person to add to the discussion. During the Second World War, the
Jasenovac concentration camp was the scene of the extermination of large numbers of
opponents of the fascist regime. The actual numbers that died in the camp are heavily
43 Robert Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May
1995) Vol: 259, Columns 616-618.
44 The NDH was the fascist regime, led by Ante Pavelic, which collaborated with Nazi Germany during
the Second World War. The bitter legacy of this period has been discussed by, amongst others, Michael
Ignatieff. In his account, he visited the region and explored the way in which the atrocities committed
some fifty years earlier continued to impact on the area. Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging
(London: Vintage, 1994).
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disputed by both Serbs and Croats. Michael Ignatieff has elaborated on the topic in the
account of his visit to the region:
Serbs maintain the figure is 700,000. There isn't a Serb village in central
Croatia which didn't lose someone in this place. Croats insist that the
number is no more than 40,000. Independent researchers have put the total
number of people exterminated at Jasenovac in the region of 250,000, but
no one can be sure.45
By including a mention of the Jasenovac camp in his speech, Robert Wareing
highlighted both the traumatic past of the region, as well as the disputes, both past and
present, that existed between Serb and Croat in that country. Of key relevance here is
the way in which, yet again, events of the Second World War period were brought
into deliberations on the events in the Balkans during the 1990s. Whilst one could
argue that this particular example coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the ending
of the earlier conflict thus it is unsurprising that the Second World War was
mentioned, it is still striking to see the significance and impact that international
relations from the 1940s had some fifty years later in debates that were taking place in
the House of Commons regarding the break-up of Yugoslavia.
Later in the same debate, held on 9 May 1995, Mike Gapes elaborated further
on the wartime situation in the former Yugoslavia. In a detailed description of events
in the Jasenovac camp, he outlined the casualty figures and the way in which the
Ustase had collaborated with the Nazis. Gapes linked the events of the 1940s with the
contemporary situation in the region. For him, anyone trying to understand the politics
of the area had to grasp what had taken place during the Second World War. This was
illustrated towards the end of his contribution to the debate:
Reference has already been made to the former second lieutenant, Dinko
Sakic, the final commander of that camp. From April 1945 onwards, the
Ustashi guards at Jasenovac toiled day and night to slaughter those still
surviving - Serbs, Jews and gipsies. They did so under the control of
45 Ibid, p22.
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Dinko Sakic. The killing stopped on 2 May 1945 only when Tito's
partisans finally liberated the area. Anybody who is thinking and talking
about events of the past week in Croatia has to understand that context.
When we hear talk of appeasement, we must understand that history and
that it is a little simple to associate the partisan-led, communist-led,
predominantly Serb partisan forces and their successors with the Ustashi
fascists of that period in quite such a glib way."
Apparent here, yet again, is the way in which the events of the past hung so heavily
over the contemporary situation in the former Yugoslavia. For Gapes, there were
striking parallels in the behaviour of the Ustase during the Second World War, and the
Croatian expulsion of the Serbian population from the Krajina towards the end of the
Balkan wars. Of particular interest in his speech is the way in which similarities of
behaviour were identified between different generations of the same national group.
This raises the question of how the Balkans were regarded by the British political
class; namely, were certain types of behaviour specific to the region and thus not
surprising, or was Gapes's argument that a cloud of history hung over the region
something that would be inappropriate to raise with regard to other countries. Of
interest to us here is the way in which the history of the region was used so heavily as
a means to explain - or understand - what was going on in the then current situation.
This use of historical parallel was one that occurred frequently during the period 1991
- 1995, the duration of the various wars of secession.
The idea of the Balkans being a place where violence was endemic, and
savagery inherent in the behaviour of the population is a theme which is explored by
Lene Hansen, in Security as Practice - Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War.47
She examines the way in which a 'Balkan discourse' featured heavily in the
comments made by politicians when dealing with the break-up of Yugoslavia. Hansen
46 Mike Gapes (Ilford, South), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol: 259,
Columns 637-640.
47 Lene Hansen, Security as Practice - Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War (London: Routledge,
2006).
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argued: "With the brutal violent continuity in place, the relatively peaceful co-
existence of the nationalities of the second Yugoslavia during the Cold War had to be
constructed as an anomaly, as something which broke the pattern of 'normal' Balkan
behaviour.,,48 Thus, politicians linking the contemporary conflict in the region with
the events of the Second World War were able to present the new conflicts as part of a
pattern of behaviour consistent with the area.
The fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War in 1995 provided
a natural reference point for those taking part in debates regarding the break-up of
Yugoslavia. As one would expect, the following extracts are all taken from
Parliamentary debates that took place in the summer of 1995, thus coinciding with the
commemoration of V.E. Day. Again, as with other topics examined so far, comment
was not restricted to just one strand or faction of the Parliamentary party. This will be
demonstrated herein, with analysis of speeches from members of both the front and
back benches.
During a debate on Bosnia in May 1995, the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Robin
Cook, raised a point regarding the events commemorating the end of the Second
World and the current situation in the Balkans. He asked:
On the conflict in Croatia, will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that
President Tudjman of Croatia is due to arrive here on Saturday to
represent his country at the Victory in Europe celebrations? Do the
Government still think it appropriate that the celebration of peace in
Europe should be attended by a Government who have just broken the
peace? If so, will our Government take the opportunity to impress on
President Tudjman that there must be no further military assaults on UN-
49protected areas?
48 Ibid, p107.
49 Robin Cook (Livingston), Bosnia (Official Report, Hansard: 3 May 1995) Vol: 259, Column 328
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The timing of the commemorative events coincided with a renewed Croatian
offensive which sought to drive Croatian Serbs from their homes in the Krajina.i" For
this reason, the presence of President Franjo Tudjman at the events in London was,
for Cook and others, a controversial move.
The anniversary of the ending of the Second World War was used by Cook in
a further speech just one week later during a House of Commons debate on the former
Yugoslavia. Cook used the commemorations marking the earlier conflict to highlight
the contemporary events in the Balkans. For Cook, there was a particular poignancy to
the two events coinciding: "[y]esterday the House did not sit as a mark of respect for
the 50th anniversary of peace in Europe. That gives added point to finding ourselves
debating today the outbreak of war in one part of Europe."sl Cook's sentiments here
tie in with the comments attributed to various speakers earlier, regarding war crimes
and genocide. Due to the fact that both conflicts were European - or started on that
continent - a theme regularly raised by politicians was that Europe should not allow
such atrocities to occur again. Of interest is the way in which the break-up of
Yugoslavia was discussed in a manner very different from other conflicts. For
example, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda was not debated in as much detail as the wars
in Yugoslavia. It is difficult to suggest definitive reasons for this; one explanation
could be that British politicians found the violent break-up of Yugoslavia more
shocking as it was happening within two hours flying time from London, and that it
was taking place on a continent where the memory of the Second World War held
more resonance.
50 Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin & BBC Books, first
published 1995, revised edition 1996) pp353-363.
51 Robin Cook (Livingston), Former Yugoslavia (Official report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol: 259,
Columns 589-592.
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Back bench Labour politicians similarly held forth on the topic of the timing
of the Second World War commemorations with what was taking place in the
Balkans. Robert Wareing, a figure who has featured consistently throughout this
thesis, commented on the presence of the Croatian President in London during the
commemorative events. He said:
I consider it outrageous that not only Tudjman but his vice-president were
invited to the celebrations here in London. They were not invited to other
capitals. Indeed, the Israeli President refused to meet the Croatian
president recently, when his country's delegation opened the memorial
museum of the holocaust in Israel. According to the New York Times, the
invitation to Tudjman to attend the opening of the holocaust museum was
an insult to 6 million dead Jews. It certainly was.52
Of interest here is the way in which the V.E. Day commemorative events in London
were used as a means to criticise the Croatian President and offer a commentary on
the stance that he had taken during the break-up of Yugoslavia. Tudjman, as has been
documented here earlier, was a divisive figure who was seen by his critics as having
reintroduced a fascist government into Croatia. Thus, as Wareing points out here, the
Croatian President's presence at a Second World War commemorative event was
controversial.
Speaking in the same debate, Malcolm Wicks also mentioned the juxtaposition
of commemorative events for V.E. Day with the conflict in the Balkans:
I rise to speak in the debate because, like other hon. Members who have
noted it, I too am struck by the coincidence that yesterday our nation
celebrated the 50th anniversary of VE day and today we are discussing the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia. It is a coincidence of timing that should
challenge us all and encourage thoughtful and sombre reflection about
where we are in Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia. It puts into context all
of the talk that we have heard recently about 50 years of peace in Europe.
In Bosnia, just two hours flying time from London, we find experiences
that mock our pretensions about the strengths of collective security in
Europe. 53
52 Robert Wareing (Liverpool, West Derby), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May
1995) Vol: 259, Columns 616-618.
53 Malcolm Wicks (Croydon, North), Former Yugoslavia (Official Report, Hansard: 9 May 1995) Vol:
259, Columns 634 - 637.
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Wicks's speech provides us with a useful summary of the points raised regarding the
fiftieth anniversary of the war's end and the break-up of Yugoslavia. He succinctly
highlights much of what has been discussed by the previous speakers analysed in this
chapter.
This examination of the impact of the events of the Second World War on the
debates that took place over the break-up of Yugoslavia highlights some interesting
points. Firstly, the majority of people who make reference to Yugoslavia's war time
past present a critique of the Croats and the atrocities committed by that national
group during the Second World War. This is especially evident when discussing the
visit of President Tudjman to the so" Anniversary commemorations in London. It is
that national group which seems to be singled out for negative attention by the
politicians; interestingly, the only M.P. to offer a broader reading of events is Ken
Livingstone. He gives a more detailed analysis of Croatian history in the years prior to
the Second World War. However, it would be wrong to infer from these remarks that
the Labour Party was pro-Serb. Whilst the examples that I have shown suggest a high
degree of anti-Croat sentiment, there is not a direct binary opposition. Instead, what is
apparent is much more subtle than that. There are no blatantly pro-Serb comments:
instead, remarks which single out another group focus on the communist Partisan
guerrillas who fought against the fascist Croat regime. Although there were large
numbers of Serbs within that group, their leader Tito, the post war leader of
Yugoslavia, was a Croat. This may seem a subtle point, but the nature of the Balkan
wars of the early 1990s, meant that few Labour Party back benchers, perhaps with the
exception of Robert Wareing, demonstrated overt shows of support for the Serbian
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cause. As Phythian has stated: "From the outset, it was clear that Serbia bore the
greatest responsibility for the destruction being inflicted on the region.t''"
CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown how events of the Second World War impacted on the
contributions that politicians made to the different debates that took place regarding
the break -up of Yugoslavia. Again, as with earlier parts of this study, comments came
from both front and back bench Members of Parliament. Indeed the only distinction
seems to be that members of the Shadow Cabinet tended to avoid making points of
comparison with the Holocaust. They restricted their comments to making
observations regarding 'genocide' instead. Whilst this could be described as being a
small distinction, it is perhaps noteworthy for the reason that more high profile
members of the Labour Party might have wished to avoid making comments that
could be viewed as controversial. The only exception to this was Clare Short, who, as
has been previously mentioned, is well known for taking a more individual approach
to politics than that of a conventional front bench politician. However, this difference
aside, what is apparent is that politicians from all parts of the Labour Party, both front
and back bench, harnessed the powerful issues of genocide and war crimes in order to
call for more intervention. Many of these same politicians used the image of the failed
appeasement policy of the 1930s when calling for tougher action. Indeed, this can
even be seen as the harbinger for the muscular foreign policy orchestrated by Tony
Blair in his subsequent premiership.
The Second World War experiences of Yugoslavia were also employed by
Labour Party politicians in debates. As has been demonstrated, there were a number
54 Mark Phythian, Op cit., P113.
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of remarks that could be described as anti-Croat, However, the politicians who made
these comments cannot be categorised as one group; speakers included those who
advocated a tougher policy in the region as well as those who did not support such a
stance.
Fifty years after its conclusion, the legacy of the Second World War was such
that it was used as a harbinger of the worst that could happen to the continent if
intervention was not taken in the former Yugoslavia. The power of the imagery from
the earlier conflict was such that comparisons were used so as to spur the government
into action. However, the longevity of the Balkan wars of secession shows that the
attempts to utilise the earlier conflict as a catalyst for action were futile. The thesis has
demonstrated that the Second World War cast a substantial shadow over
Parliamentary debates about the break-up of Yugoslavia. The impact of the earlier war
served to act as a catalyst for the debates which have been analysed herein. Lasting
memories and images of the Second World War were used as a platform on which to
offer opinion on all manner of issues; for many politicians, such knowledge was at the
root of the debates which determined topics such as intervention; thus, the conflict
was used as a framing device with which to inform the themes examined in the earlier
chapters of this thesis. 55
55 As a final footnote to this chapter, it is interesting to note that Brendan Simms's detailed study of the
break-up of Yugoslavia, which has been referred to throughout this thesis, is entitled Unfinest Hour-
Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 2001). 'Unfinest Hour'
is a clear reference to 'finest hour', the phrase used in Winston Churchill's famous speech to the House
of Commons in 1940.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis has examined the way in which the Parliamentary Labour Party responded
to the break-up of Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. There were a multitude of
different responses by Labour Party politicians towards the break-up of Yugoslavia.
This could be expected, especially when considering that this was the first major
conflict to affect Europe since the end of the Second World War. However, what has
been demonstrated herein is that there were a complex series of opinions and positions
in debates which cannot be easily categorised. It is far too simplistic to describe the
various splits and factions as being emblematic of a front bench and back bench
divide: that type of binary split would be expected. Instead, what is demonstrated
throughout the thesis is a complicated web of alliances and opposing views.
As one would perhaps expect, the Shadow Cabinet, that is the Labour Party
front bench, remained united on different aspects of policy that were discussed within
Parliament. Both front benches of the House of Commons tended to take a bi-partisan
approach to the break-up of Yugoslavia. What this thesis has demonstrated is that the
Labour Shadow Cabinet supported the Government's position, the only exception to
this being that they called for the implementation of air strikes slightly before Major's
Government. This assessment of the Labour front bench is shared by both Mark
Phythian and Carole Hodge. Phythian describes the two front benches as being "at
one."! Hodge offers a similar assessment, stating how John Cunningham spoke out,
"endorsing government policy" and that David Clark "confirmed Labour solidarity
with the government position.P'
IMark Phythian, The Labour Party, War and International Relations, 1945-2006 (London: Routledge,
2007) plIO.
2 Carole Hodge, Britain and the Balkans, 1991 until present (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) p43, p89.
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However, the back bench M.P.s present us with a wealth of different opinions
and positions, which were informed by a number of motivating factors. Many back
bench M.P.s remained loyal to the position taken by their front bench colleagues.
However, in tum, many figures within the Labour Party presented strongly held views
which were in direct contrast to the Shadow Cabinet. Tony Benn and Robert Wareing
would be two such figures. Throughout this study, Benn spoke very much in the
mould of a traditional old Labour figure, promoting strongly held beliefs in the role
and power of the United Nations. Robert Wareing, however, consistently
demonstrated a position informed by a stance of moral equivalence; he was reluctant
to align himself with anyone particular 'side' in the conflicts which he viewed as a
civil war. Opponents of the position held by the Shadow Cabinet then, were not
always informed by the same reasons.
To add to the complexity of divides and different opinions held in the Labour
Party regarding the break-up of Yugoslavia, it is important to state that some figures
that one would normally align together, that is, holding similar views and taken from
the same part of the party were often on opposing sides of debates. One such example
would be Tony Benn and Chris Mullin. Both figures are on the left wing of the party,
but held opposing views on the implementation of air strikes. Likewise, Tony Banks,
who would also be seen as being from the traditional wing of the party. He
consistently took a strong line in debates about action that should be taken in the
Balkans, very often calling for policies which were not promoted by the Labour Party
front bench.
The thesis has demonstrated that there was strong support for the role of the
United Nations. As one would expect with the Labour Party, this was very much the
preferred institution for bringing resolution to the conflicts. However, the failure of
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that body to succeed in the region, whilst not attracting criticism of the concept of the
United Nations, led some politicians to look towards NATO for bringing the wars to a
conclusion. Thus, it is possible to identify the antecedents of a 'Blairite' style
interventionist foreign policy apparent even before Tony Blair had become leader of
the party. In examining the way in which institutions were discussed by Labour Party
politicians during Parliamentary debates, it is also important to consider the impact of
the European Union on the proceedings. Whilst one would expect some kind of split
between Europhile and Euro-sceptic M.P.s, that is again, too simplistic a distinction. It
is fair to say that some figures used fairly colourful language when discussing the
failings of the E.U. and its attempts to deal with the break-up of Yugoslavia.
However, it is important to note that some critics of the institution's policy in the
region used measured language which did not demonstrate a natural antipathy to the
E.U.
An examination of intervention, and the different forms which this can take,
forms a considerable part of this thesis. What is clear is that it is relatively simple for
a party to gain broad agreement on general 'umbrella' terms such as 'humanitarian
intervention'. It is, however, much more problematic to get consensus within a party
on more specific, detailed policy examples. Thus, each of the different types of
intervention that were mooted at different points in the years between 1991-1995
received extremely varying responses from the party within Parliament. As is shown
throughout this thesis, the type of intervention suggested ran the whole gamut from
economic sanctions right through to military action, including the deployment of
ground troops. However, it is not possible to suggest a straightforward way in which
to label politicians speaking either in favour or against any particular policy. As has
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been demonstrated above, back bench figures were divided or, for that matter, united
on all manner of issues.
The legacy of the Second World War loomed large in Parliamentary
proceedings determining British policy towards the Balkans. Appeasement appeared
as a spectre, and was a useful tool with which to strengthen calls for more effective
intervention. Politicians, who mentioned appeasement in their speeches, were also
those who demanded more effective, strong involvement in the region; this group
included M.P.s such as Max Madden, Malcolm Wicks and Calum MacDonald.
Yugoslavia's troubled wartime past was also used within debates, and this increased
in resonance coinciding with the commemorations to mark fifty years since the ending
of the war. The wartime role of the different national groups within Yugoslavia was
used to inform debates regarding the present, particularly with reference to the
Partisans, and their military campaign against the Nazis. This was seen as a reason to
oppose intervention in the contemporary conflict; the lack of local knowledge about
the terrain would give any international coalition a severe disadvantage if engaged in
military operations. Thus, Tam Dalyell who spoke out regularly against any further
military intervention in the former Yugoslavia was one such figure to describe the war
time experiences of that country. In addition to this, Croatia's links to Nazi Germany
were used as means to raise questions on the current situation. A significant back
bench figure to talk about Croatia's fascist past, was Robert Wareing. As has been
demonstrated throughout this thesis, he frequently talked about the moral equivalence
argument with regard to intervention in the region. Using the contentious phrase 'civil
war' to describe events, he was anti-interventionist and unwilling to place sole
responsibility on one national group. As has been mentioned previously, he was
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viewed as having pro-Serbian sentiments, which were not representative of the wider
feeling amongst the Labour back benches of Westminster.
The impact of the Holocaust, genocide and war crimes was never far from the
debates when politicians were calling for more decisive action in the region.
Interestingly though, the Labour Party front bench did not use the Holocaust as a
means by which to demand further intervention in the region. Clearly, politicians such
as Cunningham, and Smith did not seek to employ the term 'Holocaust' for the
purpose of political debate. Using the term 'genocide' was a more generalised way to
describe events that were occurring in the former Yugoslavia, with slightly different
resonances to 'Holocaust'.
A final point of consideration demonstrated throughout the thesis is the way in
which Labour Party politicians regularly engaged in debates on a wide range of issues
regarding the wars in the former Yugoslavia. The House of Commons is frequently
criticised for its confrontational nature, and politicians are often viewed with little
esteem. However, what has been demonstrated here is that a large number of Labour
Party politicians spoke regularly on issues regarding the Balkans. The fact that these
M.P.s frequently contributed to debates on this particular foreign policy issue shows
that they had an interest and a commitment to events that were taking place in the
former Yugoslavia. Their motivation for doing so was varied, but their participation in
these discussions demonstrated a desire to be involved in informing policy on a topic
which, to many people, was of little direct consequence to Britain, although one could
perhaps argue that some M.P.s were influenced by constituency concerns. For this
reason then, Brendan Simms's comments regarding the failure of the Labour Party to
place pressure on the Conservative Government is unfair. Although there was no
concerted mass campaign by the Labour Party, certain individuals, for example, Max
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Madden, Malcolm Wicks, Tony Banks and Calum MacDonald, regularly spoke out in
favour of more decisive action in the Balkans. Of course, all of these politicians were
in the party of opposition, thus they had no chance of seeing their demands come to
fruition. By extension of this point, one could ask whether these same M.P.s would
have made similar contributions to debates if they had been in the party of
government and thus in a real position to implement more proactive policies. For
example, it is much easier to suggest military action when a political party is not in
power as they do not have the means with which to reach their goal.
The thesis has demonstrated that there are certain themes as outlined in the
literature review of chapter one which are pertinent to the findings herein. Firstly, the
works on Britain and the Balkans, notably by Brendan Simms and Carole Hodge
demonstrate that there was a lack of coherent policy implemented by the Conservative
Party, and that the Labour Party front bench was more or less in agreement with the
Government approach. However, this thesis differs from those two works in that it
demonstrates, in detail, that there was an ongoing participation and commitment,
specifically by back bench M.P.s, in arguing for a more proactive policy in the former
Yugoslavia. The second body of literature, that is, the examination of the use of
stereotypes when describing the Balkans, raises interesting questions for the findings
of this thesis. What has been shown herein, is that although, certain hackneyed
phrases and long held views were employed specifically regarding the Balkans, there
were also entrenched attitudes displayed towards other national groups, either in
Europe, or on a broader level, including the USA, via its membership of NATO. Thus,
Tony Benn was critical of any extension to NATO's remit within the region; by
extension, this would reflect his long held views on the USA and Russia. Likewise,
Dennis Skinner's assessment of Germany's role in the ongoing diplomatic activity
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also demonstrates a SuspICIOn or mistrust of another country. Thus, the use of
stereotypes within these Parliamentary debates, to describe either a particular country
or institution, was not necessarily confined to the Balkans. Indeed then, politicians
demonstrated a similar level of criticism or anxiety about a number of countries, or
institutions. The literature which outlines New Labour in office examines the party's
stance on international relations. This thesis shows how the more pro-interventionist
policies espoused by some back bench politicians in these Parliamentary debates can
be seen to have developed into a discourse close to the foreign policy of the later New
Labour government. As has been shown, although Tony Blair only became the leader
of the Labour Party towards the end of this period of study, his speeches already
showed a more concerted policy of strong intervention. The fourth group of literature
studied, that is, on the traditional approach of Labour Party foreign policy, also
resonates throughout this thesis. Those who spoke in debates opposing intervention
tended to be politicians who held most faith in the role of the United Nations, that is,
held a belief in the power of internationalism in foreign affairs. As was demonstrated
in chapter two, that is a key tenet of a traditional approach to left-wing foreign policy,
and was still effective in the 1990s.
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